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Market Fragmenting Regulation 
WHY GASOLINE COSTS SO MUCH  
(AND WHY IT’S GOING TO COST MORE) 
Andrew P. Morriss† & Nathaniel Stewart†† 
INTRODUCTION 
Virtually everyone holds an opinion on what is wrong 
with gasoline markets.  Some critics argue that gasoline costs 
too much, fattening greedy oil barons at the expense of 
consumers.1  Some link reducing oil producers’ profits to 
stopping terrorism.2  Others contend that gasoline costs too 
little, subsidizing suburban sprawl and gas-guzzling SUVs at 
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 1 See, e.g., Press Release, Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi, With Skyrocketing 
Gas Prices, Americans Can No Longer Afford Rubber Stamp Congress (Apr. 24, 2006), 
available at http://www.house.gov/pelosi/press/releases/April06/Rubberstamp.html 
(“With record gas prices, record CEO pay packages, and record oil company profits, 
Speaker Hastert and the Majority Congress continue to give the American people 
empty rhetoric rather than join Democrats who are working to lower gas prices now.”); 
Press Release, Sierra Club, Update on Congressional Action this Week on Several 
Environmental Fronts (Nov. 8, 2005), available at http://www.sierraclub.org/ 
pressroom/releases/pr2005-11-08.asp (discussing Sierra Club’s calling on Congress to 
“put money back in the pockets of Americans who need it, not in the coffers of 
multinational oil companies”); Surges in Energy Prices, The Nader Page, Mar. 13, 2004, 
http://www.nader.org/interest/031304.html (“The expanding volume of consumer 
dollars here are going to the oil industry.”). 
 2 See Gary S. Becker, Let’s Make Gasoline Prices Even Higher, BUS. WK., 
May 31, 2004, at 24, available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/ 
04_22/b3885046_mz007.htm. 
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the expense of the environment.3  Web sites track gasoline 
prices4 and grocery stores sell low-cost fuel to lure shoppers.5  
Policy makers debate whether gas taxes should be cut to lower 
the cost of living;6 need to be increased to make drivers pay the 
full cost of their behavior;7 or whether gas taxes should be a 
user fee for highway use.8  The Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC), congressional committees, and a host of state 
governments have repeatedly investigated gasoline prices, 
searching for someone to blame when prices rise. 
These debates treat gasoline as a fungible commodity, 
widely traded in a national or international market.  And for 
most Americans, gasoline gives every appearance of being just 
such a commodity—you can fill up in Boston or Dallas, Los 
Angeles or Cleveland, from pumps that look much the same 
from city to city, and your car will run without noticeable 
differences in performance regardless of where you bought gas.  
But Gulf Coast refinery closures in the wake of Hurricanes 
  
 3 See, e.g., Thomas L. Friedman, Seeds for a Geo-Green Party, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 16, 2006, at A31 (calling for a $1 per gallon gasoline tax to “increase the price of 
gasoline to a level that would ensure that many of the most promising alternatives—
ethanol, biodiesel, coal gasification, solar energy, nuclear energy and wind—would all 
be economically competitive with oil and thereby reduce both our dependence on crude 
and our emissions of greenhouse gases”); Jacob Weisberg, I Smell Gas, SLATE, Apr. 26, 
2006, http://www.slate.com/id/2140613 (“Cheap gasoline imposes its own costs on 
society: greenhouse gas emissions, air pollution and its attendant health risks, traffic 
congestion, and accidents.  The ideal way to cope with these externalities would be with 
higher gas taxes or a carbon tax.”). 
 4 See, e.g., UCAN’s Gasoline Price Tracking Service, http://home.fueltracker.com/ 
home.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2007) (providing low gas prices for San Diego County); 
GasBuddy.com, http://www.gasbuddy.com (last visited Apr. 12, 2007) (locator for low 
gas prices in the United States and Canada). 
 5 Kathy Showalter, Grocers See Gold in Gas, Add Discounted Pumps, BUS. 
FIRST OF COLUMBUS, June 12, 2006, available at http://columbus.bizjournals.com/ 
columbus/stories/2006/06/12/story3.html (describing trend toward subsidized gas prices 
as means of luring customers to grocery stores); U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE 
PETROLEUM INDUSTRY: MERGERS, STRUCTURAL CHANGE, AND ANTITRUST 
ENFORCEMENT 42 (2004) [hereinafter FTC, MERGERS] (stating that “the FTC observed 
significant growth in low-price gasoline retailing by supermarkets, club stores, and 
mass merchandisers”).  
 6 See, e.g., Russell Nichols, Bill Proposes Gas Tax Cut to Save 21 Cents a 
Gallon, BOSTON GLOBE, May 11, 2006, at B1, available at http://www.boston.com/ 
news/local/articles/2006/05/11/bill_proposes_gas_tax_cut_to_save_21_cents_a_gallon 
(discussing proposed temporary repeal of Massachusetts gasoline tax to reduce cost of 
living for “working families and small businesses”). 
 7 See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 3 (calling for gasoline tax increases). 
 8 David J. Forkenbrock & Paul F. Hanley, Mileage-Based Road User 
Charges, PUBLIC ROADS (Mar./Apr. 2006), http://www.tfhrc.gov/pubrds/06mar/02.htm 
(“For almost a century, the motor fuel tax has been the mainstay of highway finance in 
the United States.  This method has the advantage of being roughly proportional to the 
distance traveled and thus has the desirable attribute of being a pay-as-you-go form of 
user charge.”). 
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Rita and Katrina highlighted the fragility of gasoline markets,9 
and significant differences in gasoline prices throughout the 
United States over the last few years10 have raised questions 
about whether a national market really exists.  If the gasoline 
market is not a national one, there are serious implications for 
both consumer welfare and public policy.  Broad, national 
markets are able to absorb the impact of regulations at lower 
costs to the consumer than are narrow, fragmented markets.  
Moreover, fragmented markets offer the potential for implicit 
collusion among producers, collusion that can be facilitated by 
regulatory measures. 
A recent regional price spike in Phoenix, Arizona 
illustrated the fragmented nature of U.S. gasoline markets.  On 
July 30, 2003, the pipeline supplying gasoline to Phoenix 
ruptured, cutting gasoline supplies to Phoenix by 30%.11  
Phoenix gas stations sought alternate supplies from West 
Coast refineries, offering to pay higher prices to bid the 
gasoline away from California retailers.  These West Coast 
refineries had limited gasoline supplies, however, after earlier 
unplanned refinery closures had left them with lower than 
normal inventories.  Because the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) requires Phoenix to use a special blend of 
gasoline to control air pollution, gasoline from nearby Tucson 
could not be sold in Phoenix until the EPA waived the boutique 
fuel requirement on August 20.12  Once the waiver was granted, 
  
 9 See U.S. CONG. BUDGET OFF., THE MACRO-ECONOMIC AND BUDGETARY 
EFFECTS OF HURRICANES KATRINA AND RITA: AN UPDATE 19-20 (2005), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/66xx/doc6669/09-29-EffectsOfHurricanes.pdf (describing 
impact of Hurricanes Rita and Katrina on refineries); U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
GASOLINE PRICE CHANGES: THE DYNAMIC OF SUPPLY, DEMAND, AND COMPETITION 28-29 
(2005) [hereinafter FTC, GASOLINE PRICE CHANGES]  (noting that as a result of Ivan, 
crude oil production immediately fell by 83% and continued below normal for several 
months, with reductions in crude from Venezuela also occurring due to tanker delays 
caused by the storm). 
 10 CARL E. BEHRENS & CAROL GLOVER, CONG. RES. SERV. ISSUE BRIEF 
IB10134, GASOLINE PRICES: POLICIES AND PROPOSALS 1 (Oct. 27, 2005), available at 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/56862.pdf (In the five years before 2004, 
“gasoline prices demonstrated a great deal of regional volatility but less of an increase 
at the national level.”). 
 11 This example is drawn from FTC, GASOLINE PRICE CHANGES, supra note 9, 
at 1-6. 
 12 The delay was due to Arizona’s delay in requesting a waiver, not the EPA’s 
processing.  The waiver was requested on August 19 and granted on August 20.  Id. at 
3-4. 
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gas from Tucson was trucked to Phoenix, raising prices in 
Tucson but lowering them in Phoenix.13   
U.S. gasoline markets are fragmented and that 
fragmentation stems from over a century of often inconsistent, 
overlapping regulations of gasoline and petroleum markets.  
This article charts the sources and extent of that fragmentation 
and its likely effects on the domestic gasoline market.  We 
highlight the dangers of following the current regulatory trend 
toward additional fragmentation and recommend that policy 
makers and industry analysts acknowledge the market’s fragile 
condition and take remedial steps to avert future crises.  Part I 
outlines the characteristics of competitive markets and 
examines the structure of the gasoline market as shaped by the 
traits of gasoline, refining, distribution, and crude oil.  Part II 
turns to the regulatory measures that affect the market for 
gasoline, tracing the impact of economic and environmental 
regulation.  We then identify the incentives created by the 
structure of U.S. environmental regulation that lead to the 
creation of regulatory market externalities and we suggest 
measures to reduce those incentives and so avoid market 
fragmentation.  Part III concludes with recommendations for 
avoiding this problem in the future. 
I. COMPETITIVE MARKETS AND THE MARKET FOR GASOLINE 
The impact of regulation on gasoline markets can be 
understood only against the backdrop of the role market forces 
play in competitive markets and an understanding of the 
complex nature of gasoline production and marketing.  This 
section provides a baseline for our analysis of the regulatory 
market externalities created by economic and environmental 
regulations. 
  
 13 Id. at 5-6.  Tucson prices also rose because the pipeline passed through 
Tucson on its way to Phoenix.  The break, which was between the two cities, prevented 
the Phoenix-blend gasoline from being shipped to Phoenix, reducing storage capacity in 
Tucson and thereby reducing supplies in Tucson.  Id. at 6.  Although the waiver 
resolved the immediate problem, the use of waivers discourages investment in capacity 
to produce the boutique fuels, potentially worsening the problem. NAT’L PETROLEUM 
COUNCIL, OBSERVATIONS ON PETROLEUM PRODUCT SUPPLY I-19 (2004) [hereinafter 
NPC, OBSERVATIONS]. 
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A. The Role of Competition 
The United States was founded with an eye toward 
creating a national market.14  Preserving that national market 
thus enjoys a longstanding tradition in American 
jurisprudence—and with good reason.15  Economic theory 
teaches that markets discipline firms, forcing them to cut costs 
to compete and survive.16  Recent business news demonstrates 
that this is not simply a textbook concept: Wal-Mart has forced 
retail costs down;17 competition from Toyota and Honda has 
pushed General Motors to force its suppliers to drastically cut 
costs; and the competition from Southwest Airlines has driven 
passengers’ costs down significantly in many markets.18  This 
  
 14 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Elastic Commerce Clause: A 
Political Theory of American Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1355, 1369 (1994) (“In light 
of the nation’s experience under the Articles of Confederation, there was a consensus 
after the adoption of the Constitution that the federal government should be able to 
exercise national authority to facilitate a national market.”); see also Paul B. Stephan, 
Redistributive Litigation—Judicial Innovation, Private Expectations, and the Shadow 
of International Law, 88 VA. L. REV. 789, 820-23 (2002) (describing courts’ role in 
protecting the national market from “predatory localism” under the Constitution).  The 
Founders understood the importance of expanding the internal market beyond the 
borders of the individual states.  As Richard Posner has written, a key role of the 
Commerce Clause was to prevent states from erecting barriers to interstate commerce: 
“When so interpreted, the commerce clause becomes a charter of free trade—a subject 
of detailed economic analysis since Adam Smith—and, relatedly, an element of an 
efficient federalism.”  Richard A. Posner, The Constitution as an Economic Document, 
56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 4, 17 (1987); see also Robert G. Natelson, The Legal Meaning of 
“Commerce” in the Commerce Clause, 80 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 789 (2006) (analyzing 
contemporary sources and concluding that the Commerce Clause was intended to 
address commercial activity); Nathaniel Stewart & Andrew P. Morriss, Hedgerow 
Economics: The Marriage of Green Policy and Economic Regulation (working paper on 
file with authors). 
 15 See F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE 38 (2d ed. 1980) (“Over the long pull, there is one simple criterion for 
the survival of a business enterprise: Profits must be nonnegative. . . . [F]ailure to 
satisfy this criterion means ultimately that a firm will disappear from the economic 
scene.”). 
 16 F.M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND 
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 20-21 (3d ed. 1990). 
 17 See Steven Greenhouse, Mixed Grade for Wal-Mart on Report Card, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 5, 2005, at C4 (“A respected economic forecasting firm, Global Insight, 
found that by keeping its prices low and pressuring rival retailers over the last 19 
years, Wal-Mart has kept the Consumer Price Index 3.1 percent below what it would 
have otherwise been.”); Emek Basker, Selling A Cheaper Mousetrap: Wal-Mart’s Effect 
on Retail Prices 1, 28 (Univ. of Mo., Working Paper 04-01, 2005), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=484903 (finding price impacts on 
commodity goods from Wal-Mart stores opening). 
 18 See, e.g., Steven A. Morrison, Actual, Adjacent, and Potential Competition: 
Estimating the Full Effect of Southwest Airlines, 35 J. TRANSP. ECON. & POL’Y 239, 253-
54 (2001) (estimating savings from competition from Southwest at $12.9 billion in 
1998). 
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competition has costs for some market participants: Wal-Mart’s 
competitors have suffered from Wal-Mart’s low prices;19 
General Motors’ suppliers are fewer and leaner and their 
workforces are smaller and less well paid as a result of G.M.’s 
cost-cutting;20 and the major American “legacy” airlines have 
been regularly forced into bankruptcy, cutting their employees’ 
compensation by the upstarts.21  It also has benefits: retail 
customers, car purchasers, and airline passengers all pay 
substantially less as a result of the market pressures produced 
by competition. 
The competitive pressures in these examples derive 
from the breadth and depth of the markets in which these 
firms operate.  Because a bottle of a particular shampoo in 
Dallas is (aside from its location) identical to a bottle of the 
same shampoo in Boston or, for that matter, a bottle in 
Bombay, the market is deep.  Because there are many possible 
shampoos that deliver roughly equivalent hair-cleaning 
experiences, the market is broad.  As a result, Wal-Mart can 
buy shampoo to resell in a market that is both deep and broad.  
If a bottle of shampoo costs less in one location than in another 
(taking transportation costs into account), Wal-Mart can buy in 
the cheaper location and ship the bottle to the more expensive 
market.  If the maker of one brand raises its price, Wal-Mart 
can buy from a different manufacturer.  The same is true in our 
other examples.  If auto parts can be made more cheaply in 
Mexico than in Detroit, General Motors can obtain parts from 
Mexico instead of from Detroit.  If the profitability of airline 
fares is higher in one market than another, Southwest can shift 
planes from the market where the profits are lower to the 
market where the profits are higher.  Of course, by shifting 
resources to the higher-margin markets, market pressures 
increase in the more profitable markets as supply in them 
increases, and decrease in the less profitable markets as supply 
  
 19 See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, Wal-Mart, Driving Workers and 
Supermarkets Crazy, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2003, § 4, at 3 (“Wal-Mart has already 
helped push more than two dozen national supermarket chains into bankruptcy over 
the past decade.”). 
 20 See Jeffrey McCracken & Lee Hawkins Jr., Buyouts Promise a Big Boon for 
GM, WALL ST. J., June 23, 2006, at A2 (describing General Motors’ payment to workers 
to leave it and its supplier, Delphi). 
 21 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-04-836, LEGACY AIRLINES 
MUST FURTHER REDUCE COSTS TO RESTORE PROFITABILITY 41-44 (2004), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04836.pdf (discussing impact of low-cost carriers’ 
entry). 
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there decreases.  Over time, therefore, prices tend to converge 
across linked markets.22 
Consider the counterfactual: What if trade barriers 
blocked markets from expanding and deepening?  What if 
shampoo sold in Dallas were required to be formulated 
differently from shampoo sold in Boston?23  What if auto parts 
made in Mexico were subject to lengthy inspections when they 
were brought into the United States?24  What if airlines needed 
regulatory permission to fly between cities and that permission 
could be denied if allowing a flight would injure competitors?25  
These barriers to trade would fragment the relevant markets 
and reduce competitive pressures.  This would benefit existing 
providers of shampoo, auto parts, and air travel, as well as 
existing providers of other competing products, since the 
reduction in market pressures could allow market incumbents 
opportunities to charge supra-competitive prices or reap other 
benefits from reduced competition.  The costs of fragmenting 
these markets would fall on consumers, who would face higher 
prices for the goods and services.  Fragmented markets also 
raise important equity considerations, since consumers in such 
markets will face different prices for similar goods.26 
Curbing market forces has effects on more than price.  
Competition pushes firms to innovate in product design, cut 
costs in production, find new markets, and engage in a host of 
additional beneficial activities.27  As discussed below, 
  
 22 Before they actually converge, of course, new events may produce a new set 
of price pressures. 
 23 This is not entirely fanciful.  Guatemala requires sugar sold there to have 
vitamin A added, a requirement that serves no purpose other than to protect 
Guatemala’s high-cost sugar industry from imports.  See CANADIAN AGRI-FOOD TRADE 
ALLIANCE, EMERGING MARKETS: WILL CANADA MEET THE CHALLENGE? (Nov. 30, 2004), 
available at http://www.cafta.org/emerging_markets.html (listing fortification 
requirement as a non-tariff barrier to trade). 
 24 See Joel R. Paul, Do International Trade Institutions Contribute to 
Economic Growth and Development?, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 285, 295 (2003) (discussing non-
tariff barriers to trade). 
 25 See Richard D. Cudahy, The Airlines: Destined to Fail?, 71 J. AIR L. & COM. 
3, 8-9 (2006) (describing pre-deregulation control of routes by Civil Aeronautics Board). 
 26 Cost to Consumers of Deregulation of Crude Oil: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce, 96th Cong. 43-44 (1980) [hereinafter Cost to Consumers] (In an exchange 
over the impact of price controls in the 1970s on consumers, the then-Secretary of 
Energy, Charles Duncan, argued that uniformity of gasoline prices across the nation 
constituted equitable treatment of consumers.). 
 27 See, e.g., DANIEL YERGIN, THE PRIZE: THE EPIC QUEST FOR OIL, MONEY, 
AND POWER 549 (1991) (“Competition [in the 1950s and 1960s] took other forms 
[besides price] as well.  Never had motorists been better served.  Tires and oil were 
checked, windows were washed, drinking glasses and sweepstakes entry forms were 
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improvements in gasoline quality since World War II are 
largely attributable to “[i]ntense competition in the petroleum 
industry.”28  Similarly, the rapid rise in microprocessor 
capabilities in recent years tracks the fierce competition 
between Intel and AMD.29  Such innovations yield widespread 
benefits.  In the case of microprocessors, a wide range of 
products which incorporate microprocessors become more 
powerful and less expensive as microprocessors fall in price.30  
Markets also serve an important role as a discovery process, 
with prices revealing opportunities to market participants.31 
Competitive markets depend on the ability of firms to 
enter and exit product markets.  Perfect competition rarely 
exists outside the textbook, but the existence of rivals forces 
firms to innovate and compete even when competition is 
imperfect.32  Even the existence of potential rivals can be an 
important source of pressure on incumbent firms.33  Not 
surprisingly then, incumbents often try to prevent competition 
by seeking regulations that raise barriers to entry.34  By 
  
handed out—and all for free—in order to win and hold the affection of 
motorists. . . . Texaco also proudly assured its patrons that, for their benefit, it had 
gone so far as to ‘register’ all its restrooms throughout the forty-eight states.”). 
 28 NAT’L PETROLEUM COUNCIL, IMPACT OF NEW TECHNOLOGY ON THE U.S. 
PETROLEUM INDUSTRY 1946-1965, at 261 (1967) [hereinafter NPC, IMPACT]; see infra 
note 322. 
 29 See, e.g., Benjamin Pimentel, Intel Ramping up Competition with AMD, 
S.F. CHRON., June 8, 2006, at D1, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi 
?f=/c/a/2006/06/08/BUGA8JAT7F9.DTL (describing product quality and price cuts 
resulting from competition). 
 30 See Gordon Moore, Intel Keynote Transcript, Intel Developer Forum, Fall 
1997, http://www.intel.com/pressroom/archive/speeches/gem93097.htm (noting that 
drop in price of microprocessor performance has expanded range of products including 
processors). 
 31 See F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 
525-26 (1945). 
 32 The airline industry is an excellent example of the impacts of such 
competition.  Despite their desperate need to raise fares, the legacy carriers (American, 
Continental, Delta, Northwest, and United) have been forced to discount fares and 
restructure their businesses in response to competition from discount carriers such as 
Southwest.  See THOMAS PETZINGER, JR., HARD LANDING 317-33 (1995) (describing 
impact of Southwest Airlines). 
 33 See, e.g., Joel B. Dirlam & Alfred E. Kahn, Leadership and Conflict in the 
Pricing of Gasoline, 61 YALE L.J. 818, 826 (1952) (describing how potential competition 
limits market leaders in gasoline markets as “[a] good margin may tempt independents 
and majors, other than the leader, to cut price in order to increase volume. Implicit 
competitive influences of this sort may place very narrow limits upon the discretion of 
the leader, even though overt price warfare is sporadic.”); see also William G. 
Shepherd, Potential Competition Versus Actual Competition, 42 ADMIN. L. REV. 5, 15-17 
(1990) (describing potential competition theory). 
 34 See John S. Moot, Economic Theories of Regulation and Electricity 
Restructuring, 25 ENERGY L.J. 273, 273 (2004) (“Many forms of regulation . . . became 
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erecting barriers to entry through regulations, incumbents can 
deter new entrants and make supra-competitive pricing 
possible.  
Although the environmental law literature has 
traditionally focused on the special case of unpriced waste 
disposal services in analyzing market forces,35 market forces 
also have a significant role to play in reducing negative 
environmental impacts of production and consumption of 
goods.36  For example, even where disposal of wastes to the 
environment is unpriced due to the failure to fully specify 
property rights in environmental goods, disposal of a waste 
product represents the loss of any potential value contained in 
that waste product.  Increasing the efficiency of a production 
process, which by definition involves reducing waste 
production, allows a firm to produce more with the same or 
fewer inputs.   
Gasoline provides a classic example of this process.  
Initially, gasoline was simply “the portion of crude petroleum 
too volatile to be included in kerosene.  The first refiners had 
no use for it and often dumped an accumulation of gasoline into 
the creek or river that was always nearby.”37  Consumer 
  
suspect as creating barriers to entry and regulating price as a means of providing 
supracompetitive rents to producers, rather than correcting market failures.”). 
 35 See, e.g., Noah Sachs, Planning the Funeral at the Birth: Extended 
Producer Responsibility in the European Union and the United States, 30 HARV. ENVTL. 
L. REV. 51, 56-57 (2006) (criticizing products whose price does not take into account the 
cost of disposing of their waste, noting that “[i]n this zero-price disposal market, 
neither manufacturers nor consumers have any incentive to reduce waste generation or 
packaging or to consider the costs of disposal in production or consumption decisions”). 
 36 See, e.g., TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, FREE MARKET 
ENVIRONMENTALISM (2d ed. 2001); TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, ENVIRO-
CAPITALISTS (1997). 
 37 JAMES G. SPEIGHT, THE CHEMISTRY AND TECHNOLOGY OF PETROLEUM 567 
(3d ed. 1999) [hereinafter SPEIGHT, CHEMISTRY]. When increasingly sophisticated 
cracking operations increased gasoline yields in the 1930s, they also increased 
byproduct gases, which initially had no economic value and were simply disposed of by 
venting or burning.  PAUL H. GIDDENS, STANDARD OIL COMPANY (INDIANA): OIL 
PIONEER OF THE MIDDLE WEST 32 (Arno Press 1976) (1955) (“the quantity of these 
byproduct gases increased until their disposal became an economic problem”).  
Polymerization processes enabled refineries to turn these gases from wastes to 
valuable octane-enhancing feedstocks.  Id.  More generally, Miller and Shea’s 1941 
review concluded that “[t]he constant practical application of chemical and engineering 
research to refining operations has resulted not only in improvement of products to 
meet changing conditions and requirements but in the reduction of waste in processing 
and in the manufacture of an almost infinite variety of products.”  H.C. MILLER & G.B. 
SHEA, NAT’L RES. PLANNING BD., TECHNICAL PAPER NO. 3, GAINS IN OIL AND GAS 
PRODUCTION REFINING AND UTILIZATION TECHNOLOGY 36 (1941).  Refineries continue 
to find ways to reduce costs by making use of waste products.  See Eric Martin, 
Environmental Protection, in 2 MODERN PETROLEUM TECHNOLOGY 197, 209 (Alan G. 
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demand, generated by the rising automobile industry,38 
transformed gasoline into a highly valued commodity.39  By 
1900, demand for gasoline exceeded the quantities previously 
produced by distillation and chemical engineers began 
experimenting with “cracking” crude (using heat to boost 
gasoline yields at the expense of the kerosene yield)40 and 
“widening the cut” of gasoline.41  Ten years later, kerosene was 
no longer the most important product42 and refiners were 
worried about a shortage of gasoline.43  Production yields 
captured the magnitude of the change: In 1880, 100 barrels of 
crude produced, on average, 75.2 barrels of kerosene and 10.3 
barrels of gasoline, while in 1940, the same 100 barrels yielded 
an average of 40 to 50 barrels of gasoline, but only 5.5 barrels 
of kerosene.44 
Thus, in the presence of incompletely specified property 
rights to environmental goods, market forces sometimes 
provide an incentive to dispose of waste products in ways that 
potentially damage the environment.  This is best viewed, 
however, as a special case caused by the failure to completely 
specify property rights, rather than as the paradigmatic case.  
The general market incentive is to reduce waste, an incentive 
which is greater when the cost of waste disposal is positive 
than when it is zero.45  The incentive to reduce waste exists 
  
Lucas ed., 2000) (stating that “[t]he optimum place to recover wastes is within the 
refinery itself” and listing examples). 
 38 U.S. auto sales doubled “approximately every two years” between 1900 and 
1916.  YVETTE TAMINIAU, ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE 57 (2001). 
 39 U.S. DEP’T OF COM., OFF. OF DOMESTIC COM., INDUS. SERIES NO. 73, 
UNITED STATES PETROLEUM REFINING: WAR AND POSTWAR 14 (1947) [hereinafter 
USDOC, WAR AND POSTWAR] (“Demand for gasoline arising from the increased use of 
the automobile was the principal force behind the increasingly complicated refining 
technology and larger percentage conversion of crude oil to gasoline.”). 
 40 WILLIAM L. LEFFLER, PETROLEUM REFINING IN NONTECHNICAL LANGUAGE 
4 (3d ed. 2000); see also YERGIN, supra note 27, at 111-12 (describing invention and 
commercialization of cracking). 
 41 This was done by raising the gasoline fraction to include hydrocarbons 
with boiling points up to 250 degrees Celsius rather than only up to 140 degrees 
Celsius.  TAMINIAU, supra note 38, at 57. 
 42 GIDDENS, supra note 37, at 33. 
 43 Id. at 140 (“One of the most urgent and important problems confronting 
the petroleum industry in 1909 was the rapidly growing demand for 
gasoline. . . . [A]lert refiners realized that, at the rate gasoline was being consumed by 
1909, the normal supply would soon be inadequate and prices would skyrocket.”). 
 44 MILLER & SHEA, supra note 37, at 27. 
 45 Some critics of market processes object to the tendency of markets to 
provide individuals with consumer goods, arguing that consumption itself is 
problematic.  See, e.g., BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE: WHY MORE IS LESS 
221 (2004) (“Having too many choices produces psychological distress, especially when 
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even in the limited case of free disposal, however, because the 
waste itself has potential value that is lost when it is discarded, 
as early refiners learned in the case of gasoline. 
Despite its beneficial social effects, competition is costly 
for market participants, so many prefer to avoid it.  If 
participants in a market can arrange to collude, they can 
reduce competition and increase their profits, perhaps even 
approaching what a monopolist would earn.46  Collusion on 
prices is, of course, illegal.47  Monopoly profits are so desirable, 
however, that market participants sometimes attempt 
alternative methods that allow collusion without explicit 
agreements.48  Where it avoids the attention of antitrust 
authorities, such implicit collusion can result in higher prices 
and reduced output.49 
Difficulties for the would-be cartel go beyond avoiding 
antitrust authorities, however.  By undercutting the cartel 
price slightly, a cheating member can greatly expand output 
and so gain greater revenue—provided, of course, that the 
chiseling goes undetected and unpunished by the rest of the 
cartel.50  Because all cartel members face this incentive, a cartel 
without an effective enforcement mechanism will quickly 
unravel as members cheat the price down to the competitive 
price.  Thus, a cartel will only succeed if it can effectively 
monitor its members’ behavior and punish those who cheat.51  
Of course, antitrust law restricts explicit contracts in aid of 
cartels, and would-be oligopolists must resort to less effective, 
  
combined with regret, concern about status, adaptation, social comparison, and 
perhaps most important, the desire to have the best of everything—to maximize.”).  
Because such criticisms rest on a presumption that a minority is entitled to dictate its 
preferences to the majority, however, we do not address them here. 
 46 See JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 239-62 
(1988) (summarizing literature on tacit collusion); Alexis Jacquemin & Margaret E. 
Slade, Cartels, Collusion, and Horizontal Merger, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL 
ORGANIZATION 415, 417-18 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989) 
(“Sellers who recognize their mutual interdependence will have an incentive to 
cooperate as long as the profit which each can obtain when acting jointly is higher than 
when they act independently.”). 
 47 See Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). 
 48 See DAVID M. KREPS, A COURSE IN MICROECONOMIC THEORY 524-26 (1990) 
(explaining economics of implicit collusion). 
 49 See id. at 528-29 (discussing GE-Westinghouse implicit collusion in the 
turbine generator market in the 1960s). 
 50 See Jacquemin & Slade, supra note 46, at 420-21 (summarizing literature 
on incentive to cheat).  There is some evidence that this occurs in the crude oil market, 
with OPEC functioning only imperfectly as a cartel.  See FTC, GASOLINE PRICE 
CHANGES, supra note 9, at 23. 
 51 Jacquemin & Slade, supra note 46, at 417. 
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more expensive, indirect methods of maintaining a cartel.  
Such methods can be effective and allow cartel members to 
escape legal sanctions, in some cases.52 
Firms that wish to avoid competition must find a 
substitute for explicit contracts that allows them to coordinate 
their pricing behavior.53  This is difficult, but coordinating 
behavior can occur even in the absence of legally enforceable 
restrictions.  Such efforts are simpler with fewer competitors.54  
(If the cartel is successful at earning supra-competitive profits, 
those profits will attract new rivals.55)  Regulations can play an 
important role here, as they can aid cartels by helping them 
restrain output by assisting informal cooperation by members.56 
  
 52 See id. at 453 (discussing evidence of collusive bidding practices in 
government auctions); id. at 443 (listing “cement, drugs, dyes, lumber, theaters, and 
tobacco” as industries that may exhibit “conscious parallelism”). 
 53 Id. at 429 (discussing the “phases of the moon” strategy used in one cartel 
to allocate low bid privileges).  Critics of the oil industry continue to believe such 
behavior explains much of the industry’s conduct.  For example, a U.S. labor union 
seeking to ensure that “a far higher proportion of the international tanker fleet 
bringing petroleum to the United States should consist of American ships with 
American crews,” commissioned a study of the oil industry aimed at proving that 
“[t]here is a hard core of joint action and control in the oil industry surrounded at its 
periphery by semi-independent fiefdoms which offer a somewhat deceptive patina of 
truly independent competition.”  STANLEY H. RUTTENBERG & ASSOC., INC., THE 
AMERICAN OIL INDUSTRY: A FAILURE OF ANTI-TRUST POLICY, at iii-iv (1973). 
 54 Jacquemin & Slade, supra note 46, at 421.  See also ELLIS W. HAWLEY, THE 
NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY: A STUDY IN ECONOMIC AMBIVALENCE 114 
(1995) (“Generally speaking, the difficulties of maintaining and enforcing cartel 
arrangements were greatly enhanced in industries that were made up of a large 
number of units producing a variety of unstandardized products, particularly where 
limitations upon entry were slight.”). 
 55 Jacquemin & Slade, supra note 46, at 421 (“A cartel . . . contains the seeds 
of its own undoing.”). 
 56 Among the best-known examples of regulations with this effect are the 
industry codes legalized and promoted for a time by the National Recovery 
Administration (NRA) during the New Deal.  See LEVERETT S. LYON ET AL., THE 
NATIONAL RECOVERY ADMINISTRATION: AN ANALYSIS AND APPRAISAL 551 (1972) 
(“Among the avowed purposes of the National Industrial Recovery Act none stands out 
more clearly than the declaration of intention to revise the nature of competition in 
American business. . . . As a consequence of this purpose of the law, NRA codes have 
contained, either under the title of trade practices or otherwise, provisions designed to 
regulate trade activities.  Indeed the codes are called codes of fair competition.”).  Given 
the opportunity to write legally enforceable rules governing competitive behavior, 
“business domination of the code-writing process was virtually inevitable” considering 
the significant rewards of institutionalizing limits to competition for market 
incumbents.  HAWLEY, supra note 54, at 56.  See also LYON ET AL., supra, at 568 
(“[U]nder the terms of the law [business interests] were practically invited to find out 
what they could secure with the trust laws in abeyance.”).  The codes reduced 
competition as the NRA generally “seemed willing to go along with the rationale of 
trade association secretaries and business planners, to accept the ideal of ‘industrial 
self-government’ and to allow a substantial measure of cartelization.”  HAWLEY, supra 
note 54, at 66.  See also DAVID M. KENNEDY, THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN THE GREAT 
DEPRESSION 184 (1999) (Codes cartelized “huge sectors of American industry.”).  See 
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This brief survey of the impacts of market forces 
suggests three issues to consider in our examination of 
regulation’s effect on gasoline markets.  First, competitive 
forces exert more influence as the number of competitors 
increases, raising the question of whether gasoline regulations 
have reduced the number of competitors in the gasoline 
market.  In particular, incumbent firms will naturally seek to 
erect barriers to entry, making it important to consider the 
impact of regulations on entry.  Second, competitive forces 
exert more influence as the goods traded in markets become 
more like commodities, and so are more readily substituted for 
one another.  We must therefore look to see if regulations 
inhibit the commodification of gasoline.  Third, cartels face a 
serious enforcement problem when they cannot directly collude.  
We should therefore examine whether regulations create 
conditions under which refiners’ profit-maximizing behavior 
results in tacit collusion without open violations of antitrust 
laws.  We now turn to the particulars of the gasoline market 
and their influence on how these forces operate. 
B. The Market for Gasoline 
Like most markets, the gasoline market is not perfectly 
competitive even without taking into account the impact of 
economic and environmental regulations.57  The two questions 
that must be answered are: first, whether the gasoline market 
so diverges from the textbook ideal as to demand regulatory 
intervention to increase competitiveness; and second, whether 
regulation has increased or decreased the market’s 
competitiveness.  We begin with the features of the market 
created by the technical characteristics of gasoline, refining, 
distribution, and crude oil.  Perhaps the most important overall 
development in refining is the trend toward fewer, larger, more 
capital-intensive refineries.  As we shall see, this trend is 
  
also LYON ET AL., supra, at 620 (“[T]he NRA has, through several devices and in a wide 
range of industries, shifted an important measure of control over prices away from 
individual determination and increased the degree of influence and control of 
industrial groups.”).  See also id. at 705-15 (discussing contemporary criticism of the 
NRA for fostering monopoly). 
 57 See Severin Borenstein & Andrea Shepard, Sticky Prices, Inventories, and 
Market Power in Wholesale Gasoline Markets 1-2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working 
Paper No. 5468, 1996) (describing price stickiness); FTC, GASOLINE PRICE CHANGES, 
supra note 9, at 41-43 (same). 
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partially the result of the nature of gasoline production and 
distribution. 
1. Crude Oil’s Impact on the Market for Gasoline 
“U.S. refiners compete with refiners all around the 
world to obtain crude oil.”58  As a result, world market trends 
have important impacts on U.S. gasoline supply by affecting 
the price,59 amount, and type of oil that U.S. refineries can 
obtain.60  Because what can be produced in a refinery depends 
in part on the type of crude oil used as an initial feedstock, the 
market for crude affects the market for gasoline. 
Crude oil is a complex mixture of hydrocarbons with a 
variety of characteristics relevant to gasoline production 
including density, sulfur content, pour point, carbon residue, 
salt content, nitrogen content, metals content, and boiling 
range.61  Crude’s qualities vary considerably depending on its 
source.62  Characteristics of a particular crude may make it 
  
 58 FTC, GASOLINE PRICE CHANGES, supra note 9, at 13. 
 59 Id. at 15 (“Variation in the price of crude oil drives most of the variation in 
the price of gasoline.”).  The FTC found that changes in crude prices accounted for 85% 
of the variation in gasoline prices between 1984 and January 2005.  Id.  See also NAT’L 
PETROLEUM COUNCIL, U.S. PETROLEUM REFINING: ASSURING THE ADEQUACY AND 
AFFORDABILITY OF CLEANER FUELS, at C-7 (2000) [hereinafter NPC, ADEQUACY] (“The 
characteristics of the crude oil feedstock are critical to process selection.  There are 
hundreds of crude oils available on the world market today that vary widely in physical 
properties.”). 
 60 Those inclined to see conspiracies behind oil issues should note that 
estimates of the concentration of the oil industry range from “very low” to “moderately 
concentrated,” depending on whether all nominally independent oil firms are 
considered independent in fact or whether OPEC is considered a single producer (as it 
would be if the cartel functioned perfectly).  See FTC, GASOLINE PRICE CHANGES, supra 
note 9, at 21.  In particular, the FTC’s 2005 review of the oil industry concluded that 
“[m]ajor private oil companies, both individually and collectively, control only a very 
small share of world crude oil production.”  Id. at 22. 
 61 JAMES H. GARY & GLENN E. HANDWERK, PETROLEUM REFINING: 
TECHNOLOGY AND ECONOMICS 22-26 (4th ed. 2001); NAT’L PETROLEUM COUNCIL, 
FACTORS AFFECTING U.S. PETROLEUM REFINING: A SUMMARY 53 (1973) [hereinafter 
NPC, FACTORS AFFECTING] (“Crude oil is a substance comprised of a very complex 
mixture of hydrocarbons, which are molecules consisting almost solely of carbon and 
hydrogen atoms in various arrangements.  Crude oil contains thousands of different 
molecules of varying sizes . . . .”); FTC, GASOLINE PRICE CHANGES, supra note 9, at 17 
(“Crude oils from different fields usually have different chemical properties, including 
differences in density and sulfur content.”); SPEIGHT, CHEMISTRY, supra note 37, at 244 
(“It is now generally recognized that the name petroleum does not describe a 
composition of matter but rather a mixture of various organic compounds that includes 
a wide range of molecular weights and molecular types which exist in balance with 
each other.” (citation omitted)). 
 62 SPEIGHT, CHEMISTRY, supra note 37, at 215 (“Petroleum is not a uniform 
material. In fact, its chemical and physical (fractional) composition can vary not only 
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unsuitable or more costly for particular refineries and more or 
less expensive to formulate into gasolines with specific 
characteristics.63  For example, refineries are often designed to 
process particular types of crude oil and cannot easily change 
to a different type (e.g., from lower to higher-sulfur crude) 
without extensive and expensive modifications.64  The FTC 
considers the technological capabilities of refineries to process 
particular types of crudes relevant to its antitrust analysis of 
proposed mergers in the oil industry.65  Indeed, refineries differ 
so significantly that some analysts suggest that it is not even 
meaningful to attempt to describe an “average” refinery.66 
Crude oil supplies have shifted toward higher-sulfur 
crude of the type supplied by Saudi Arabia, and away from the 
lower-sulfur crudes that typified West Texas Intermediate.67  
  
with the location and age of the oil field but also with the depth of the individual 
well.”). 
 63 Carl Mortished, Western Refineries Spurning Sulphurous Saudi Oil, TIMES 
(London), Sept. 16, 2005, at 52, available at http://www.energybulletin.net/print. 
php?id=8949 (“Few refineries are able to convert” high-sulfur Saudi oil into low-sulfur 
gasolines required by U.S. environmental regulations.); NAT’L PETROLEUM COUNCIL, 
PETROLEUM REFINING IN THE 1990S: MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT 
15 (1991) [hereinafter NPC, 1990S] (“The kind of crude oil, other raw materials, and the 
wide array of processing units employed in its manufacture will determine the gasoline 
batch composition.”); FTC, GASOLINE PRICE CHANGES, supra note 9, at 17 (“[R]efineries 
are usually designed to be most productive using a specific range of crude oil.  When 
they substitute other types of crude, their efficiency and productivity will decline.”); 
NPC, FACTORS AFFECTING, supra note 61, at 13 (“A change in the type of crude oil 
available to a refinery will affect the capacity of the refinery to process crude oil.  Many 
refineries are designed to process low-sulfur crude oils and would soon become 
inoperable if significant volumes of high-sulfur crude oils were processed.”).  Even as 
early as the 1950s, some refineries were specifically designed for particular foreign oil 
sources.  DOUGLAS R. BOHI & MILTON RUSSELL, LIMITING OIL EXPORTS: AN ECONOMIC 
HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 44 (1978).  
 64 NPC, FACTORS AFFECTING, supra note 61, at 4 (“A given refinery cannot 
effectively process every type of crude oil.  If a refinery processes a type of crude oil for 
which it was not designed, the effective throughput capacity of the refinery will in 
many cases be reduced substantially. . . . High-sulfur crude oil . . . cannot be 
exclusively processed in a domestic refinery designed for low-sulfur crude oil without 
the installation of additional facilities and/or extensive modification of existing 
facilities to prevent corrosive damage and to meet product specifications.”).  When 
energy policies have dictated reallocation of crude supplies among refineries, the task 
has proven to be a challenge.  See infra notes 433-44. 
 65 FTC, MERGERS, supra note 5, at 24. 
 66 NPC, FACTORS AFFECTING, supra note 61, at 55. 
 67 JAMES G. SPEIGHT & BAKI ÖZÜM, PETROLEUM REFINING PROCESSES 27 
(2002) (“In a more general sense, the average quality of crude oil has become worse in 
recent years.  This is reflected in a progressive decrease in API gravity and a rise in 
sulfur content.” (citations omitted)).  Lower-sulfur crudes are referred to as “sweet” and 
higher-sulfur crudes are termed “sour.”   
 
954 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:3 
 
This shift in crude supplies has occurred at the same time as 
the demand for lower sulfur content in gasoline has increased 
due to environmental regulations.  As a result, many smaller 
refineries optimized for low-sulfur crudes shut down rather 
than incur the cost of modifications to handle high-sulfur 
crudes.68   
Crude prices also affect refinery operations.  The price 
of crude oil fluctuates based on a wide variety of international 
and political events, seasonal demand, and other factors, with 
the price of crude determined in the global market.69  Changes 
in relative prices between crude and refinery products have 
substantial effects on individual refineries’ profitability, and 
these effects can differ greatly depending on the characteristics 
of the refinery.70  As a result, particular refiners may 
experience economic conditions that reduce their profitability, 
even as other refiners continue to make money, producing 
temporary or permanent shutdowns or product mix changes. 
The evolution of the crude oil market also influenced 
refinery location.  Refineries were initially located near oil 
fields but soon came to be located closer to the markets for 
their products, in part because of security concerns that 
developed during World War I,71 and in part because of supply 
  
Typical sweet crudes are West Texas Intermediate (the popular, traded crude 
on the New York Mercantile Exchange), most Louisiana and Oklahoma 
crudes, North Sea, and Nigerian crudes.   
Sour crudes include Alaska North Slope, Venezuelan, and West Texas.  Sour 
from fields like Yates and Wasson.   
Intermediate crudes include California Heavy, such as from the San Joaquin 
Valley and many of the Middle East crudes. 
LEFFLER, supra note 40, at 17. 
 68 NPC, FACTORS AFFECTING, supra note 61, at 16.  Sulfur comes bound with 
the hydrocarbons and is released when the hydrocarbons are burned, creating “one of 
several smelly or otherwise environmentally objectionable sulfur/oxygen or 
sulfur/something compounds.”  LEFFLER, supra note 40, at 16.  See also U.S. ENVTL. 
PROT. AGENCY, OFF. OF COMPLIANCE, EPA 310-R-95-013, PROFILE OF THE PETROLEUM 
REFINING INDUSTRY 11 (1995) [hereinafter EPA, PROFILE] (noting that cost of 
upgrading to meet 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments also made it more economical “in 
some cases” to close refineries rather than upgrade to meet the new standards). 
 69 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-04-96, ENERGY MARKETS: EFFECTS 
OF MERGERS AND MARKET CONCENTRATION IN THE U.S. PETROLEUM INDUSTRY 18 
(2004) [hereinafter GAO, MERGERS] (“The price of crude oil produced in the United 
States is determined in the world oil market because the decontrol of domestic oil 
prices in 1981 has effectively linked the U.S. oil market to the world oil market.”). 
 70 LEFFLER, supra note 40, at 219-21. 
 71 J.D. Butler, The Influence of Economic Factors on the Location of Oil 
Refineries, 1 J. INDUS. ECON. 187, 193-94 (1953). 
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problems for oil field plants.72  Limited infrastructure continues 
to give refiners in some locations cost advantages.  Trade 
regulations also encouraged location of refineries near markets, 
as many countries adopted preferential tariffs for crude oil 
relative to refined products to offset crude’s higher 
transportation costs and encourage domestic refining.73  
Locating a refinery away from oil fields requires infrastructure 
to deliver the crude to the refinery, and as the oil market 
became an international one, oil increasingly came to be 
transported by tanker.74  Eventually, refineries concentrated 
relatively close to ports capable of handling tankers in order to 
reduce transportation costs once the tanker arrived.75  As a 
result, “refinery operations have become more concentrated 
both regionally and nationally” since the 1980s.76 
Today, the only real alternative to locating a refinery 
near a port is to locate it near a pipeline connected to a crude 
oil source (either an oil field or a port).77  Because land near 
ports is desirable for other uses, and because refineries are 
often not considered desirable neighbors,78 the potential sites 
  
 72 USDOC, WAR AND POSTWAR, supra note 39, at 13 (“The modern [1947] 
refinery with its several expensive units and laboratories needed to make selected 
hydrocarbon products is being built at locations where markets are accessible.  A 
steady source of supply can be depended on through trunk pipe lines, or tankers.”).  
 73 Butler, supra note 71, at 195; EPA, PROFILE, supra note 68, at 7 (“For 
reasons of efficiency in transporting crude oil feed stocks and finished products, 
petroleum refineries typically were sited near crude oil sources (onshore petroleum 
terminals, oil and gas extraction areas) or consumers (heavily industrialized areas).”). 
 74 U.S. government subsidies for tankers also played a role.  See 1 ROBERT L. 
BRADLEY JR., OIL, GAS & GOVERNMENT: THE U.S. EXPERIENCE 1003-05 (1996). 
 75 Refineries were initially located near U.S. oil fields, but capacity soon 
shifted to coastal areas as the shipment of oil by tankers became common after 1920.  
See J. Sidney Gould, Recent Changes in Location and Size of Petroleum Refineries, 1 J. 
BUS. U. CHI. 497, 501 (1928) (discussing trend toward coast locations).  For example, 
Rocky Mountain state refiners are the major market for some Canadian oil fields and 
the lack of more than “minimal infrastructure in place to deliver oil produced in the 
Rockies and Canada to other refining regions” gives those refiners a price advantage.  
Stock Report, Frontier Oil, MORNINGSTAR (Mar. 27, 2006), at 1. 
 76 D.J. PETERSON & SERGEJ MAHNOVSKI, NEW FORCES AT WORK IN REFINING: 
INDUSTRY VIEWS OF CRITICAL BUSINESS AND OPERATIONS TRENDS 24 (2003). 
 77 See USDOC, WAR AND POSTWAR, supra note 39, at 15 (describing 
transportation constraints on location requiring refineries to be built near ports or 
pipelines); see also YERGIN, supra note 27, at 410 (discussing impact of need to build 
pipelines and tankers to accommodate post-war boom in gasoline consumption). 
 78 See Alastair Walling, Exposed Refineries, Price-Gouging, and the Gas 
Crisis that Never Was, 20 NAT. RES. & ENV’T 55, 56 (2006) (discussing NIMBY problems 
of refineries); Tom van Riper, Not in My Backyard, FORBES, Sept. 7, 2005, available at 
http://www.forbes.com/energy/2005/09/07/katrina-oil-refineries-cx_tvr_0907refineries.html 
(quoting an oil analyst who stated that a company proposing a new refinery “would 
need to hire about 15 lawyers just to argue it won’t break any environmental 
regulations”). 
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for new refineries are limited.79  Therefore, it is more costly and 
complicated to build a new refinery, inducing refiners to 
expand existing refineries rather than build new ones, and 
limiting competition from new entrants since owning an 
existing refinery is a de facto requirement for entry. 
Crude markets have three important impacts on 
gasoline markets.  First, the international nature of the crude 
market creates powerful incentives to locate refineries in places 
where crude shipments can readily reach the refinery.  As a 
practical matter, this limits refineries in the United States to 
locations near domestic oil fields, near deep water oil 
terminals, or near pipelines connected to terminals or oil fields.  
Securing a feasible location for a refinery thus becomes a 
barrier to entry into the refining industry.  Second, crude 
supplies are trending toward types of crude that are more 
costly to refine into less-polluting forms of gasoline, 
particularly with respect to sulfur content.  This increases the 
capital intensity of refining, contributing to the trend toward 
fewer, larger refineries.  It also makes entry into the refining 
business more difficult, an additional limit on competition.  
Third, the relationship between crude prices and refined 
products’ prices has a significant impact on refinery economics, 
putting a premium on refineries that are capable of flexible 
production methods, which puts older, less sophisticated 
refineries at a competitive disadvantage.  This contributes to 
the trend toward more capital-intensive refineries. 
2. Gasoline Production’s Impact on the Market 
The method of producing gasoline also has significant 
impacts on the market for gasoline.  At the most abstract level, 
producing gasoline is simply a matter of separating crude oil 
into the hydrocarbons with the appropriate boiling range and 
those with higher or lower boiling ranges.  Early petroleum 
refineries did so by distilling off the various components from 
  
 79 PETERSON & MAHNOVSKI, supra note 76, at 23 (“The refining industry is 
dominated by legacy assets.  In many cases these are century-old sites, chosen because 
they were near major population centers or crude oil supplies (e.g., major producing 
fields, crude oil pipelines, and ports) of that time.  As a result, most major refineries 
are clustered along the coasts.  Because of demographic shifts, the movement of 
industry, and changing crude oil supplies in the intervening years, this hardware 
legacy no longer matches the current supply-and-demand patterns for many regions 
and communities.”). 
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small batches of crude,80 making refining “a wasteful, 
underdeveloped operation in the hands of many people, each 
one working on a small scale.”81  While distilling remains an 
important step in refining,82 technological progress quickly 
added more sophisticated processes, with a refinery today best 
described as “a complex network of integrated unit processes 
for the purpose of producing a variety of products from crude 
oil.”83 
Refineries use a variety of methods to transform the 
crude into refined products.  “Any hydrocarbon can be 
converted into any other hydrocarbon by the appropriate 
applications of energy, chemistry, and technology.”84  Among 
the most important method is “cracking,” which converts 
higher molecular-weight components into lower molecular-
weight components by rupturing the carbon bonds with heat 
(“thermal cracking”), or catalysts (“catalytic cracking”).85  A 
second important technique is “coking,” in which low-value 
  
 80 SPEIGHT, CHEMISTRY, supra note 37, at 536 (“Early refineries were 
predominantly distillation units, perhaps with ancillary units to remove objectionable 
odors from the various product streams.”); id. at 565 (describing earliest thermal 
cracking units based on heating crude in pressurized containers); see also USDOC, 
WAR AND POSTWAR, supra note 39, at 7 (“The complexity of the large modern [1947] 
refinery is as marked as the simplicity of the first refinery that went into operation at 
Titusville, Pa., in 1861.  The contrast may be drawn by comparing the expenditures of 
the Cities Service Oil Co. of approximately 75 million dollars for its Lake Charles, La. 
plant (70,000 B/D capacity) with the 15 thousand dollars spent to construct the 
Titusville refinery.”).  By 1930, there were 472 petroleum refineries operating or being 
built in the United States, processing 850,000,000 barrels of petroleum a year.  MILLER 
& SHEA, supra note 37. 
 81 DAVID O. WHITTEN & BESSIE E. WHITTEN, THE BIRTH OF BIG BUSINESS IN 
THE UNITED STATES, 1860-1914, at 9 (2006). 
 82 SURINDER PARKASH, REFINING PROCESSES HANDBOOK 1 (2003) (“The first 
processing step in the refinery, after desalting the crude, is separation of crude into a 
number of fractions by distillation.”).  Refinery capacity is generally measured by 
distillation capacity.  FTC, MERGERS, supra note 5, at 180.  However, “capacity to 
produce refined products at some refineries exceeds their distillation capacity because 
their downstream processes rely, at least in part, on intermediates produced at other 
refineries.”  Id. at 180 n.4. 
 83 SPEIGHT, CHEMISTRY, supra note 37, at 501.  A 1941 government report 
summarized a long list of “remarkable achievements” in refining and concluded that “it 
is possible to rearrange the molecular structures of oils to obtain greater yields of 
products with more desirable properties than was possible when refining was largely a 
distillation operation.”  MILLER & SHEA, supra note 37, at 27. 
 84 James G. Speight, Thermal Chemistry of Petroleum Constituents, in 
PETROLEUM CHEMISTRY AND REFINING 121, 122 (James G. Speight ed., 1998). 
 85 SPEIGHT, CHEMISTRY, supra note 37, at 503-04.  Catalytic cracking took off 
after World War II, with U.S. capacity increasing fivefold from 1945 to 1965.  NPC, 
IMPACT, supra note 28, at 285.  There may be higher molecular weight by-products 
produced as well.  SPEIGHT, CHEMISTRY, supra note 37, at 503.  See also EPA, PROFILE, 
supra note 68, at 19-24 (describing and diagramming process); LEFFLER, supra note 40, 
at 59-70 (describing process in nontechnical terms). 
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residual fuel oils are cracked into transportation fuels, leaving 
a residual of carbon with impurities known as coke.86  Further 
significant advances in refinery technology and design enable 
refiners to extract greater amounts of gasoline and other high-
value products.87 
Refining technology evolved partially as a result of 
rising demand for gasoline.  Oil refineries primarily produced 
kerosene from about 1870 (when they became “characteristic 
features” of the new oil industry)88 until 1910, when the shift in 
demand to gasoline prompted innovative new methods to 
increase gasoline yields.89  Today the primary function of most 
  
 86 EPA, PROFILE, supra note 68, at 19-20.  See also NPC, IMPACT, supra note 
28, at 284 (describing coking’s development after 1930).  Leffler gives a colorful 
description of coking: “If thermal cracking is like throwing a hamburger on a hot grill, 
coking is like Texas barbeque—slow cooked all the way through.”  LEFFLER, supra note 
40, at 110. 
 87 SPEIGHT, CHEMISTRY, supra note 37, at 585 (“The last 60 years have seen 
substantial advances in the development of catalytic processes.  This has involved not 
only rapid advances in the chemistry and physics of the catalysts themselves but also 
major engineering advances in reactor design . . . [which together] have allowed major 
improvements in process efficiency and product yields.” (citations omitted)).  This 
progress had an impact on costs as well: total operating costs for refineries fell 12% in 
real terms from 1945 to 1965.  NPC, IMPACT, supra note 28, at 257. 
 88 SPEIGHT, CHEMISTRY, supra note 37, at 7; USDOC, WAR AND POST-WAR, 
supra note 39, at 1 (“In contrast to the early years of the industry, gasoline and fuel oil 
now compose about four-fifths of refinery production.”).  The early years of the oil 
industry “are shrouded in a statistical fog.”  Butler, supra note 71, at 188.  We do know 
that production more than doubled between 1900 and 1910 and again by 1915, and 
increased tenfold between 1900 and 1930.  Id.  Kerosene was originally produced from 
asphalt and similar substances and by 1859, there were thirty-four companies making 
$5 million of kerosene per year in the United States.  YERGIN, supra note 27, at 23.  
 89 SPEIGHT, CHEMISTRY, supra note 37, at 565-67.  “The original incentive to 
develop cracking processes arose from the need to increase gasoline supplies.  Since 
cracking could virtually double the volume of gasoline from a barrel of crude oil, the 
purpose of cracking was wholly justified.”  Id. at 585 (citations omitted).  Before the 
invention of methods of cracking the heavier hydrocarbons, refineries faced the serious 
problem of producing various products “in certain rather closely fixed proportions” as 
“under present methods over 50 per cent of the crude oil refined must go into kerosene 
and fuel oil classes of products.  No effort or sacrifice can make a given crude yield over 
50 per cent of gasoline and lubricating oils by commercially successful methods.”  Lewis 
H. Haney, Gasoline Prices as Affected by Interlocking Stock Ownership and Joint Cost, 
31 Q.J. ECON. 635, 649 (1917).  Cracking soon solved this problem.  A 1924 article 
noted: 
The yield of gasoline has been increased greatly by the widespread use of 
cracking processes.  A refiner using Mid-Continent crude can recover from 45 
to 55 per cent of gasoline from a barrel of crude petroleum when pressure 
stills are used, as compared with about 25 per cent from ordinary distilling 
methods.  Improvements in internal combustion engines should soon make 
possible the utilization of a still larger yield of serviceable motor fuel than is 
now obtainable in the form of gasoline from cracking processes. 
Huston Thompson, Distribution of Gasoline and Methods of Price Control, 116 ANNALS 
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 89, 90 (1924).  Thermal cracking made it possible to convert 
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refineries is to produce gasoline, with other products generally 
treated as byproducts.90  Over 80% of the volume of finished 
products falls into the “light petroleum products” class 
(gasoline, diesel, home heating oil, and jet fuel).91 
As a result of these technological changes, gasoline 
refineries today do not simply produce a single product.  
Rather, they now produce a variety of intermediate components 
of gasoline, which the refineries then blend in a complex 
operation to achieve the desired characteristics for the final 
gasoline product.92  Because components blended into gasolines 
may have multiple uses, with refineries often closely integrated 
with petrochemical plants,93 and because unit shutdowns affect 
  
40% of crude to gasoline, the technological limit until World War II.  USDOC, WAR AND 
POSTWAR, supra note 39, at 8.  It also made possible processing of “straight-run” 
gasoline to raise its octane rating.  Id.  Catalytic cracking, which developed in the 
1930s, boosted output further.  Id. 
 90 SPEIGHT, CHEMISTRY, supra note 37, at 567 (“It is generally recognized that 
the most important part of any refinery is its gasoline (and liquid fuels) manufacturing 
facilities; other facilities are added to manufacture additional products as indicated by 
technical feasibility and economic gain.”).  This has been true for some time.  See 
ALBERT V. HAHN, THE PETROCHEMICAL INDUSTRY: MARKET AND ECONOMICS 5 (1970) 
(“In the U.S. the demand for motor fuel has tended to grow faster than for fuel oil or 
diesel fuel. Accordingly, most refineries contain catalytic cracking units which convert 
heavy fractions to additional gasoline . . . .”). 
 91 FTC, MERGERS, supra note 5, at 179.  
 92 Blending various outputs of refineries developed early.  In 1917, for 
example, Lewis Haney complained that gasoline “had ceased to be a homogeneous 
product and in its name were sold blends of heavy naphtha or ‘cracked’ residual 
products combined with more volatile elements.”  Haney, supra note 89, at 647.  Yet by 
1924, Huston Thompson reported without comment that “[t]he great bulk of gasoline 
used as a motor fuel for automobile and other internal combustion engines is a blended 
product.  Formerly only ‘natural’ or ‘straight run’ gasoline, obtained by distilling 
petroleum by the application of heat at atmospheric pressure, was sold for motor fuel 
purposes.”  Thompson, supra note 89, at 89.  The FTC also noted blending and cracking 
had begun to play a significant role in 1915.  U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, REPORT ON THE 
PRICE OF GASOLINE IN 1915, at 21-22 (1917) [hereinafter FTC, 1915].  By World War II, 
the transition to “a product made by careful blending of refinery stock prepared by 
involved new processes and special additives developed in extensive research 
programs” was complete.  NPC, FACTORS AFFECTING, supra note 61, at 51-52.  By the 
late 1960s, in-line blending techniques were used for about half of U.S. gasoline 
production, a technique which a technical survey called “one of the significant new 
developments in the refinery industry.”  NPC, IMPACT, supra note 28, at 293.  Blending 
is done in virtually all refineries today.  J.D. Robinson & R.P. Faulkner, The Oil 
Refinery: Types, Structure and Configuration, in 2 MODERN PETROLEUM TECHNOLOGY, 
supra note 37, at 1, 8.  See D.R. Blackmore, Gasoline and Related Fuels, in 2 MODERN 
PETROLEUM TECHNOLOGY, supra note 37, at 217, 245-46 (discussing complexity of 
modern blending techniques). 
 93 David S. Glass, The Petrochemical Interface, in 2 MODERN PETROLEUM 
TECHNOLOGY, supra note 37, at 149, 149. 
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the available blendstocks,94 the components of the final product 
may vary considerably over time, even within a single refinery.  
The mix of components operational at any particular time at a 
particular plant also has an impact on the refinery’s ability to 
operate at its full capacity.95   
The process of improving oil production and refining 
began almost as soon as oil was commercially produced.96  
Cracking and coking techniques first appeared after World War 
I,97 during a period in which “the field of hydrocarbons 
chemistry took off in a series of revolutionary discoveries.”98  
The technology rapidly advanced again during and after World 
War II, in response to the war’s demand for fuel for combat 
aircraft.99  From then on, “the refining industry became a 
branch of the chemical industry and it was capable of 
transforming the complex mixtures that constitute petroleum 
into high-quality fuel components by controlling specific 
chemical reactions.”100  One significant example of technological 
  
 94 NPC, 1990S, supra note 63, at 15 (“As an individual processing unit is shut 
down for scheduled or unscheduled maintenance, the gasoline formula may be adjusted 
to compensate for a shortage of that unit’s blendstock.”). 
 95 See, e.g., NPC, ADEQUACY, supra note 59, at 25 (stating that “configuration 
and processing capability in units downstream of the atmospheric distillation unit may 
be such that the product output mix is uneconomic at full utilization of atmospheric 
distillation capacity”). 
 96 1 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 19 (noting “innumerable mechanical 
innovations that lowered business costs and reduced oil waste”). 
 97 USDOC, WAR AND POSTWAR, supra note 39, at 7 (“The refinery process 
used to convert crude petroleum to products at the Titusville plant [the first refinery], 
and the only one used up to about the time of World War I, was the crude-distillation 
process.”); MILLER & SHEA, supra note 37, at 26 (stating that “the introduction of the 
cracking process in 1912 marked the beginning of a new epoch in the chemistry and 
refining of petroleum . . . [and] led the way for further technical advances in refining 
practices”); see also YERGIN, supra note 27, at 111-12 (describing development and 
commercialization of cracking); 2 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 1107-08 (describing 
development of technology). 
 98 RICHARD H. K. VIETOR, ENERGY POLICY IN AMERICA SINCE 1945: A STUDY 
OF BUSINESS-GOVERNMENT RELATIONS 28 (1984). 
 99 SPEIGHT, CHEMISTRY, supra note 37, at 536, 565; TAMINIAU, supra note 38, 
at 61 (“World War II was a trigger for the production of fuel that had an octane number 
of 100 and for the production of vast quantities of aviation gasoline of a high quality.”).  
Consider one particularly dramatic example: catalytic cracking was first put into 
commercial operation in 1936 and refinery capacity for it was at 122,000 barrels per 
day in 1940.  By November 1944, U.S. catalytic cracking capacity reached 1,011,650 
barrels per day, a 729% increase in four years.  USDOC, WAR AND POSTWAR, supra 
note 39, at 9.  Automobile engine advances also spurred improvements in refining 
technology.  MILLER & SHEA, supra note 37, at 26 (“The petroleum-refining industry 
has had to keep pace with the rapid strides in development made by the automobile 
engine and the changing demands of the automotive industry, and improvements in 
engine design and efficiency often have resulted from the ability of refiners to improve 
the quality of motor fuel and lubricants.”). 
 100 TAMINIAU, supra note 38, at 61. 
2007] WHY GASOLINE COSTS SO MUCH 961 
 
progress shows how dramatically refining changed under 
demand pressures.  In the early 1930s, the 100 octane 
reference fuel “was a rare chemical costing $25 per gallon in 
the small quantities necessary for anti-knock testing purposes,” 
but by 1941, “the industry [was] manufacturing millions of 
gallons of isooctane for use directly as aviation fuel at little 
more than 25 cents per gallon.”101 
The increasingly sophisticated technology gave refiners 
ever greater control over the refining process.  As a result, 
refineries became increasingly capable of producing a wide 
range of outputs with multiple uses.102  “[M]ajor changes” in 
refinery processing after World War II vastly increased output 
quantity and quality.103  Refineries were able to obtain 
increasing amounts of gasoline and other high-value 
transportation fuels from each barrel of crude.104  Today, 
refineries use a wide range of “downstream” processing units to 
process lower-quality crudes, make products with more 
demanding specifications, and increase yields.105  Investment in 
these technologies has soared since the 1980s, with hydro-
treating capacity increasing 53.6% from 1985 to 2003, thermal 
cracking capacity increasing 29.5% over the same period, and 
catalytic hydro-cracking capacity increasing 42.4%, compared 
to a 9% increase in atmospheric distillation capacity and a 
  
 101 MILLER & SHEA, supra note 37, at 30.  Demand for higher-octane gasolines 
beginning in the 1930s led to innovations as well.  SPEIGHT, CHEMISTRY, supra note 37, 
at 681 (discussing use of thermal reforming to improve octane).  Average octane ratings 
rose steadily from World War II into the mid-1960s.  NPC, IMPACT, supra note 28, at 
262 (showing increase for premium from motor octane number (MON) 78 / research 
octane number (RON) 85 to MON 90 / RON 99 by 1965). 
 102 LEFFLER, supra note 40, at 77. 
 103 NPC, IMPACT, supra note 28, at 281.  The NPC’s assessment of 
technological change from 1945 to 1965 in refining concluded:  
The product specifications of all refinery products have been steadily 
changing since World War II to improve the performance of these products in 
end use.  As the equipment and machinery using petroleum products have 
become more sophisticated, so have the treatment and finishing techniques.  
Technology advances have improved the operating and economic aspects, 
resulting in a beneficial influence on blending, as well as improvements in 
the uniformity of product quality.  Usually, blending formulations are 
dictated by product volume requirements and product costs, and the treating 
and finishing steps are taken to assure that the blend meets specifications. 
Id. at 293. 
 104 FTC, GASOLINE PRICE CHANGES, supra note 9, at 53 (“Consumer demand 
for products such as gasoline and diesel has motivated investment in downstream 
processes that can increase the yield of these products from a given barrel of crude.”). 
 105 FTC, MERGERS, supra note 5, at 182. 
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15.6% increase in vacuum distillation capacity.106  The payoff 
from this investment has been significant.  Gasoline production 
grew from 142,465 barrels per day in 1900 to 4.1 million 
barrels per day in 1960, reaching 8.3 million barrels per day in 
2005.107  In addition, there has been dramatic progress in 
catalysts, substrates, and catalysis modeling as well, which has 
allowed improvements in “environmental performance, product 
quality and volume, feedstock flexibility, and energy 
management without fundamentally changing fixed capital 
stocks.”108 
As the production process became more complex, 
gasoline evolved as well.  “Prewar [World War II] gasoline was 
a simple mixture of largely unprocessed stocks with basic 
additives for octane improvement and storage stability.”109  By 
the 1960s, additives had become more sophisticated and 
refineries produced a range of specific hydrocarbons to blend 
into the finished gasoline.110  Refineries have also become more 
complex in an effort to reduce raw material costs, adding 
technology to allow processing of lower-quality fuels.111  
Refineries today are essentially solving a complex linear 
programming model to optimize the mix of hydrocarbon 
fractions produced and the blends of gasoline created.112 
In short, refinery production is not a static process.  
Refineries can adjust the fraction of their output that goes to 
gasoline and regularly do so.113  A more recent development is 
  
 106 Id. at 201 tbl.7-3. 
 107 Energy Info. Admin., U.S. Refinery and Blender Net Production of Finished 
Gasoline, available at http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/hist/mgfrpus2a.htm (last visited 
Apr. 12, 2007) (all figures except 1900); NPC, ADEQUACY, supra note 59, at C-1 (1900 
figures). 
 108 PETERSON & MAHNOVSKI, supra note 76, at 44. 
 109 NPC, IMPACT, supra note 28, at 256. 
 110 Id.  See also NPC, ADEQUACY, supra note 59, at 28 (“Demand for light 
products such as gasoline and diesel fuel exceed the natural quantity of these products 
in crude oil” and so prompt investment in conversion technology.). 
 111 NPC, ADEQUACY, supra note 59, at 28-29. 
 112 GARY & HANDWERK, supra note 61, at 243.  Because of the technological 
changes induced by demand for higher-performance fuels by World War II, the post-
war period is the most appropriate for examining long-term trends in the industry.  See 
also NPC, IMPACT, supra note 28, at 297 (noting increasing sophistication of refinery 
controls as refinery complexity grew); PETERSON & MAHNOVSKI, supra note 76, at 44 
(“Innovations in advanced process monitoring and controls have allowed refineries not 
only to operate more efficiently and safely but also to produce fuels to more-exacting 
product quality specifications in a more reliable manner—not unlike a highly 
automated chemical plant.”). 
 113 PARKASH, supra note 82, at 119 (“The yield of products in FCC [fluid 
catalytic cracking] depends on the feedstock quality, type of catalyst, and operating 
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the operation of a network of refineries as a unit, allowing “for 
movements of feedstocks and blending stocks across refineries 
and therefore more efficient use of capacity at each refinery.”114  
Regulations dictating the characteristics of outputs place 
additional constraints on the process, substantially increasing 
its complexity and making compliance with the various 
regulatory mandates and technical constraints a managerial 
“art form.”115  Moreover, crude oil price and product price 
variations also influence decisions about refinery operation.  
For example, as oil prices climbed, refinery economics changed 
and the ability to maximize production of the appropriate mix 
of high-value products became more important than 
maximizing volume.116  The result was “increasingly wide 
variations in refinery margin” depending on whether refineries 
had the ability to produce the appropriate combination of 
  
conditions.  FCC units are usually operated to maximize the yield of gasoline; however, 
the process is versatile and can be operated to maximize middle distillate or LPG, both 
of which are at the expense of gasoline.”); see also U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, DOE/RG-
0048, AN ANALYSIS OF REFINERS’ TOTAL BARREL COSTS AND REVENUES FROM THE SALE 
OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS: 1976-1979, at 23 (1980) (“If the wholesale price difference 
[between gasoline and heating oil] is less than about 2 cents per gallon, an economic 
incentive may exist to take feedstock away from the catalytic cracker and put it into 
heating oil.  Conversely, if the difference exceeds 5 cents per gallon, an incentive may 
exist to take distillate away from heating oil and put it in the catalytic cracker for 
gasoline, up to the capacity limit of the cracker.”).  One regular change is the shifting of 
production between maximizing gasoline in the summer and maximizing heating oil in 
the winter.  LEFFLER, supra note 40, at 65. 
 114 FTC, MERGERS, supra note 5, at 102. 
 115 LEFFLER, supra note 40, at 147.  Leffler describes the competing 
constraints as follows: 
The emissions from burning gasoline cannot exceed various combinations of 
the four emitants [toxics, NOX, VOCs, SOX] . . . . The control mechanism sets 
limits on combinations of the four.  
At the same time the generation of the four emitants is connected in 
complicated ways to the gasoline characteristics [a wide range of technical 
criteria including RVP, oxygen content, benzene, aromatics content, olefin 
content, sulfur content, and the T50 and T90] . . . . Because of their impact on 
the four emitants, all these properties have explicit limits, some by statute, at 
least in the US. 
Finally, in order for gasoline to work well in car engines, refiners must make 
gasoline that meets their own performance specifications . . . . 
Id. 
 116 P. Ellis Jones, Introduction, in 2 MODERN PETROLEUM TECHNOLOGY, supra 
note 37, at xv, xviii (“The key to refinery economics became the addition of value—the 
excess of realizable value of the saleable products over the cost of crude and other 
feedstocks, and other economic inputs such as chemicals, catalysts, utilities, 
maintenance and salaries.”).  
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products, leading to the closure of some older refineries and 
significant upgrades to others.117   
This increased sophistication of refinery operation 
comes at a price.118  Investments in hydrotreating in the 1970s 
and 1980s, for example, allowed the Gulf Coast refiners in 
particular to process cheaper sour crudes, but roughly trebled 
capital expenditures.119  The equipment necessary to maximize 
the production of economically valuable products, which 
requires producing precisely calibrated intermediate 
hydrocarbons and blending them into consistent products, is 
considerably more sophisticated and expensive than the 
rudimentary distillation equipment used in the industry’s early 
years.120  Accordingly, gasoline’s production process has become 
complex and capital intensive,121 which in turn allows precise 
control over the product’s final characteristics.  Although 
technology has repeatedly revolutionized refining over the last 
100 years, refining’s modern sophistication may be nearing the 
limits of current technology’s ability to squeeze additional 
capacity out of existing refineries,122 due in part to the maturity 
of many refining technologies.123 
  
 117 Id. at xviii-xix. 
 118 Not all refineries are equally complex, of course.  NPC, 1990S, supra note 
63, at 15 (“Of the more than 120 refineries producing gasoline in the United States, 
processing complexity ranges from the relatively simple topping-reforming plants to 
extensive coking deep conversion systems.”). 
 119 PETERSON & MAHNOVSKI, supra note 76, at 62.  See also FTC, GASOLINE 
PRICE CHANGES, supra note 9, at 66 n.66 (noting investments to enable processing 
lower-quality crude). 
 120 See USDOC, WAR AND POSTWAR, supra note 39, at 13 (New technology 
developed in the 1930s “require[s] much larger capital to construct and maintain the 
refinery proper.”); id. at 28 (listing the need to secure “adequate capital” to build new 
capacity and technology as one of the major problems of smaller refiners); MILLER & 
SHEA, supra note 37, at 31 (“The time has arrived [1941] when it is possible for the 
industry to obtain virtually what it desires from petroleum and its gaseous 
hydrocarbons by an increasing variety of catalytic and synthetic processes, which give 
the flexibility so desirable and necessary for profitable operations.”).  Leffler gives some 
detailed hypothetical examples that demonstrate how different refinery characteristics 
affect the output streams.  See LEFFLER, supra note 40, at 219-21. 
 121 See WHITTEN & WHITTEN, supra note 81, at 137.  
Economies of scale in refining, the efficiencies in close fractional refining 
(rather than waste various oils, refiners tried to maximize production of the 
more marketable products and to offer the remainder for specialized uses), 
and the superior products from the refining process combined to give refiners 
a strong competitive advantage over small-scale distillers. 
Id.   
 122 PETERSON & MAHNOVSKI, supra note 76, at 39 (“Upgrading pipes, controls, 
catalysts, and boosting process temperatures and pressures is no longer cost effective 
without major changes in the capacity or configuration of reactor vessels—changes that 
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Wider trends in manufacturing also affected gasoline 
refining and retailing.  The last decades of the twentieth 
century saw increased attention paid to inventory control, with 
“just-in-time” manufacturing processes124 cutting inventory 
costs in a wide range of businesses.125  Trends in retailing, such 
as the rise of retail giants like Wal-Mart, also had an impact as 
those companies moved into gasoline retailing, bringing their 
buying power to bear on the price and terms of gasoline sales.126  
Refiners expanded vertically into higher-margin retailing, with 
service stations evolving to include convenience stores.127  These 
changes, together with the closure of smaller and less efficient 
  
are much more expensive.  ‘Most of the easy, low-hanging-fruit investments have been 
made,’ said one participant.  Another concurred: ‘The capacity for additional 
improvements is declining.’  Mid-size and smaller refineries could probably still obtain 
10-15 percent increases, observed a third respondent, but larger firms ‘probably can’t 
go a whole heck of a lot higher.’”). 
 123 Id. at 43 (“The petroleum refining industry relies on mature technologies 
and processes—many of which were developed decades ago.  The increases in 
productivity experienced in the 1990s were achieved through incremental 
improvements in existing refinery equipment, processes, and practices.  ‘Not much is 
being done on the processes themselves,’ said one executive of a leading operating 
company.”). 
 124 Just-in-time, or lean production cuts costs through aggressive inventory 
management and other techniques.  See S. Robson Walton, Wal-Mart, Supplier 
Partners, and the Buyer Power Issue, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 509 (2005) (describing 
techniques and assessing impact of Wal-Mart’s cost-cutting on partners). 
 125 See id. at 518-22 (describing cost-cutting).  Just-in-time techniques have 
spread to the gasoline business with “better market information and transparency.  
With greater information about the status of a firm’s supply chain and inventories, 
maintaining just-in-time operations and running on the edge have become less risky 
from a business perspective.”  PETERSON & MAHNOVSKI, supra note 76, at 42.  See also 
FTC, GASOLINE PRICE CHANGES, supra note 9, at 54-55 (noting trend toward reduction 
of inventories of gasoline to reduce costs and to free up capital for other investments); 
id. at 76 (noting impact on reducing prices by making refineries more efficient and 
increasing them by making the system less tolerant of unplanned outages). 
 126 See infra note 165. 
 127 Yergin describes the early evolution of the gasoline retail market as 
follows: 
Before the 1920s, most gasoline was sold by storekeepers, who kept the motor 
fuel in cans or other containers under the counter or out in back of the store.  
The product carried no brand name, and the motorist could not be sure if he 
was getting gasoline or a product that had been adulterated with cheaper 
naphtha or kerosene. 
. . . . 
In 1920, certainly no more than 100,000 establishments sold gasoline; fully 
half of them were grocery stores, general stores, and hardware stores.  Few of 
those stores were selling gasoline a decade later. In 1929, the estimated 
number of retail establishments selling gasoline had grown to 300,000. 
Almost all of them were gas stations or garages. 
YERGIN, supra note 27, at 209.  
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refineries, reduced refiners’ excess capacity, and so the amount 
of spot market, unbranded gasoline.128  The spot market for 
essentially commodified gasoline had provided needed 
flexibility for the national market, allowing quick response to 
shortages.  But as the spot market shrank in the 1990s, the 
ability to make up for shortfalls caused by even a temporary 
closure of a particular refinery129 declined. 
3. The Properties of Gasoline and the Market 
The physical process of gasoline production is crucial to 
understanding the market for gasoline.  Refineries produce a 
wide range of products, including nonfuel products from 
solvents to asphalt, chemical feedstocks such as benzene, and 
fuels including diesel, jet fuel, kerosene, liquefied petroleum 
gas, residual fuel oil,130 distillate fuel oil, and motor gasoline.131  
Gasoline comes in many varieties, as it has almost from the 
beginning of the industry.132  Indeed, “gasoline” is now defined 
in the technical literature simply as “complex mixtures of 
hydrocarbons having typical boiling ranges from 100 to 400ºF 
  
 128 A spot market is one “in which a commodity or currency is traded for 
immediate delivery.  It is distinguished from a futures or a forward market, in which 
contracts for delivery at some future date are traded.”  THE MIT DICTIONARY OF 
MODERN ECONOMICS 398 (David W. Pearce ed., 3d ed. 1986). 
 129 See PARKASH, supra note 82, at 384 (noting need for refineries to change 
product mix in response to conditions such as “a critical pump-out of service, partially 
coked-up furnace, catalyst bed with high pressure drop or low activity, a delayed ship 
causing severe ullage constraints, or a change of specifications can upset the best-laid 
plans” for output).  The need to shift from aviation fuel to gasoline had contributed to 
the post-World War II shortages.  YERGIN, supra note 27, at 410. 
 130 Residual fuel oil (or “resid”) 
is the viscous residuum of the refining process which strips the lighter 
molecules from crude oil.  Because of its consistency—it sometimes cannot be 
pumped unless heated—resid cannot be transported long distances 
economically except by water . . . . The primary U.S. market for resid is as a 
utility and industrial fuel . . . . 
BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 144-45. 
 131 EPA, PROFILE, supra note 68, at 4. 
 132 As early as 1917, the FTC noted that “[t]he idea that gasoline is gasoline is 
erroneous.”  FTC, 1915, supra note 92, at 44.  A 1958 survey identified forty types of 
gasoline produced by refineries.  GARY & HANDWERK, supra note 61, at 9 (citing 
American Petroleum Institute survey from 1958, published in Info. Bull. No. 11).  
Today, “gasolines of many different designs have evolved to meet local needs and 
legislation.”  Blackmore, supra note 92, at 218; see also JOHN K. PEARSON, IMPROVING 
AIR QUALITY: PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES FOR THE AUTO INDUSTRY 83 (2001) 
(“Gasoline composition varies depending upon the crude oil source, refinery processes 
used in its manufacture, and the amount of oxygenated compounds added in the final 
blend.”). 
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(38 to 205ºC) as determined by the ASTM method,”133 leaving 
open the application of the term to a wide range of substances.  
As one refinery executive noted, “Gasoline is not gasoline 
anymore.  It is a specialty chemical.”134 
There are many properties that differentiate gasolines 
from one another.  These properties determine both engine 
performance135 and the environmental effects of burning the 
particular gasoline.136  These impacts are not simple or 
unidimensional.  Particular characteristics of gasoline can have 
both positive and negative impacts on engine performance and 
the environment, often making the precise mix of 
characteristics a matter of tradeoffs.  The motives for changes 
in gasoline characteristics vary over time.  For example, the 
EPA seeks to reduce SOX emissions and to improve catalytic 
converter performance by reducing the amount of sulfur in 
fuels.137  Yet early efforts to reduce gasoline’s sulfur content 
were market-driven.  For example, in the 1880s, the Lima, 
Ohio oil field produced sulfur-contaminated oil that yielded 
products so odiferous that they were virtually impossible to 
sell,138 and in the post-World War II period, sulfur was “an 
important contributor to engine wear and deposits.”139  
  
 133 GARY & HANDWERK, supra note 61, at 9 (citing American Petroleum 
Institute survey from 1958, published in Info. Bull. No. 11).  See also J.G. Calvert, J.B. 
Heywood, R.F. Sawyer & J.H. Seinfeld, Achieving Acceptable Air Quality: Some 
Reflections on Controlling Vehicle Emissions, 261 SCIENCE 37, 42 (1993) (“Gasoline is a 
complex mixture containing hundreds of different HCs; its physical and chemical 
properties are difficult to describe with a few parameters.”); Blackmore, supra note 92, 
at 217 (discussing meaning of the term “gasoline”). 
 134 PETERSON & MAHNOVSKI, supra note 76, at 21 (quoting a “technology and 
services executive”). 
 135 GARY & HANDWERK, supra note 61, at 14 (“The Reid vapor pressure (RVP) 
and boiling range of gasoline governs ease of starting, engine warm-up, rate of 
acceleration, loss by crankcase dilution, mileage economy, and tendency toward vapor 
lock.”); LEFFLER, supra note 40, at 130-31. 
 136 Data from a study before the widespread use of boutique fuels found major 
differences in emissions from different forms of gasoline.  A 1993 article, for example, 
reported:  
Recent data . . . indicate that the highest exhaust emission fuels had some 
combination of T50  (the temperature at which 50% of the fuel evaporates) 
values greater than 100ºC, T90 (the temperature at which 90% of the fuel 
evaporates) values exceeding 171ºC, or sulfur content greater than 300 parts 
per million by weight. . . . According to a 1992 survey, 20% of commercial 
fuels exceeded these distillation cutpoints and 40% of commercial fuels 
exceeded the sulfur cutpoint. 
Calvert, Heywood, Sawyer & Seinfeld, supra note 133, at 40. 
 137 NPC, ADEQUACY, supra note 59, at 43. 
 138 GIDDENS, supra note 37, at 3. 
 139 NPC, IMPACT, supra note 28, at 262. 
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Similarly, controlling evaporation from storage tanks first 
became an industry priority as a cost-cutting measure,140 only 
later becoming an environmental measure.  
One major characteristic of gasoline is its volatility, 
measured in terms of Reid Vapor Pressure (RVP) or the 
Drivability Index (DI).141  “Overall, lower RVP appears to be the 
major contributor to lowered VOC [volatile organic compounds] 
emissions resulting from the use of RFG [reformulated 
gasoline].”142  But too low an RVP can cause incomplete 
combustion in the engine, leading to higher HC emissions due 
to unburnt fuel.143  Gasoline with a higher RVP improves 
starting in cold conditions, but, at high temperatures and 
altitudes, can cause vapor lock, which degrades engine 
performance.144  Optimizing the volatility of a gasoline blend 
thus involves tradeoffs over several performance 
characteristics and consideration of the altitude and 
temperatures of the area where the gasoline will be used.  
Since at least the 1930s, refiners have optimized their products’ 
volatility for different temperature and pressure conditions, 
and a number of other characteristics as well.145  Different 
  
 140 Id. at 258. 
 141 “The Reid vapor pressure is approximately the vapor pressure of the 
gasoline at 100ºF (38ºC) in absolute units (ASTM designation D-323).”  GARY & 
HANDWERK, supra note 61, at 15.  See also Blackmore, supra note 92, at 228 
(discussing volatility issues).  The Driveability Index is calculated from “three specified 
distillation points plus an oxygen content measurement in some forms of the 
calculation.”  NPC, ADEQUACY, supra note 59, at 93. 
 142 NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., OZONE-FORMING POTENTIAL OF REFORMULATED 
GASOLINE 142 (1999) [hereinafter NAS, OZONE-FORMING POTENTIAL].  
 143 Blackmore, supra note 92, at 228.  Too low an RVP, however, and “the 
vapour pressure in the fuel tank can fall to a dangerously low level under cold ambient 
conditions whereby it falls below the upper flammability limit of the gasoline, thereby 
posing a risk of fire during refueling.”  Id. at 225; see also id. at 228-29 (discussing 
impact of volatility on driving performance and emissions). 
 144 GARY & HANDWERK, supra note 61, at 11. 
 145 As early as the 1930s, refiners began to introduce “seasonally balanced” 
gasolines with characteristics that varied with location and season, making them more 
volatile in winter to help starting, and less volatile in the summer to boost mileage.  
GIDDENS, supra note 37, at 478; LEFFLER, supra note 40, at 131; NPC, IMPACT, supra 
note 28, at 256 (volatility optimization).  Customers seek a range of gasoline 
characteristics. 
In general, customers will be looking for good performance under all weather 
conditions (power, smoothness (driveability), cold starting, fuel economy), for 
reliability (no engine damage, no undesirable combustion noise such as 
knock, cleanliness and non-corrosion of the components) and for 
environmental acceptability (not only legislated exhaust and evaporative 
emissions, but also low odour levels, and the ability to meet regular emission 
checks). 
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gasolines are generally defined in terms of desired properties 
rather than by their particular components.  But the definition 
of the optimal mix of characteristics has changed significantly 
over time, as evolving production techniques gave refiners 
greater control over gasoline composition.146  For example, 
“front end volatility” of gasolines increased after World War II 
into the 1960s because the higher volatility “improved 
performance characteristics markedly.”147  Today, of course, a 
primary concern is reducing volatility to reduce vehicle 
emissions.148 
Since World War II, gasolines have often contained, in 
addition to their various hydrocarbon components, a variety of 
additives designed to improve some aspect of their 
performance.149  In particular, additives that control engine 
“knock” by increasing octane have played an important role.150  
Perhaps the most important innovation was the Ethyl 
  
Blackmore, supra note 92, at 217. 
 146 See NPC, IMPACT, supra note 28, at 261-62 (“Following World War II, 
motor gasoline changed from a relatively simple mixture of petroleum fractions into a 
complex product made by careful blending of many intermediate refinery stocks. . . . 
[T]he refiner is able to exercise close control over the final product to give it desired 
properties.”). 
 147 Id. at 263.  These improvements include “starting easier, warmup is 
quicker, there is less crankcase dilution and, to a lesser extent, an improvement has 
been made in cylinder deposits and engine wear.”  Id. 
 148 See infra note 514 and accompanying text. 
 149 Blackmore, supra note 92, at 238 (discussing increasing need for additives 
for product differentiation, maintaining engines, and preventing corrosion and deposits 
from mandated oxygenates); NPC, FACTORS AFFECTING, supra note 61, at 52 (noting 
that in the 1970s, “[s]pecial detergent or dispersant additives are now available to help 
maintain a clean carburetion system, resulting in improved engine performance, better 
mileage in city driving, reduced carburetor maintenance and reduced exhaust 
pollutants”); NPC, IMPACT, supra note 28, at 256 (“Additives now [1967] are used not 
only for octane improvement and stability, but also to reduce carbon deposits, clean 
carburetors, prevent carburetor icing, prevent corrosion, reduce spark plug fouling, and 
for many other quality improvements.”); id. at 263 (“Prior to 1950, the number of 
different additives used in gasolines was relatively small.”); YERGIN, supra note 27, at 
549 (“[P]urpose [of additives] was to carve out brand identification for a product, 
gasoline, that was, after all, a commodity that was more-or-less the same, whatever its 
brand name.  In a period of a year and a half, in the mid-1950s, thirteen of the top 
fourteen marketers began to sell new ‘premium’ gasolines, racing hard to outdo one 
another in extravagant claims.”). 
 150 GARY & HANDWERK, supra note 61, at 13.  Anti-knocking ability is 
measured in terms of octane numbers.  As engines increased in their compression 
ratios, higher octane-number gasoline became necessary.  MILLER & SHEA, supra note 
37, at 29.  “The type of hydrocarbons present in gasoline governs its anti-knock value, 
and therefore this property of motor fuel is controllable in cracked and synthesized 
gasoline.”  Id. at 30.  The octane number serves as an index to relate the gasoline in 
question to the standard of a mixture of normal heptane (octane equal to zero) and 
isooctane (octane equal to 100).  Id.; see also Blackmore, supra note 92, at 221 
(describing knocking problem in depth). 
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Corporation’s introduction of anti-knock gasoline in the 1920s, 
which forced companies without contracts for Ethyl’s additives 
to develop their own high-performance fuels.151  Lead, for 
example, was added to gasoline for many years to improve its 
octane rating152 and, more recently, methyl tertiary butyl ether 
(MTBE) was added to reduce the environmental impact of 
combustion and boost octane.153  In short, products labeled 
“gasoline” initially varied substantially from retailer to 
retailer.154  Early retail gasoline competition focused on quality 
claims155 as consumers gradually learned to distinguish 
differences relevant to performance.156  Some states attempted 
quality regulations, but these initial efforts were based on an 
imperfect understanding of gasoline quality.157  Similarly, today 
  
 151 GIDDENS, supra note 37, at 287-92. 
 152 MILLER & SHEA, supra note 37, at 30.  The discovery of lead’s anti-knock 
properties had “radical repercussions for the oil industry . . . [and] became one of the 
components of the dominant design in the search (in the era of ferment) to increase the 
quality of fuel.”  TAMINIAU, supra note 38, at 55.  See also Arnold W. Reitze Jr., The 
Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives Under Section 211 of the Clean Air Act, 29 
TULSA L.J. 485, 497-98 (1994). 
 153 LEFFLER, supra note 40, at 141-45.  See NPC, ADEQUACY, supra note 59, at 
82-89 (overview of MTBE use).  Of course, both were eventually removed from U.S. 
gasolines because of their overall negative environmental impacts.  See NAS, OZONE-
FORMING POTENTIAL, supra note 142, at 107 (lead phased out to protect catalytic 
converters); infra note 525. 
 154 For example, a 1935 analysis concluded that 
almost any gasoline could operate satisfactorily the automobile of 1920, and 
many fuels were then evaluated more in psychological and esthetic ways than 
in terms of performance.  But today [1935] the automobile gasoline must be 
made so that its properties will conform to the requirements of a high-speed 
high-compression motor . . . . In order to fill these and other new economic 
needs the industry began to treat the crude oil in special ways to produce 
products of higher quality and a greater variety of properties. 
MILLER & SHEA, supra note 37, at 27 (quoting Frederick D. Rossini, Chemical 
Constitution of the Gasoline Fraction of Petroleum, REFINER AND NAT. GASOLINE MFR., 
June 1935, at 255).  Early refineries produced kerosene of such variable quality that 
the very name of the Standard Oil Company was chosen to convey the “standard 
quality of the product.”  YERGIN, supra note 27, at 40.  Of course, variable quality in 
kerosene was particularly dangerous—“[i]f the kerosene contained too much flammable 
gasoline or naphtha, as sometimes happened, the purchaser’s attempt to light it could 
be his last act on this earth.”  Id. 
 155 GIDDENS, supra note 37, at 180-81 (Early competition between Standard 
(Indiana) and Wadhams Oil Company of Wisconsin was over quality.  Wadhams 
argued gas from cracking was inferior, Standard argued its gas was uniform in quality.  
The main issue was which worked better under cold conditions.). 
 156 Id. at 182 (Light-gravity gas started easier but had greater tendency to 
vapor lock and gave less mileage.  Motorists soon recognized this.). 
 157 Id. at 179 (States regulated gasoline quality and these laws “were based 
upon gasoline obtained directly from crude oil” and refined products processed with 
cracking, etc. could not satisfy the definitions (which specified a gravity of at least 63 
degrees).). 
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many gasolines are blended with ethanol, initially thought to 
improve environmental quality, but now largely seen as 
ineffective.158 
Over time, however, the consistency of gasoline 
converged in several key respects.159  From the consumer’s point 
of view, the most important was the gradual standardization of 
octane ratings; three roughly similar grades of gasoline are 
now offered by most U.S. gasoline retailers.160  Although some 
gasoline retailers attempted to differentiate their products 
through the use of particular additives161 or unusual octane 
ratings,162 from the 1920s to the 1980s, gasoline steadily 
became more of a commodity in which price competition 
dominated competition through product differentiation.163  Not 
  
 158 See Jonathan H. Adler, Clean Fuels, Dirty Air, in ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLITICS: PUBLIC COSTS, PRIVATE REWARDS 19, 28-37 (Michael S. Greve & Fred L. 
Smith, Jr. eds., 1992) (reviewing the politics of the oxygenate provisions in the CAA 
Amendments of 1990). 
 159 NPC, 1990S, supra note 63, at 15 (“With the exception of the additives 
package, which is typically unique from brand to brand, gasolines are generally 
interchangeable.”); id. at 30 (stating that “most current gasolines are truly 
interchangeable products”); see also NPC, ADEQUACY, supra note 59, at 95 (noting 
development of ASTM standards for gasoline specifications and efforts by refiners to 
use “internal specifications” to assure quality). 
 160 LEFFLER, supra note 40, at 137. 
 161 Mobil, for example, promoted the inclusion of detergents in its gasoline 
starting in the 1950s.  See United Dairy Farmers, http://www.udfinc.com/mobil/ (last 
visited Apr. 12, 2007) (“Mobil has long recognized that gasoline detergent additives are 
necessary for modern vehicles to stay in top operating condition.  In fact, Mobil was the 
first gasoline marketer to use detergents, back in 1954, 40 years before the U.S. 
government began to require their use.  Since that time, we’ve continued our 
leadership position in gasoline detergency.  In 1985, Mobil was the first to use 
detergents that cleaned fuel injectors.  We continue to use state of the art detergent 
additives in all of our gasoline grades.”).  Exxon told consumers, “[p]ut a Tiger in your 
Tank.”  See Tiger, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tiger (last visited Apr. 12, 
2007) (describing Exxon’s use of tiger mascot).  Amoco sold unleaded gasoline long 
before gasoline retailers were required to do so and marketed the absence of lead as an 
advantage.  See Leslie H. Moeller, Nick Hodson & Brad Wolfsen, The Superpremium 
Premium, STRATEGY+BUSINESS, Winter 2004, available at http://www.strategy-
business.com/press/16635507/04401. 
 162 Dirlam & Kahn, supra note 33, at 831 (describing how Sun Oil competed in 
the 1950s by “offering higher than standard octane gasoline at standard prices” and so 
“giving the customer more for his money”); James B. McNallen, A New Concept in 
Gasoline Marketing, 22 J. MKTG. 273 (1958) (discussing Sun’s marketing strategy). 
 163 Jones, supra note 116, at xxi (“In the period up to the late 1970s there was 
an element of performance competition amongst the major oil companies, but since that 
time this element of competition has largely disappeared and, in respect of petroleum 
fuels at least, it has become much more of a commodity market meeting industry 
standard specifications. Where companies have sought to distinguish their fuels in 
recent years it has rarely been on the basis of performance . . . .”); see also Vernon T. 
Clover, Price Influence of Unbranded Gasoline, 17 J. MKTG. 388, 393 (1953) (noting that 
a study of independent gasoline retailers in the 1950s found that “[i]ndependents, as 
compared to standards, offer little in the way of services, and put little stress upon 
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surprisingly, as the product became more of a commodity, 
refining became a low-margin business,164 and any effort to 
raise prices caused the price leader to lose market share.165  As 
refiners’ attempts to reduce competition failed, the gasoline 
market increasingly approached the economics textbook ideal.  
Thus, market forces helped bring about a relatively steady 
decline in the real price of gasoline—aided, of course, by the 
decline of real crude oil prices that occurred throughout most of 
this period.  
The crucial point for our purposes is that gasoline is a 
complex commodity, the design of which presents refiners with 
a large number of tradeoffs.166  Gasolines differ in terms of their 
environmental impacts and their engine performance.  With 
gasoline composition largely unregulated through the 1980s,167 
market pressures during that decade commodified gasoline, 
pushing it toward a more-or-less standard set of characteristics 
about which consumers cared (e.g., octane), broadening and 
deepening the market for gasoline.168  Refiners remained free to 
  
attractive buildings and facilities, and uniformed employees,” instead stressing prices 
below the standards). 
 164 See, e.g., Walter Pfeiffer, Refining: Let the Good Times Roll (Paper 
Presented at CERAWeek 2005), available at http://www.accenture.com/Countries/ 
Canada/Research_And_Insights/RefiningLetGoodTimesRoll.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 
2007) (“Over the last 20 years conventional wisdom has been that refining is capital 
intensive and low margin.  The industry has been trapped in a period of limited 
demand growth, overcapacity and low profitability, coupled with repeated boom-and-
bust cycles.  It has become viewed as more of a necessity, rather than an attractive 
business in which to invest and grow . . . .”).  Pfeiffer forecasts better times ahead, 
however.  Id. 
 165 Further evidence of the commodification of gasoline is the development of 
new forms of marketing gasoline to develop alternative revenue streams.  As early as 
the 1920s, Standard Oil of Indiana was treating its service stations as vehicles for the 
sale of a broad array of products, giving managers quotas for its entire range of 
products from furniture to lubricants.  GIDDENS, supra note 37, at 283 (“By the late 
1920’s Standard service stations had evolved into stores for the sale of petroleum 
products instead of simply being gasoline filling stations.”).  Grocery stores are 
increasingly using gasoline sales as a loss leader today.  See Penelope Patsuris, Wal-
Mart’s Next Victims, FORBES, Nov. 10, 2004 (describing Wal-Mart’s move into gas 
sales); Report: Gas Group Fumes Over Giant Eagle Discounts, PITT. BUS. TIMES, Mar. 
14, 2005, available at http://www.bizjournals.com/pittsburgh/stories/2005/03/14/ 
daily7.html (describing grocery store use of fuel discounts to gain market share). 
 166 For example, hydrotreating gasoline to remove sulfur also reduces octane 
by approximately ten numbers in “FCC gasoline” (that made with fluid catalytic-
cracking units).  NPC, ADEQUACY, supra note 59, at 45. 
 167 The major exception was the mandatory phaseout of lead in the 1970s and 
1980s.  See infra notes 496-502 and accompanying text. 
 168 Market pressures during the 1980s were particularly effective as the 
industry had excessive domestic refining capacity through the mid-1990s as a result of 
the distortions introduced by MOIP and 1970s price controls/allocation system.  See 
NPC, ADEQUACY, supra note 59, at 21. 
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alter other gasoline characteristics to maximize profits, 
producing gasoline blends that varied with refinery equipment 
and crude supplies.  Since then, however, environmental 
regulations and engine performance demands have complicated 
the market by introducing new requirements.169 
4. The Impact of Distribution Systems 
Gasoline was originally transported by tank wagons and 
rail cars.170  The “most revolutionary development” in 
transportation was the 1929 conversion of an oil pipeline into a 
gasoline pipeline running from Bayonne, New Jersey to 
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.171  “With a carrying charge far below 
railroad freight rates, gasoline could now be shipped into the 
Middle West via the Ohio River and the Great Lakes and have 
a profound competitive effect upon the price of gasoline from 
Wood River, Whiting, and other Mid-Continent refineries.”172  
Pipeline capacity rapidly expanded in the 1930s.  Capacity 
grew from 1,289 miles in 1930 to over 8,000 miles by 1940.173 
By the 1980s, the pipeline networks and the rest of the 
transportation system174 had grown to allow refiners to ship 
across wide territories,175 although significant gaps remained.176  
  
 169 NPC, OBSERVATIONS, supra note 13, at I-18 (“As product specifications 
become more restrictive, the ability to utilize all the flexibility and volume capacity 
inherent in the refining system can be diminished.”); PETERSON & MAHNOVSKI, supra 
note 76, at xiv (“As demand for petroleum products has grown, their quality and 
performance have changed substantially as a result of environmental regulations and 
motor vehicle performance requirements.”). 
 170 GIDDENS, supra note 37, at 46-48 (describing early distribution methods). 
 171 Id. at 466. 
 172 Id. at 466-67. 
 173 1 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 825. 
 174 NPC, 1990S, supra note 63, at 23 (“As gasoline moves from each refinery 
through the complex maze of transportation modes, through terminals and bulk plants 
to the consumer, it may move into many tanks and vessels owned and operated by 
different companies.”); PETERSON & MAHNOVSKI, supra note 76, at 23 (“In response to 
the changing geography of consumption, a complex network of refined-products 
pipelines has evolved.”). 
 175 FTC, MERGERS, supra note 5, at 210 (“Pipelines are the leading method 
used for bulk transport of refined products within the United States; transportation by 
water is also important.”); PETERSON & MAHNOVSKI, supra note 76, at 23 (“The East 
Coast and the Midwest, while having relatively few refineries given the size of their 
population, obtain approximately 40 and 20 percent, respectively, via pipeline and 
water carriers from Gulf Coast mega-refineries.  The Northeast also relies on a large 
increment of refined products (17 percent in 1999) imported from abroad, giving that 
region a measure of additional market liquidity.”). 
 176 PETERSON & MAHNOVSKI, supra note 76, at 23 (“California, Nevada, and 
parts of Arizona are largely walled off from the rest of the country by both geography 
and stringent local environmental regulations.”). 
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“[S]hipments by pipeline increased from 236 billion ton-miles 
in 1979 to 299 billion ton-miles in 2001.”177  As gasolines 
became commodities, this system allowed shipments to be 
treated as interchangeable178 and refiners routinely engaged in 
product exchanges to reduce transportation costs and solve 
temporary shortages.179   
Today the United States has a “complex set of facilities” 
that distribute gasoline and other fuels which “includes a 
network of geographically dispersed pipelines, marine vessels, 
and occasionally rail cars” and which “is made even more 
complex by the number of different product variations that 
must be transported to the marketplace.”180  Most large 
petroleum markets are supplied primarily by local refineries 
because “[t]he fundamental transportation and flexibility 
advantage of moving crude oil versus a variety of products 
generally favors local refiners serving local markets.”181  
Distribution systems are critical to the competitiveness of a 
local market, however, as they link markets and allow 
shipments in and out as local demand and supply conditions 
vary.  “In some cases a pipeline may have more control over the 
pricing and volume of products entering a market than do the 
refiners supplying the pipeline.”182 
Unfortunately, however, “[a]ccess to refined product 
pipelines . . . varies widely among different regions in the U.S.”183  
The amount of refinery capacity and the interconnection of an 
area with other areas are important determinants of whether 
or not market pressures can produce a response to temporary 
shortages.184  For example, almost half of U.S. refining capacity 
is concentrated on the Gulf Coast,185 while 95% of East Coast 
  
 177 FTC, MERGERS, supra note 5, at 210. 
 178 NPC, 1990S, supra note 63, at 23 (stating that the “preponderance of 
shipments” of gasoline are “interchangeable”). 
 179 Id. at 23 (“The interchangeability of base motor gasolines is further 
demonstrated by the product exchanges between refiners in different locations.  It is 
typical for a refiner in one location to trade or exchange surplus product to another 
refiner located in a different state. . . . Unique additive packages, specified by each 
company, are often added at the terminal upon truck loading in order to achieve unique 
product quality and marketing differentiation.”). 
 180 NPC, ADEQUACY, supra note 59, at 101. 
 181 Id. at 22. 
 182 FTC, MERGERS, supra note 5, at 189. 
 183 FTC, GASOLINE PRICE CHANGES, supra note 9, at 80. 
 184 Id. at 69. 
 185 Id. at 81. 
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refineries sit in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Delaware.186  
New England, on the other hand, has no refineries or 
pipelines,187 and California remains isolated by its special fuel 
formulations and lack of pipelines.188 
As might be expected, “refinery capacity [also] varies 
widely among different regions of the U.S.”189  Refined products 
are often not produced where they are used, so they must be 
transported to the market.  These transportation costs limit the 
extent to which any particular refinery can sell its gasolines in 
each location and define the extent of market power each will 
have in particular areas. 
The product mix is also crucial to determining the cost 
of transportation.  When different products are sent through a 
pipeline, for example, the interface between the two products 
where some mixing occurs must be sold as the lower-quality 
product, producing a loss in value.190  Boutique fuels make this 
even more difficult.191 
A low degree of connectivity to the broader market has 
been crucial in determining the success of some refiners.  For 
example, “[a] critical asset of many smaller refiners is their 
location in interior markets where a lack of pipeline access 
protects them from competition from large coastal refineries.”192  
Extending a pipeline into a small refiner’s territory is a “real 
threat.”193  Thus, these higher-cost producers survive only 
because they are insulated from competitive pressures by their 
relative isolation from the broader market and the costs and 
regulatory obstacles associated with entering those markets.  
  
 186 Id. at 84. 
 187 Id. at 85. 
 188 Id. at 87. 
 189 FTC, GASOLINE PRICE CHANGES, supra note 9, at 79. 
 190 NPC, ADEQUACY, supra note 59, at 105. 
 191 Id. (“As the number of different products increases and batch sizes 
decrease, quality control become more difficult and the effective capacity of the pipeline 
system decreases.”); see also id. at 108 (For each new fuel specification, “there will be 
distribution system modifications required.”). 
 192 PETERSON & MAHNOVSKI, supra note 76, at 18-19; see also NPC, 
ADEQUACY, supra note 59, at 29 (“In some situations, local markets are isolated from 
direct product supply routes and are therefore more expensive to supply from distant 
refining centers.”); FTC, GASOLINE PRICE CHANGES, supra note 9, at 52 (“A small 
refinery’s cost disadvantages from small-scale operation may be offset if it is located 
near an area of crude oil production or strong gasoline consumption, so that 
transportation costs are low, or if it is able to serve a niche market.”). 
 193 PETERSON & MAHNOVSKI, supra note 76, at 67. 
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C. Understanding the Market for Gasoline 
This brief overview of the non-regulatory aspects of 
gasoline markets paints the following picture:  Gasoline has a 
broad range of characteristics produced from a substance that 
itself varies significantly, using equipment that varies from 
location to location.  Its production remains subject to various 
constraints imposed by the crude, the equipment, and the 
characteristics of the final product demanded by consumers.  
Market pressures produced a commodity fuel from this mix of 
unique inputs, equipment, and outputs, at least with respect to 
the characteristics about which consumers have a preference 
(e.g., octane, RVP).  Refiners were able to create this 
commodity by using other aspects of gasoline composition (e.g., 
the particular combination of hydrocarbon fractions blended 
into a particular batch) because the differences among these 
characteristics were invisible to, and so irrelevant for, 
consumers.  Refiners were also able to continually expand 
output from refineries through technological progress, again 
making use of the ability to use a variety of blendstocks 
without changing the consumer-demanded characteristics of 
the gasoline.  The price of being able to do so, however, was 
increasing the complexity of refineries to give them the 
flexibility to process quite different crudes into gasolines with 
the appropriate consumer-demanded characteristics. 
Without the impact of either economic or environmental 
regulation of refining, the market for gasoline was likely 
headed toward fewer, larger, more complex refineries 
producing a product with sufficiently commodified 
characteristics that consumers primarily differentiated among 
gasolines by price.  In the absence of regulation, therefore, we 
would expect to see a national market for gasolines, with 
regional variations in composition designed to promote uniform 
performance under a range of local conditions.  The limit to 
such a market would likely be transportation costs.  Those, in 
turn, would likely have been derived primarily from the extent 
of the pipeline and tanker network.  Because businesses in 
other markets have prospered by solving similar logistical 
problems,194 an unregulated gasoline market would likely have 
led to logistical innovations, extending the market’s size.  This 
  
 194 See MICHAEL BERGDAHL, WHAT I LEARNED FROM SAM WALTON: HOW TO 
COMPETE AND THRIVE IN A WAL-MART WORLD 126-27 (2004) (describing Wal-Mart’s 
logistics savings). 
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conclusion stems from the above analysis and the almost 
uninterrupted trends toward such a market, despite the radical 
shifts in regulatory policy since World War II, which are 
described in the next section. 
How competitive would gasoline markets be in the 
absence of regulation?  Counterfactuals are always difficult to 
prove, but it seems most likely that markets would have tended 
toward the competitive end of the spectrum for two reasons.  
First, from the consumer’s perspective, gasoline has moved 
steadily toward commodity status, particularly during the 
comparatively unregulated early period and the brief return to 
relatively unregulated status during the 1980s.  During this 
period (and into the 1990s), refineries became more efficient 
and competitive.195  Second, although the capital intensity of 
modern refineries makes entry more costly than it would be in 
a less capital-intensive industry, capital intensity alone is not a 
sufficient barrier to entry to prevent the development of 
competition where opportunities for profit exist.  The industry 
would likely have attracted new entrants.  Indeed, when excess 
capacity declined in the 1980s, additional capacity in existing 
refineries quickly eliminated the higher than usual returns 
that the industry briefly enjoyed during the late 1980s.196  
Moreover, as economic deregulation occurred in the 1980s, new 
firms did enter the refining industry by buying existing 
refineries.197  We now turn to the impact of regulatory policy 
and the question of whether it produced negative regulatory 
externalities that fragment the market. 
II. REGULATORY IMPACTS 
Energy markets have historically been subject to 
numerous regulations from a wide range of federal and state 
agencies.  One analysis of U.S. policy through the 1970s 
concluded that the dominant theme was a “drift toward 
government control” of the oil industry, perhaps best explained 
“by the tendency to presume that any situation defined as a 
problem must have a solution, and that a solution is, ipso facto, 
  
 195 NPC, ADEQUACY, supra note 59, at 30 (using financial data collected by the 
Energy Information Administration to demonstrate increased competitiveness). 
 196 Id. at 32 (returns to capital rose to 13% in 1988-1989 before declining to 4% 
in 1990-1998 as new capacity came online). 
 197 For example, Valero, the largest U.S. refiner today, bought its first refinery 
in 1981. Valero Energy Corp., Valero Through the Years, http://www.valero.com/ 
About+Valero/History/ (last visited Apr. 12, 2007). 
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worth pursuing.”198  These regulations have had a major impact 
on gasoline markets, if not always the impact intended.  
Although the focus shifted from economic regulation to 
environmental regulation after the 1981 decontrol of oil prices, 
the depth of the interaction between the government and the 
market continued.  In this section, we describe the major 
economic and environmental regulations that shaped the 
gasoline market. 
A. Economic Regulatory Activity and Gasoline Markets 
U.S. energy policy reflects numerous twists and turns, 
falling into five distinct periods, each characterized by a 
different approach to government intervention. 
1. The Early Years 
The regulatory story of the refining business, and of the 
oil business more generally, begins with Standard Oil and its 
opponents’ efforts to defeat the company’s alleged monopolistic 
advantage.199  Indeed, one of the abiding themes of American 
regulatory policy—fear of monopoly—was present virtually 
from the start of the oil industry.  The recurrence of 
government intervention aimed at preventing monopoly bred 
“an unusually virulent and mutual distrust between 
government and the oil industry” that has persisted ever 
since.200 
There is extensive literature on Standard Oil and the 
evidence on whether the company harmed or helped consumers 
remains decidedly mixed.201  For example, despite playing the 
villain to the trust-busters’ hero, Standard Oil actually 
contributed positively toward the creation of a national market 
in gasoline.  The company took the lead in creating a standard 
form of gasoline.  Indeed, John D. Rockefeller chose the name 
  
 198 BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 14-15. 
 199 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); see also GIDDENS, 
supra note 37, at 124-25 (describing issuance of opinion by Supreme Court).  The 
attack was led by Ida M. Tarbell, whose series in McClure’s was later published as a 
554-page, two-volume work with 242 pages of appendices including copies of contracts, 
maps, and reproductions of letters.  David M. Chalmers, Introduction to IDA M. 
TARBELL, THE HISTORY OF THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY at xiv-xv, xxii (David M. 
Chalmers ed., Dover Publ’ns, Briefer ed. 2003) (1966). 
 200 VIETOR, supra note 98, at 34. 
 201 See 1 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 1070-1105 (summarizing Standard Oil 
case and analyzing welfare effects). 
2007] WHY GASOLINE COSTS SO MUCH 979 
 
“Standard Oil” in part to convey the image of a standardized 
product, a key marketing advantage in the early years of the 
petroleum industry, when many refined products varied widely 
in quality.202  Standard Oil also played an integral part in 
establishing a national market for petroleum products by 
building infrastructure to help move oil and refined products 
around the nation.203  By 1910, a truly national gasoline market 
had begun to emerge, ironically weakening Standard Oil’s 
market power just as the antitrust-based assault on the 
company reached its climax.204  On the other hand, there is 
little doubt that Standard Oil and its successors repeatedly 
attempted to cartelize the industry.  Indeed, the trend toward 
consolidation was apparent by the end of the Civil War, only a 
few years after the first oil well began producing.205  Such 
efforts are unsurprising.  After all, the dream of monopoly 
profits casts a tempting lure and there is no reason to expect 
the oil industry to be any better able to resist this lure than 
other firms. 
Anti-monopoly efforts give government involvement in 
gasoline markets a lengthy pedigree.  In the Standard Oil 
cases, the result was a famous court-ordered breakup in 
1911,206 followed by various antitrust actions seeking additional 
remedies when the newly-separated Standard companies 
provided less vigorous competition for one another than 
antitrust authorities thought optimal.207  Despite these 
aggressive antitrust efforts, before the outbreak of the First 
World War, U.S. refining was “expanding and profitable.”208   
By the end of World War I, a second regulatory concern 
had appeared: national security.  The Great War highlighted 
  
 202 See id. at 1093. 
 203 Id. at 1089-94 (summarizing Standard Oil’s contributions). 
 204 WHITTEN & WHITTEN, supra note 81, at 147 (“At the peak of Standard’s 
power, the trust controlled over 90 percent of crude oil production and refining 
capacity.  By the time the firm was dismembered under court order—the manifestation 
of the public’s fear and ignorance—Standard controlled less than 70 percent of 
production and refining, and the percentages were falling.”). 
 205 Id. at 10. 
 206 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). 
 207 The breakup was insufficient to end the “problem,” however, as the new 
companies created continued to be owned by overlapping shareholder groups.  1 BRADLEY, 
supra note 74, at 1087.  Public suspicions of the oil companies continued, fueled by 
observations that the newly independent Standard companies did not invade one 
another’s territories.  Id. at 1089.  Thus, although formal coordination had been ended, 
antitrust regulators feared that informal coordination among the Standard companies 
was continuing to restrain competition and keep prices above the competitive level. 
 208 2 id. at 1110. 
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the military importance of oil supplies209 and wartime price 
controls caused supply problems.210  Responding to these 
concerns, the federal government deemphasized its antitrust 
activity as regulatory attention shifted to maximizing 
production for the war effort.211  Because national security 
concerns often run counter to antitrust policies, federal energy 
policy can appear bipolar as it cycles between them.212   
A third regulatory motive appeared during World War I 
as energy companies recognized that influencing government 
policy was potentially lucrative.  Wartime price controls put 
many refiners into financial difficulties, prompting some to 
seek government assistance.213  Rent-seeking by oil interests 
began in earnest as the wartime experience created new 
players in energy regulation debates in the form of oil trade 
associations organized to lobby for industry favors in 
Washington.214   
A related desire to prevent “excessive competition” 
presented yet another justification for regulation after the war.  
The post-war boom saw oil production and use soar.215  
Domestic oil discoveries increased, and although these made 
the United States a net exporter of petroleum by 1923,216 
increased supplies exerted consistent downward price 
  
 209 Mining Laws of 1872 and 1989: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Mineral 
Resources Development and Production of the S. Comm. on Energy and Natural 
Resources, 101st Cong. 35 (1990) (“The 1920 Mineral Leasing Act . . . was passed in 
1920 after the United States had fought the great war in which oil powered ships and 
other vehicles had played a vital role.”); CARL J. MAYER & GEORGE A. RILEY, PUBLIC 
DOMAIN, PRIVATE DOMINION: A HISTORY OF PUBLIC MINERAL POLICY IN AMERICA 169 
(1985) (Oil lands policy after the war “met the needs of a powerful official constituency, 
the American military.”). 
 210 1 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 28. 
 211 HAWLEY, supra note 54, at 10. 
 212 VIETOR, supra note 98, at 33. 
 213 2 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 1111. 
 214 HAWLEY, supra note 54, at 10 (“The newly organized trade associations 
remained as a prominent part of the postwar economy.  Business leaders, especially 
those who had worked in Washington, had caught a new vision of what could be done 
by economic planning and business-government cooperation.  A new breed of public 
administrators, skilled in the techniques of wartime control, were more prone to reject 
competitive values and stress the goal of a planned economy.”).  Of course, national 
security and military concerns continue to surface in energy policy debates today, and 
often touch on a wide range of related issues.  See Jon Schutz, An Analysis of the 2001 
National Energy Policy: Is a Domestic Production-Based Oil Policy Appropriate for the 
United States?, 12 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 307 (2004) (surveying U.S. dependence on 
foreign oil and energy security issues). 
 215 GIDDENS, supra note 37, at 172 (crude consumption up from 240,000,000 
barrels in 1912 to 412,000,000 barrels in 1918). 
 216 BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 20. 
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pressure.217  Oil producers worried that too much competition in 
production kept prices low,218 while conservationists worried 
that excessive consumption would deplete stocks.219  Oil-
producing states tried to regulate production to prevent 
technical inefficiencies from dissipating the resource through 
over-drilling, and made an effort to keep prices higher for 
mineral rights owners by restraining production.220  These 
efforts had limited success,221 although the development of legal 
doctrines such as pooling held out the promise of a solution to 
the problem of wastefully rapid production.222   
Demand for gasoline continued to grow through the 
1920s, rising from 2,747,000,000 gallons per year to 
15,051,000,000 gallons per year between 1918 and 1929, 
primarily due to increased automobile use.223  Refined product 
imports soared from 3,000 barrels per day in 1918 to 82,000 
barrels per day in 1929.224  Although the United States 
remained the chief oil producer, foreign discoveries began to 
create a world-wide crude industry and many of the major oil 
companies took steps to limit competition.  For instance, the 
1928 “As Is” agreement aimed to preserve existing 
international market shares; the “Red Line” agreement that 
same year limited competition over Middle Eastern production; 
and various patent pools restricted competition between the 
chemical and petroleum industries.225  Nevertheless, without 
enforcement powers, these arrangements typically failed to 
prevent competition from resurfacing.226 
  
 217 1 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 88. 
 218 Id. at 88-89 (describing industry concern with overproduction of crude in 
mid-1920s). 
 219 HAWLEY, supra note 54, at 27. 
 220 See 1 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 78-131 (comprehensive survey of state 
conservation legislation). 
 221 VIETOR, supra note 98, at 22 (explaining that waste in oil fields was a real 
problem in the 1910s-1920s; state boards had been unsuccessful in reigning in 
production). 
 222 See 1 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 200-11 (describing mandatory pooling 
and unitization rules).  Bradley makes a convincing case that there were private 
alternatives to mandatory pooling and unitization and that these were blocked in part 
by antitrust laws.  See id. at 211-17. 
 223 GIDDENS, supra note 37, at 213. 
 224 1 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 716 tbl.13.1. 
 225 VIETOR, supra note 98, at 23, 26-28. 
 226 Id. at 28 (“[D]espite the elaborate administrative procedures and 
interlocking joint-ventures designed to implement these agreements, their 
effectiveness was limited by the absence of sovereign authority.  Only prorationing 
within the United States proved to be durable, comprehensive, and enforceable.”). 
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These four cornerstones—monopoly, national security, 
rent-seeking, and restraining “excessive” competition—laid the 
foundation for energy policy throughout the twentieth century 
and into the twenty-first.  Often contradictory, they yielded 
ever-shifting coalitions that brought each policy to the fore at 
different times and contributed to the general incoherence of 
energy regulatory policy by providing a wide range of policy 
targets in different directions.  Nonetheless, on the eve of the 
Great Depression, despite the shifting attentions of the federal 
and state governments, the market for gasoline was well on its 
way to becoming a national market.  Transportation costs227 
and crude prices were falling, while demand for gasoline 
continued to skyrocket.  Refiners were competing on quality, 
driving gasoline toward commodity status,228 and new 
technologies were boosting gasoline yields from crude.229  The 
monopoly problem was held in check by vigorous competition 
and the ease of entry; America was a leading oil producer, 
temporarily vitiating the national security concerns; states 
were groping toward legal mechanisms like unitization to solve 
the technical problems of wasteful production, if not the 
economic problem of increasing supply; and regular new 
discoveries limited the ability of the incumbents to rent-seek by 
undermining collusion. 
2. The New Deal 
When the Great Depression suffocated the economy of 
the Roaring Twenties, oil prices fell dramatically.230  They were 
hit particularly hard because of the supply boom caused by the 
discovery of substantial reserves in East Texas in 1930.231  More 
than 5,000 new wells were drilled there between 1930 and 1932 
and the East Texas field alone met one-third of U.S. demand.232  
Refinery capacity greatly exceeded the Depression-reduced 
demand, with the capacity-to-demand ratio at 1.48.233  Despite 
the Depression, technological progress continued and began to 
have an important impact by the end of the 1930s, improving 
  
 227 See supra notes 170-72 and accompanying text.  
 228 LEFFLER, supra note 40, at 77. 
 229 See supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
 230 YERGIN, supra note 27, at 254.  
 231 HAWLEY, supra note 54, at 212. 
 232 VIETOR, supra note 98, at 23. 
 233 BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 296 tbl.8-8. 
2007] WHY GASOLINE COSTS SO MUCH 983 
 
gasoline quality, as an “octane race” developed.234  In oil and 
refined products, as elsewhere, Franklin Roosevelt’s 
administration sought recovery through measures promoting 
higher, more stable prices, bringing the “excessive competition” 
policy to the forefront.  
Existing state regulatory schemes offered one means of 
raising oil prices, but these schemes were too porous, allowing 
the so-called “hot oil” to leak out of regulated channels into 
commerce, undercutting prices.235  “This bootleg oil was secretly 
siphoned off from pipelines, hidden in camouflaged tanks that 
were covered with weeds, moved about both in an intricate 
network of secret pipelines and by trucks, and then smuggled 
across state borders at night.”236  In 1932, oil prices plummeted 
further, falling from $1.05 per barrel to $0.25 per barrel, and 
Texas and Oklahoma declared martial law in the oil fields in 
an attempt to stop hot oil.237  Even when the states were 
successful in raising prices and limiting domestic production, 
foreign oil imports threatened to undermine their efforts, 
sparking demands for tariffs to protect domestic producers.238  
The Roosevelt administration severely limited imports of both 
crude and refined products in September 1933.239 
The federal government moved to assist the states in 
restricting hot oil240 by including a provision in the National 
Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) giving the president authority 
to ban hot oil,241 and imposing a tariff on crude oil imports of 
twenty-one cents per barrel in 1932.242  The Roosevelt 
administration took several additional steps, including 
promulgating an industry-designed Oil Code under the 
National Recovery Administration (NRA), which limited 
  
 234 GIDDENS, supra note 37, at 600; see also id. at 482 (Despite the Depression, 
Standard expanded to upgrade equipment to produce more high-grade gasoline.); 2 
BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 1134 (“On the eve of hostilities, the U.S. refining industry 
was prospering with the automobile age.  Markets were expanding, and technological 
advances abounded.”). 
 235 HAWLEY, supra note 54, at 213; YERGIN, supra note 27, at 255-56. 
 236 YERGIN, supra note 27, at 255.  
 237 VIETOR, supra note 98, at 23. 
 238 GIDDENS, supra note 37, at 461 (mid-continent and Gulf Coast producers 
wanted a tariff of $1 per barrel in 1929). 
 239 1 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 721. 
 240 Id. at 99-103 (describing hot oil provisions of the NIRA). 
 241 HAWLEY, supra note 54, at 213. 
 242 VIETOR, supra note 98, at 92.  In an attempt to head off the tariff, several 
producers agreed to voluntary cuts in imports of 25% and more.  GIDDENS, supra note 
37, at 462.  
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competition and created a production quota for each state.243  
The production quota, as amended in 1934, allocated crude 
among refineries,244 further restricting competition.  As with 
other industries’ codes, the rules included policies that enabled 
the industry to take steps to limit competition and so promote 
higher prices.245   
The Supreme Court struck down the NRA system and 
its hot oil provision in 1935,246 but federal intervention had 
established a framework in the oil industry that survived the 
demise of the NRA itself.  Congress quickly passed the 
Interstate Transportation of Petroleum Products Act (also 
known as the Connally Hot Oil Act),247 banning transmission of 
hot oil in interstate commerce and lending federal assistance in 
stopping the leakage.248  Together with “suggested” federal 
production limits, this created an informal system that 
effectively enforced the “suggested” quotas set out by the 
federal government and proved sufficient to coordinate 
production even without mandatory federal controls.249  A 
congressional investigation later concluded that the various oil 
controls formed “a perfect pattern of monopolistic control over 
oil production, the distribution thereof among refiners and 
distributors, and ultimately the price paid by the public.”250  It 
also encouraged the oil industry to look to Washington for 
aid.251  The addition of a tariff on foreign oil in 1932 limited the 
ability of the growing number of foreign oil producers to 
compete on price with domestic producers in the U.S. market,252 
  
 243 YERGIN, supra note 27, at 255-56.   
Theoretically, [these quotas] were justified as conservation measures, but in 
reality the rate of withdrawal bore little relation to what a geologist might 
regard as the rate necessary to minimize waste.  The state allowables, in fact, 
rarely deviated from the monthly estimates of the Federal Bureau of Mines, 
estimates that in effect merely stated how much crude oil would be needed to 
meet demand for gasoline at the existing price level. 
HAWLEY, supra note 54, at 217-18. 
 244 GIDDENS, supra note 37, at 517. 
 245 2 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 1120-27. 
 246 See Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (striking hot oil 
provision); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (striking 
NIRA); see also 1 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 107-08 (describing impact of these cases). 
 247 Pub. L. No. 74-14, 49 Stat. 30 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 715 (2000)).  
 248 YERGIN, supra note 27, at 255. 
 249 Id. at 257.  See also HAWLEY, supra note 54, at 216-17 (describing debates 
over federal role). 
 250 Quoted in HAWLEY, supra note 54, at 219. 
 251 1 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 96-98. 
 252 YERGIN, supra note 27, at 258. 
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while declining production from the East Texas oil field helped 
limit hot oil.253  Although crude tariffs began to fall at the end of 
the 1930s, the relatively high refined-product tariffs stayed in 
place, protecting domestic refiners from foreign competition.254  
In effect, a little more than twenty-five years after the decree 
breaking up Standard Oil, the federal government created a 
more effective oil cartel than Standard Oil ever was. 
Antitrust concerns reemerged in the late 1930s, with an 
FTC investigation finding evidence of “a wide variety of price-
fixing, market-sharing, exclusive dealing, and production-
restricting arrangements” in many industries, including 
refining.255  The Madison Oil cases in 1937-1938 led to the 
convictions (later overturned) of sixteen corporations and thirty 
individuals accused of conspiring to fix prices through a buying 
arrangement in which major companies agreed to purchase the 
surplus gasoline of specified independent refiners to keep it off 
the market.256  (The defendants argued they were merely 
continuing activities which the NRA had encouraged.257)  
Antitrust activity was sufficiently vigorous in the 1930s and 
early 1940s that when Attorney General Tom Clark reviewed 
the list of proposed names for industry representatives to the 
National Petroleum Council in 1946, he found that more than 
half of the executives on the list had been convicted personally, 
pled nolo contendere, or headed companies convicted or under 
indictment for antitrust violations.258 
In the early 1940s, efforts to prepare for war refocused 
attention on national security issues.259  A “Petroleum Industry 
War Council” was set up with seventy-eight oil company 
executives to coordinate working with the government, and 
there was “an unprecedented degree” of government control 
  
 253 GIDDENS, supra note 37, at 542. 
 254 1 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 722-23. 
 255 HAWLEY, supra note 54, at 166. 
 256 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).  See also 
HAWLEY, supra note 54, at 374, 433 (new trials ordered in eighteen cases and all 
charges dismissed in eleven). 
 257 HAWLEY, supra note 54, at 374. 
 258 VIETOR, supra note 98, at 35-36. 
 259 Antitrust concerns resurfaced in the “Mother Hubbard” case, which the 
Justice Department brought in 1940 against the American Petroleum Institute and 
twenty-two of its largest corporate members.  Id. at 34.  The case was suspended 
during the war, and resumed in 1946, and then dismissed in favor of several suits 
against smaller groups of defendants.  Id.  The clear message of this case was “that its 
every action was subject to question by the Attorney General of the United States.”  Id. 
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over the industry.260  As they had in World War I, the demands 
of war production dramatically affected the petroleum 
industry. 
Normal methods of transporting crude and products were disrupted 
by the submarine attacks along our East Coast.  Future military 
requirements for petroleum products were indefinite.  For example, 
the initial goal for 100 octane [for aircraft] gasoline was set at 
120,000 B/D late in 1941, a staggering figure considering that 
production at that time was somewhat less than 40,000 B/D.  Three 
years later, the requirement for 100 octane gasoline was more than 
600,000 B/D.261 
Refineries broke records for production and new facilities were 
built to satisfy the demand for aviation fuel, lubricants, and 
toluene (used in bombs).262  Standard of Indiana alone, for 
example, had a daily capacity for 1,150,800 gallons of 100 
octane aviation gasoline in 1944, more than the entire industry 
had before the war.263  Once again, technological progress in 
refining was rapid and regulators emphasized coordination of 
production over competition, encouraging coordinated efforts 
among refiners to meet the military’s needs for fuel.264   
The period from the Depression to the end of World War 
II saw gasoline markets buffeted by the constant cycling among 
government policy aims.  Concern over ruinous competition 
swung to antitrust vigilance only to have national security 
issues trump both.  These inconsistent energy policies had a 
threefold effect.  First, just as they had in World War I, the 
demands of wartime production produced rapid technological 
innovation which, in turn, spurred better quality that helped 
commodify gasoline.  Second, the growth in domestic and 
international crude supplies, which produced the “ruinous” 
competition that the NRA oil code sought to prevent, kept 
downward pressure on crude prices.  This pressure on prices 
masked industry rent-seeking to some degree, since the rents 
could be funded by having refined product prices fall more 
slowly than crude prices.  Third, the artificial limits on U.S. 
  
 260 GIDDENS, supra note 37, at 607; see also 1 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 235-
39, 243-48 (discussing World War II-era regulation). 
 261 NPC, IMPACT, supra note 28, at 324; see also 2 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 
1136-39 (describing crash program to boost aviation fuel output). 
 262 GIDDENS, supra note 37, at 609, 615. 
 263 Id. at 619. 
 264 2 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 1138-39 (discussing government coordination 
of refining “as though all [plants] were components of one huge refinery” and use of 
regulation and subsidies to accomplish that end). 
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crude production kept crude prices above world levels, creating 
conditions that produced the post-war Mandatory Oil Import 
Program to restrict the importation of cheaper foreign crude 
oil. 
World War II led to improved refinery technology and, 
applying that technology to peace-time needs, the market for 
gasoline advanced significantly.  After the war, much of the 
federal petroleum regulatory bureaucracy was “dismantled.”265  
With gasoline quality improved, gasoline production ready to 
soar, and demand for gasoline poised to explode, had there 
been no further interventions, it seems likely that a truly 
national and competitive gasoline market would have emerged. 
3. From World War II to Price Controls 
The end of World War II unleashed tremendous demand 
for gasoline as the lifting of wartime rationing and the post-war 
boom put Americans on the road in record numbers.266  Demand 
for other oil-based fuels also surged as the United States 
shifted from a coal-based to an oil-and-gas-based energy 
economy.267  Despite shifting refineries from war production to 
automobile gasoline, this surge in demand meant there was 
little excess refinery capacity in the United States,268 as can be 
seen from the fall of the ratio of operating refining capacity to 
domestic consumption from 1.48 in 1930 to 1.03 in 1950.269  The 
creation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) in 1947 cut tariffs on both crude and refined 
products,270 boosting imports and making the United States a 
net importer of oil for the first time.271  Prices soared, more than 
doubling between 1945 and 1948.272  Within a few years, 
however, the high prices induced so much entry by new 
producers273 that refinery capacity increased beyond demand, 
  
 265 1 id. at 248. 
 266 NPC, IMPACT, supra note 28, at 255-56; YERGIN, supra note 27, at 409. 
 267 VIETOR, supra note 98, at 3. 
 268 NPC, IMPACT, supra note 28, at 255-56; YERGIN, supra note 27, at 409. 
 269 BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 296 tbl.8-8. 
 270 1 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 724. 
 271 JAMES EVERETT KATZ, CONGRESS AND NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY 13 (1984); 
YERGIN, supra note 27, at 395. 
 272 YERGIN, supra note 27, at 409.  Not surprisingly, this led to “more than 
twenty Congressional investigations” and accusations of an oil company conspiracy to 
force prices up.  Id. 
 273 Over $2 billion in refining expansion and improvement went into 
production between 1946 and 1952.  2 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 1151. 
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creating “an intensely competitive industry, with the individual 
refiners working diligently, as new equipment [was] installed, 
to find ways of increasing efficiency and reducing operating 
cost.”274  Gasoline markets continued to deepen, prices 
continued to fall, and product quality continued to improve as 
competition drove refiners to innovate. 
Internationally, producing countries began to move into 
refining in an effort to boost their share of the revenue from 
their oil,275 and the ever-growing stream of cheap foreign oil 
began to roil domestic oil politics.276  “Before foreign oil became 
available, the state prorationing agencies had managed output 
in order to avoid such circumstances.  But once cheap oil was 
available anywhere in the world economy, it was irresistibly 
drawn into the market vacuum that prorationing had created 
in the United States.”277  The major oil companies invested 
heavily in foreign sources, tanker fleets, shipping facilities, and 
coastal refineries, bringing cheaper crude to their U.S. 
refineries, and thus gaining a major cost advantage over 
independent refiners reliant on higher-cost U.S. sources of 
crude.278  By January 1949, imports were growing at an annual 
rate of 25%.279  By 1957, imports as a percentage of rising 
demand reached 17%, up from 11% just eight years earlier.280  
Independent domestic refiners, particularly those located away 
from easy access to foreign crude, were left with only the more 
expensive domestic crude supplies.  These refiners worried, 
correctly, that they would lose market share to the refineries 
with access to the cheaper foreign crude as those refineries 
  
 274 NPC, IMPACT, supra note 28, at 255-56; see also YERGIN, supra note 27, at 
409.  Differential tariffs encouraged imports of heavy fuels, such as residual oil, and 
discouraged imports of lighter fuels, such as gasoline, biasing U.S. refinery production 
toward the lighter end.  VIETOR, supra note 98, at 101 (The tariff on gasoline was fifty-
one cents per barrel but only five cents for resid; as a result, resid imports rose 136% 
while imports of more valuable distillate declined 18% in 1953.); id. at 113 (Some 
importers began bringing in even more “unfinished oils,” a category that was not 
covered and was stuff that needed more refining.). 
 275 YERGIN, supra note 27, at 436 (noting Venezuela’s move into refining to 
capture downstream revenues); id. at 518 (organization that became OPEC formed in 
1959 and a key decision was to move into downstream industries like refining). 
 276 VIETOR, supra note 98, at 91 (stating that imported oil available at half the 
price of U.S. oil “caused a major disruption” in energy markets). 
 277 Id. at 115. 
 278 BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 110 (“Import patterns by firms were 
already changing at the time mandatory controls were instituted [in 1959].  A minority 
of refineries were importing crude oil; a shrinking majority were not.”). 
 279 VIETOR, supra note 98, at 95. 
 280 Id. at 105 tbl.5-5. 
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exploited their cost advantage to extend their market 
penetration into the independent refiners’ territories.281  Thus, 
domestic oil producers feared free trade in oil, turning their 
attention to rent-seeking.282  Domestic crude-oil price controls 
were reintroduced from 1950 to 1953.283  At the same time, tax 
incentives for refinery projects, nominally motivated by 
national security concerns, produced a boom in refinery 
expansion and construction, especially among small refiners.284 
Heavy reliance on foreign oil returned national security 
concerns to the U.S. energy debate.285  The massive wartime 
collaboration between the refining industry and the 
government continued after the war on a slightly smaller 
scale.286  The Suez Canal crisis in 1956, for example, 
strengthened those favoring a more interventionist policy 
toward oil by highlighting the vulnerability of foreign 
supplies.287  The 1950s and 1960s also saw “huge investments” 
in refining drive down gas prices through “hard competition.”288  
In part, this reflected the rise in domestic crude production 
that the quotas had produced, a 29% increase between 1959 
and 1969.289 
  
 281 Id. at 125 (Arguing for protection, “the inland refiners asserted that if 
imports were limited to the real importers, their cost advantage would allow them to 
penetrate the markets of inland refiners and drive them out of business. The right to 
trade quotas to real importers in exchange for domestic oil was a paper 
transaction . . . .”). 
 282 Id. at 3 (Conflict in the 1945 to 1958 period shifted from stimulating supply 
to protecting market share as market went to super surplus conditions.). 
 283 1 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 250-52. 
 284 2 id. at 1156-58. 
 285 BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 139 (“Import controls, and their 
administration, were ostensibly designed to enhance the national security, however 
defined.  In general, this goal required maintenance of a larger domestic petroleum 
industry than would otherwise exist, and one secure from attack.”). 
 286 The Secretary of the Interior convened the National Petroleum Council.  
NPC, IMPACT, supra note 28, at 324; VIETOR, supra note 98, at 38 (stating that the 
function of the National Petroleum Council was for industry and government to talk 
and for industry to discuss policy among itself).  And, after the Korean War broke out, 
the federal government formed the Petroleum Administration for Defense.  NPC, 
IMPACT, supra note 28, at 324; VIETOR, supra note 98, at 41 (During the Korean War, 
the government sought to replicate World War II organization of the oil industry with 
the Petroleum Administration for Defense that reported to the Secretary of Interior.).  
See also 1 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 253-57 (describing Korean War-era planning 
agencies). 
 287 BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 41; YERGIN, supra note 27, at 536 (“The 
Suez crisis of 1956 highlighted concerns about national security. The price fall that 
followed the crisis further increased the clamor among independents for protection in 
the form of tariffs or quotas.”). 
 288 YERGIN, supra note 27, at 548. 
 289 Id. at 539. 
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The federal government first attempted to encourage 
domestic production on national security grounds through 
voluntary programs, including a voluntary quota system begun 
in 1957.290  The voluntary quotas failed for several reasons.291  
Some companies did not cooperate because they had 
disproportionately large foreign oil holdings and some refused 
because they feared antitrust prosecutions.292  New importers 
fought controls, even voluntary ones, because their imports 
would be frozen at low levels since they had just begun to 
import, some going so far as to build coastal refineries “in an 
effort to establish themselves as legitimate importers before 
the regulatory die was cast.”293  The price differentials between 
foreign and domestic crude, caused by state-level prorationing 
rules limiting domestic production, continually attracted new 
competitors into the oil import business, undermining the 
voluntary quota system.294   
Economic conditions also weakened the voluntary 
system.  “The recession of 1958 did in the voluntary program.  
While oil demand dropped substantially, imports increased 
further, and the political pressure for mandatory controls was 
becoming irresistible.”295  In particular, powerful Texas and 
Oklahoma politicians like Senate Majority Leader Lyndon 
Johnson, House Speaker Sam Rayburn, and Oklahoma Senator 
  
 290 When the voluntary plan was announced, with a goal of cutting imports 
from 1,266,700 barrels per day (the 1957 level) to 1,031,000 barrels per day, fourteen of 
twenty-two importers agreed, one refused on the advice of antitrust counsel, five 
sought adjusted quotas informally, and two invoked the plan’s formal process to receive 
a higher quota.  BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 45-47. 
 291 1 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 732-33 (discussing reasons for failure).  
 292 YERGIN, supra note 27, at 537; VIETOR, supra note 98, at 112 (citing Sun 
Oil as one example of a company that refused to participate in the voluntary quota 
system because of antitrust implications). 
 293 VIETOR, supra note 98, at 109.  Moreover, politically it would have been 
impossible to give the major oil companies a cartel controlling imports.  Id. 
 294 BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 24-25.  The “new importer” problem 
was serious. 
The growth in imports by these firms, partly due to niches created in the 
market by limitations on the more visible major firms, made them impossible 
to ignore even while they were difficult to police on a voluntary basis.  
Newcomers for the most part were not constrained by the unofficial sanctions 
that could be imposed on large, multinational, established firms.  They were 
less affected by public or industry opinion.  Moreover, some were not involved 
in domestic production and thus did not even have the incentive to restrain 
imports that would follow from sharing production losses within the United 
States if collective restraint on imports failed. 
Id. at 35. 
 295 YERGIN, supra note 27, at 537.  
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Robert Kerr pushed hard to restrict imports to benefit U.S. oil 
producers.296  Although the Eisenhower administration was 
ideologically opposed to government intervention in the 
market, it yielded to the political realities of oil politics and 
implemented controls—giving the United States “centralized 
decision making and free market rhetoric.”297 
The mandatory quotas which began in 1959 became “the 
single most important energy policy in the postwar era,” one 
which quickly “accumulated policy goals outside of promoting 
energy security.”298  The quota system, known as the 
Mandatory Oil Import Program (MOIP), was in effect from 
March 1959 to April 1973.  It effectively constrained refiners 
only until late 1972.299  MOIP produced “a decade of stasis in 
policy,” locking in a regulatory approach which ignored the 
decade’s major changes in energy supply and demand.300  MOIP 
brought rent-seeking to new heights. 
A roll call of the special interest groups in energy policy would find 
most of them the recipient of at least some favored treatment: small 
refiners, inland refiners, Northern Tier refiners, major oil 
companies, oil producers, petrochemical companies, northeastern 
utilities and other identifiable and isolatable consuming interests, 
  
 296 Id. at 538.  Oil-state senators, who supported MOIP, also delivered other 
benefits to big companies and support for MOIP was the price for those benefits, such 
as overseas tax credits and depletion allowance overseas.  VIETOR, supra note 98, at 
134.  Louisiana Senator Russell Long made this point clear to the oil companies, 
saying:  
I believe your industry would make a great mistake not to realize that; as far 
as the government is concerned, as far as the fair treatment you are entitled 
to expect from your government is concerned, the people who will be your 
advocates are people who are very much interested in domestic oil. . . . It is 
very much to your advantage to have a very healthy domestic industry and 
do everything within your power to cooperate to that end.   
Id. 
 297 BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 15.  “Quotas are inherently 
discriminatory.  The criteria by which government allocates import licenses are not 
based on impersonal market forces (unless the licenses are auctioned); licenses are 
allocated subjectively in a way that is usually influenced by political considerations and 
the fact that allocation necessarily benefits some and harms others.”  Id. at 263-64. 
 298 VIETOR, supra note 98, at 115; see also id. at 84 (“Schemes surfaced to use 
the program to the special benefit of some segments of the refining industry and some 
domestic producers and marketers; to promote economic development of certain areas 
and enhanced air quality; and to aid various special consumer groups.”). 
 299 WILLIAM C. LANE, JR., THE MANDATORY PETROLEUM PRICE AND 
ALLOCATION REGULATIONS: A HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 4 (1981).  
 300 VIETOR, supra note 98, at 115; NPC, FACTORS AFFECTING, supra note 61, at 
37 (describing MOIP as the “principal element of government policy affecting the 
petroleum refining industry”). 
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deep water terminal operators, Island interests, West Coast 
consumers, and so forth.301 
The costs of the import quota regime were largely borne by “the 
undifferentiated portion of the consuming public.”302  MOIP also 
produced one of the most ironic unintended consequences of 
any federal program—the program spurred Venezuela to 
convene the first meeting of the organization that eventually 
became the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC).303 
Under the mandatory system, the federal government 
granted refiners permits to import crude oil, holding the total 
amount imported below the amount that would have been 
imported in a free market.304  Established importers got 80% of 
their historic imports, with the amount to be gradually reduced 
until it was proportionate to the amounts new importers 
received, eventually putting all importers on the same level, at 
least theoretically.305   
As a result, domestic crude prices were higher than they 
would have been in the absence of the quota system and the 
right to import the cheaper foreign crude became valuable.306  
The “historical” allocations also attempted to address the 
equitable concern that “[r]efinery location, capital decisions, 
marketing arrangements and production and supply patterns,” 
all of which had been disrupted by the voluntary controls, 
“would be more dramatically altered by mandatory controls.”307  
In particular, MOIP shifted refinery construction from larger to 
smaller,308 rewarding each new refinery with a quota.  
Ultimately, the mandates hindered the refining industry 
response to changes in market conditions: “The quota 
  
 301 BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 16.  The distribution of gains from the 
award of quotas created “tensions” in the administration of the program.  Id. at 45.  
“Those receiving the gains complained when newcomers were permitted to enter the 
field because the gains would be spread over more firms or because the total gains 
would be reduced.  Those on the outside were anxious to receive a share of the windfall 
and pressed for participation.”  Id. 
 302 Id. at 17; see also VIETOR, supra note 98, at 141 (stating that import 
controls were estimated to cost consumers about $3.3 billion in 1968, while Arabian 
crude sold at $1.25 per barrel, and domestic oil at $3 per barrel). 
 303 1 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 764. 
 304 LANE, supra note 299, at 4. 
 305 VIETOR, supra note 98, at 122. 
 306 LANE, supra note 299, at 4; VIETOR, supra note 98, at 120 (stating that 
quotas had “a tangible dollar value”). 
 307 BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 110. 
 308 2 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 1172. 
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discouraged the expansion of domestic refinery capacity, 
altered refinery location within the United States, altered the 
mix of the final products, encouraged investment in cracking 
capacity, and discouraged investment in capacity to handle 
high-sulfur feedstocks.”309 
A full account of MOIP lies beyond the scope of this 
article,310 but the program introduced distinctive features in 
gasoline markets that require some discussion.311  An important 
effect was that the administrative allocation of valuable import 
rights inevitably led to interest groups exerting tremendous 
political pressures in hopes of sharing in the allocations.312  Of 
course, as these groups organized politically,313 politics 
intertwined with a variety of technical questions, the resolution 
of which would reward some interests and punish others no 
matter how they were answered.314  For example, petrochemical 
companies sought their own import quotas for feedstocks, 
arguing that their plants faced unfair competition from 
petrochemical plants aligned with quota-possessing 
refineries.315  This raised definitional questions about what 
  
 309 BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 294-95.  See also 2 BRADLEY, supra note 
74, at 1163 (MOIP affected “virtually all major aspects of refinery operation—entry, 
plant siting, plant size, merger and acquisition policy, product mix, and, of course, 
profitability.”). 
 310 MOIP is described in detail in BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 66-82.  
See also 1 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 738-50; 2 id. at 1160-81. 
 311 2 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 1172 (noting that between 1954 and 1958, 
ten refiners with a capacity over 10,000 barrels per day were built, while in the next 
twelve years only nine such refineries were built). 
 312 YERGIN, supra note 27, at 538-39 (Under MOIP, “there were continuing 
fights over allocations, struggles over interpretations, searches for loopholes, and the 
ever-more-intense hunt for exceptions and exemptions.”); BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 
63, at 139 (“Other interests understandably coveted the wealth thus transferred and 
sought to divert the import control program to achieve still other ends and different 
distributive effects. Once the subsidy-wealth-transfer character of quotas was 
recognized, it became increasingly difficult for the authorities to deny other ‘worthy’ 
causes entry into the program.”); VIETOR, supra note 98, at 135 (“Nearly every sector of 
the industry supported the Program in principle, but it was every firm for itself in 
carving-up the pie.”). 
 313 BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 115 (The small refiners, for example, 
formed the American Petroleum Refiners Association in 1962 to protect their interests 
in the quota program.); VIETOR, supra note 98, at 131 (Specialized trade organizations 
formed to fight over resid imports.).  See infra notes 338-43 (discussing residual fuel oil 
imports). 
 314 See Andrew P. Morriss & Susan E. Dudley, Defining What to Regulate: 
Silica and the Problem of Regulatory Categorization, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 269, 286-87 
(2006) (discussing role of interest groups in regulation). 
 315 BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 167 (“When the petrochemical 
companies were included in the quota structure in 1966, they simply joined the group 
of other refiners who had enjoyed the subsidy benefits of import quotas from the 
beginning of the program.  The great stake of the petrochemical companies in the long 
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constituted a petrochemical plant compared to a refinery, since 
the two were technologically indistinguishable.  The question 
had no easy answer.316  Granting the quotas rewarded 
independent petrochemical producers; denying them advanced 
integrated refinery-petrochemical operations. 
The result was special interest lobbying on a grand 
scale.  “However intricately wrought and carefully articulated 
the rationales for each action, the impression was inescapable 
that the mandatory quota program was being treated as a 
source of unappropriated funds available for a variety of 
putative public purposes.”317  Ultimately, the interest-group 
maneuvering led to a program so complex that “[f]ew other 
regulatory schemes in America’s history can match the 
Mandatory Oil Import Program for labyrinthine complexity, or 
for the distortion of markets and interest-group dissension that 
it caused.”318  By 1968, MOIP had metamorphasized far beyond 
its initial goals, with “special allocations for asphalt refiners, 
electric utilities, heating oil importers, petrochemical 
companies, and finally, for crude oil quotas into foreign trade 
zones from which refined products would presumably be 
exported.”319 
Not surprisingly, MOIP roiled refining in the United 
States.  The system favored smaller refiners, giving them a 
disproportionate share of import rights.320  Yet these refiners 
  
run was the extent to which they would lose their market share to petrochemical 
production by oil and gas companies.”).  See also 1 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 745. 
 316 BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 164 (“Other administrative problems 
arose out of the technical difficulty of defining a petrochemical plant as distinct from a 
refinery, and of defining feedstocks for inclusion within the program [for allocations of 
quotas for petrochemical plants].”). 
 317 Id. at 178-79. 
 318 VIETOR, supra note 98, at 119; see also YERGIN, supra note 27, at 538-39. 
 319 VIETOR, supra note 98, at 139. 
 320 LANE, supra note 299, at 4-5. The quota system incorporated a “sliding 
scale” that favored smaller refiners. 
The basis for the different incremental levels of quotas was the amount of 
refinery runs by firm, not by plant. It was advantageous, then, for refinery 
ownership to be fragmented. This policy had predictable effects. First, it 
reduced the value of a small refinery as a merger prospect for an established 
refining firm. Second, it provided incentives for the formation of “concubine” 
relationships with large firms which could acquire informal control, but not 
integrated ownership, of small firms without losing the preferential quota of 
the small firm. The history of the program contains charges of concubinage 
but the extent of its existence is unknown. Finally, the sliding scale 
encouraged small refineries, or preserved their existence, by the additional 
revenues obtained through the sale of import tickets. 
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were often the least technologically sophisticated.  The small-
refiner bias also failed to reward those oil companies that had 
invested heavily in foreign supplies, tanker fleets, and coastal 
refineries in anticipation of a growing reliance on imports.  
Moreover, MOIP’s small-refiner bias discouraged consolidation 
of refinery ownership, preventing larger companies from 
buying out these smaller refiners, which could have increased 
efficiency.  Refiners were allowed to trade their import quotas, 
which many inland and independent refiners did, using them 
to gain access to domestic crude owned by rivals.321  In many 
respects, therefore, the program was simply a transfer of 
wealth from the large, integrated oil companies to the smaller, 
inland refiners.322   
Under MOIP, some inland refiners received a particular 
bonus.323  Because every refiner received a quota, even 
refineries with no ability to actually import oil were given 
quotas.324  (Had this not been done, coastal refineries likely 
would have displaced inland refineries, as their cost advantage 
  
BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 115-16.  The eleven real importers “objected 
strenuously” to this program.  VIETOR, supra note 98, at 125.  “They had to participate 
in it since their own quotas were insufficient to supply their coastal refineries,” and 
Atlantic Refining calculated that the profits from quota exchanges were $135 million 
by 1964.  Id.  This continued under its successor program in the 1970s.  See EPA, 
PROFILE, supra note 68, at 11 (noting that the Crude Oil Entitlements Program “had 
encouraged smaller refineries to add capacity throughout the 1970s”). 
 321 BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 74-75 (summarizing the trading rules); 
see also 1 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 738-39 (describing trading).  As Bohi and Russell 
note, “[t]he exchange process was merely a veil covering the transfer to inland refiners 
of some of the benefits of importing cheap foreign oil. No productive function was 
changed in maintaining the facade that something was actually happening.”  BOHI & 
RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 77. 
 322 VIETOR, supra note 98, at 114 (Quotas would clearly be subsidy to inland 
refiners, who could not refine the oil they were allowed to import.). 
[R]efineries located inland traded their import tickets to those companies 
with refineries located on the coast in return for access to domestic sources of 
crude owned or controlled by the coastal refiners. Companies with coastal 
refineries tended to be the larger, integrated companies. Thus, one result of 
the [quota system], and the trading system that evolved under it, was that 
smaller, inland refiners tended to depend on exchange arrangements with 
major oil companies for access to crude. 
LANE, supra note 299, at 5.  See also VIETOR, supra note 98, at 133 (“Independent 
refiners grew dependent on the Program from which they drew ‘tickets,’ knowing that 
without them they could not long compete with larger, integrated refiners running 
cheap foreign crude.”). 
 323 VIETOR, supra note 98, at 125 (The quota exchanges among inland refiners 
and coastal refiners were “the fundamental redistributive choice of the whole 
mandatory program. [They were] primarily a response to political pressure from 
domestic refiners, justified by a perverse obeisance to free enterprise.”). 
 324 BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 71. 
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from using imports would have enabled them to expand at the 
expense of inland refineries.325)  The “Northern Tier” refiners 
using Canadian oil also got a special bonus.326  These refineries 
received quota allocations in the initial distribution, when 
Canadian oil was labeled foreign, and then an exemption from 
the quota system for Canadian oil as a result of Canadian 
complaints.327 
Yet these refineries did not lose the quotas they had 
received to allow them to import the Canadian oil, giving them 
what became known as the “double dip.”328  Although the double 
dip was “an obvious fluke,” it was not remedied because of the 
political power these refineries mustered in its defense.329  
Although the Northern Tier refineries’ historical quotas were 
reduced faster than those of other refiners—to partially 
compensate for the double dip—this did not entirely eliminate 
the special treatment.330   
The quota system also discouraged construction of new 
refinery capacity in the United States.331  While the total 
amount allowed to be imported increased as refinery capacity 
increased, there was “no direct mechanism” to provide the 
“access to foreign crude oil supplies necessary to the operation 
of new refinery capacity in the United States.”332  In addition, 
oil companies began lobbying for and receiving exemptions for 
refineries in various U.S. territories outside the continental 
United States to serve the U.S. market.333  Not surprisingly, the 
  
 325 Id. at 72. 
 326 The special access to Canadian oil alone boosted growth in this region.  See 
id. at 297 tbl.8-9 (refinery capacity growth in Montana, Minnesota, North Dakota, and 
Wisconsin—a total of 19.6 (thousand barrels per day) in 1930, 66.5 in 1950, 157.4 in 
1955, 214.1 in 1960, 287.7 in 1965, and 345.4 in 1970). 
 327 Two months after MOIP began, however, it was modified to allow land 
imports without quotas in order to assist Canadian oil exporters.  VIETOR, supra note 
98, at 129.  It also helped Venezuelan exports to eastern Canada, since the western 
Canadian oil that MOIP would have kept out of the U.S. market would have otherwise 
displaced Venezuelan exports to eastern Canada.  1 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 739-40. 
 328 BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 129. 
 329 VIETOR, supra note 98, at 129.  For example, in May 1960, the Department 
of the Interior considered a rule change to eliminate the loophole, but North Dakota 
politicians intervened and Interior abandoned the revision.  Id.  One oil company that 
competed with the double-dip refiners waged a five-year war against the provision, but 
was unable to stop Minnesota Senator Hubert Humphrey from preserving it.  Id. at 
130. 
 330 Id.  
 331 2 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 1171-72. 
 332 NPC, FACTORS AFFECTING, supra note 61, at 7. 
 333 BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 51.  In particular, refineries were built 
in the United States Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico as a direct result of the quota 
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ratio of domestic refining capacity to domestic petroleum 
consumption, which was 0.98 in 1960, fell during MOIP to 0.81 
in 1970.334 
A further impact involved the diversion of crude imports 
to uncontrolled products.  Controls on crude were useless 
without controls on refined products, inasmuch as uncontrolled 
finished imports would simply substitute for U.S. refining of 
foreign crude unless their importation was also controlled.  The 
original program design thus forbade imports of refined 
products outside the quota system.335  This proved impossible to 
sustain, however.336  Refiners with existing plants outside the 
United States that were refining for the U.S. market lobbied 
for allowances for imports of those plants’ products.  They 
argued that restricting such imports “could virtually eliminate 
the market served by those refineries, with predictable serious 
consequences for the firms.”337  Moreover, some refined products 
were exempt, encouraging their production outside the United 
States.338  For instance, residual fuel imports (or “resid”), a 
heavy fraction of crude oil, soon entered outside the quota 
system.  This exemption “altered the product mix capability of 
domestic refineries and created a special dependence on 
imports of heavy fuels.”339  Predictably, U.S. production of resid 
fell after 1960 from 332,200,000 barrels of production with 
  
program exemption for oil imported to those jurisdictions on economic development 
grounds.  Id. at 297 (“Imports of products from Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands 
received special treatment under the quota system. Consequently, refineries were 
encouraged to locate in these islands for reasons other than those the free market 
would dictate.”); 1 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 743-46 (describing increase in refined-
product exports from Puerto Rico); VIETOR, supra note 98, at 136-37 (describing Puerto 
Rico exemption); YERGIN, supra note 27, at 539 (“[T]he building of substantial refining 
capacity in the American Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico because of special exemptions 
to the quotas that were granted to refineries there on economic development 
grounds.”). 
 334 BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 296 tbl.8-8. 
 335 1 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 737. 
 336 Unrestricted fuel oil imports were allowed into the East Coast (PADD I 
region), and “clean-product imports” were allowed due to program incentives.  NPC, 
ADEQUACY, supra note 59, at 20. 
 337 BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 110. 
 338 NPC, FACTORS AFFECTING, supra note 61, at 7.  The factors enumerated as 
providing incentives for offshore location included: “to accommodate revisions in U.S. 
import quota restrictions;” “logistical considerations,” such as better harbors for 
tankers elsewhere; “[t]o minimize the risks associated with acquiring crude oil 
supplies,” because foreign refineries often have greater access to foreign crude supplies; 
“[t]o avoid environmental delays” because regulations are “less severe” in some foreign 
locations; and “[t]o minimize overall costs” due to higher tax rates in the United States.  
Id. at 33. 
 339 BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 298 & tbl.8-10. 
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233,200,000 barrels of imports, a ratio of 1.42, to production of 
257,500,000 barrels with 557,800,000 barrels of imports, a ratio 
of 0.46, in 1970.340  Overall, the quota program “encouraged, 
through relatively cheap imports, northeastern utilities and 
other consumers to favor heavy fuel oil and encouraged 
domestic refineries to alter their output mix toward the lighter 
products,”341 particularly boosting Caribbean refineries’ 
production of resid.342  Further reinforcing the quota-driven 
nature of resid use, resid consumption declined after these 
programs ended, with natural gas and distillates taking its 
place.343 
Combined, these effects piled distortion upon distortion 
as interest groups competed for special favors in the political 
marketplace.  Consider just one example of the dynamics of 
MOIP:  When Canadian oil was exempted under the overland 
exemption, not only did it create the “double dip,” but it 
provoked complaints from Mexico that its oil was 
disadvantaged.  To mollify Mexico, and with the assistance of 
the State Department,344 one of the most vivid of the MOIP 
distortions began: the “Brownsville U-Turn” or “Mexican 
Merry-Go-Round.”  Despite the lack of an overland connection 
between Mexican oil fields and U.S. markets, a “crevice” in the 
import regulations was used to bring Mexican oil into the 
United States as “overland” oil exempt from import quotas.345   
Mexican crude was moved by tanker from its producing regions to 
the U.S. port of Brownsville, Texas, on the Mexican border, unloaded 
in [customs] bond and then shipped into Mexico in trucks, which 
made a U-turn, and promptly reentered the United States.  On 
reentry, the crude was taken out of bond, duty was paid on it, and it 
officially entered the United States under the overland exemption.  
Because a market for only a fraction of the Mexican oil existed in 
Brownsville, most of it was reloaded upon tankers and shipped to 
East Coast U.S. ports as “domestic” oil.346 
  
 340 Id. 
 341 Id. at 299. 
 342 Id. at 159 (“The increase in resid imports provided a wider market for 
foreign crude and made possible the further development of Caribbean refinery 
capacity.  The unbalanced demand for resid led domestic refineries to be built with 
additional processing to minimize resid output, so that lighter products were more 
expensive to produce.”). 
 343 FTC, MERGERS, supra note 5, at 65. 
 344 BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 133. 
 345 Id. at 132. 
 346 Id.; see also YERGIN, supra note 27, at 539. 
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Such strategies boosted Mexican exports to the United States 
from 7,000 barrels per day to over 40,000 barrels per day.347  
Venezuela also was given a special deal on resid imports 
because it too was upset by the Canadians receiving the 
overland exemption.348  As noted earlier, this transformed the 
U.S. refinery output away from resid.349 
Making gasoline a political issue also undermined the 
security of investments in refining capacity.  For example, 
when oil companies raised the price of gasoline in February 
1967, an unnamed administration official was quoted as saying 
that the government would flood the country with imported 
gasoline if the prices were not rolled back.  Some were.350  Such 
threats undoubtedly discouraged investment.351  This is clear 
from the decline of U.S. capacity relative to U.S. demand. 
In the years [leading] up to 1960, refinery capacity exceeded 
domestic product consumption, with the excess available to process 
crude oil for export.  After 1960, the deficit in refinery capacity 
steadily widened.  From 1960 to 1970, refinery capacity increased a 
total of 25.2 percent while domestic product consumption grew by 52 
percent, or more than twice as fast.  Thus, the United States became 
increasingly dependent on product imports.  When U.S. crude 
production declined after 1970, and high-sulfur foreign crude could 
not be used, the dependence on product imports was exacerbated.352 
Overall, the MOIP-induced “decade of stasis in policy”353 
meant that “[b]usiness and government were preoccupied with 
the tactical issues of administering [policy]: import quotas and 
‘prorationing’ for crude oil.”354  MOIP seriously distorted 
refiners’ supply of crude.  “Without controls, cheaper foreign oil 
would have forced down domestic oil prices and driven 
marginal producers out of business.”355  MOIP’s microeconomic 
impacts included preventing the international majors with 
access to foreign oil from gaining as much market share as they 
would have without MOIP and allowing “several dozen, 
  
 347 1 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 741. 
 348 Venezuelan oil, which had a low specific gravity, produced a 
disproportionate amount of resid per barrel and could not compete with Middle Eastern 
oil on the open market.  VIETOR, supra note 98, at 130; see also 1 BRADLEY, supra note 
74, at 741. 
 349 See supra notes 340-42. 
 350 BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 140. 
 351 Id. at 296-97. 
 352 Id. at 296. 
 353 VIETOR, supra note 98, at 115. 
 354 Id. at 3. 
 355 Id. at 115. 
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relatively inefficient independent refiners to stay in 
business.”356  Moreover, MOIP encouraged the migration of 
refinery capacity to foreign locations.357 
Because of declining U.S. crude production and growing 
U.S. energy demand, the increase in quota exemptions after 
1970 helped devalue the quotas and ultimately made the 
system “meaningless” in terms of constraining imports.358  The 
increasing number of exempted imports eroded support among 
oil producers while the costs of the program became higher and 
more obvious as time passed.359  MOIP was formally abandoned 
in April 1973.360  When the quota system changed in 1973,361 
and the major companies no longer found trading for import 
quotas necessary, it disadvantaged MOIP’s beneficiaries.  For 
example, both the double dip and the Canadian exemption 
encouraged refinery location along the northern border of the 
United States.  When the quota program ended, “these 
refineries could not compete with other domestic refineries 
better located to receive U.S. crude oil or imported feedstocks.  
Then, with the reduction and prospective elimination of 
Canadian crude oil exports, these refineries, and the markets 
they served, faced especially severe problems.”362  The small 
refiners sought a new crude oil allocation system to ensure 
their continued access to oil,363 discussed in the next subsection. 
The gasoline market was thus under two sets of 
countervailing pressures between the Korean War and the 
Arab oil embargo.  The first set, from market pressures, pushed 
the industry toward technological innovations, standardized 
products, and efforts to expand market share.  The second set, 
driven by the economic regulations imposed by the federal 
  
 356 Id. at 145. 
 357 BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 295 (“[S]ome of these [foreign 
refineries] were given access to U.S. markets.  Consequently, domestic refinery 
capacity began to lag behind final product demand.  To meet demand, importers 
increasingly sought to switch away from crude oil and toward finished products, and 
this switch was approved by import control authorities who foresaw domestic shortages 
if it was not allowed.  The result was that the mandatory quota program discouraged 
investment in domestic refining and encouraged investment in foreign refining.”). 
 358 LANE, supra note 299, at 6. 
 359 BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 2. 
 360 Proclamation No. 4210 (Apr. 18, 1973), 38 Fed. Reg. 9,645 (Apr. 19, 1973).  
 361 The quota system was eroded by the combination of declining U.S. 
production, which necessitated increasing imports, and the proliferation of exemptions 
and exceptions to the quotas for various interest groups that expanded the amount of 
crude imported.  See LANE, supra note 299, at 6. 
 362 BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 297. 
 363 LANE, supra note 299, at 5-6. 
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government, allocated resources to smaller, generally less 
efficient refineries and limited foreign competition to domestic 
producers.  The result was to partially offset the market’s 
incentives for larger scale refineries and to create incentives for 
importing exempt refined products rather than crude oil.  
Indeed, even before the embargo in 1973, “the United States 
was experiencing an unprecedented shortage of refined 
petroleum products” partly because of a lack of domestic 
refining capacity.364  Over time, however, the gains from 
subverting the crude oil import allocation scheme gradually 
eroded the effectiveness of the program, making the petroleum 
market in early 1973 freer than it had been since at least 1959.  
However, the combination of price controls imposed by the 
Nixon administration in an effort to control inflation and the 
Arab oil embargo in 1973 created conditions under which 
opponents of liberalizing energy markets were able to regroup. 
4. Price Controls and the Arab Oil Embargo to 
Decontrol 
By the 1970s, the cumulative impact of the various 
exemptions and special provisions had eroded MOIP and oil 
imports had risen sharply.365  Although the Nixon 
administration initially considered scrapping the quota system 
entirely and replacing it with a tariff,366 the oil industry’s 
negative political reaction torpedoed those plans.367  However, 
  
 364 KATZ, supra note 271, at 13. 
 365 YERGIN, supra note 27, at 589 (“The Mandatory Oil Import 
Program . . . was laboring under mounting strain, creating controversies and gross 
disparities among companies and regions. Its loopholes and exceptions were very 
lucrative to those who had figured out how to capitalize on them, and all too visible.”). 
 366 VIETOR, supra note 98, at 142.  Nixon appointed a task force, headed by 
Phillip Areeda, to examine the quota system.  It got 10,000 pages of comments from 
more than 200 firms, associations, etc., and position papers from two dozen scholars, 
etc.  Id.  “In effect, the Task Force staff of economic liberals seized control of the review 
process and neither the Interior Department nor the White House could recapture it.”  
Id.  The program had also been intensely criticized during the 1969 Senate hearings.  
Id. at 141. 
 367 YERGIN, supra note 27, at 589.  Oil consumers wanted looser controls to cut 
prices; domestic oil interests wanted to keep prices up; and majors who had fought the 
system when it was implemented  
had by now generally reconciled and adjusted themselves to the system, and 
were content with it.  Prices were protected for their domestic production, 
and the companies had devised distribution systems outside the United 
States to dispose of their foreign oil.  Many of them, therefore, were alarmed 
at the prospect of change and argued against it. 
Id. 
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after 1970, “rising world prices and general relaxation of 
controls progressively eliminated the protective effect of the 
quota.”368  Instead, the administration’s anti-inflation policy,369 
based on a series of price control “phases,” overtook the quota 
system as the primary economic regulation of the petroleum 
industry.370   
Oil was at the heart of the Nixon price controls, with 
crude and refined product price increases in 1970 prompting 
the administration to investigate oil companies, Nixon himself 
to denounce them, and relaxation of the MOIP quota 
restrictions.371  Phase I of the Nixon price controls, which ran 
from August 1971 until November 1971, was intended to break 
expectations of price increases372 and freeze the nominal price of 
gasoline and other refinery products and domestically produced 
crude.373  Of course, such rules had no impact on world markets 
and so the uncontrolled international price of gasoline and 
crude oil diverged sharply from the controlled domestic prices, 
severely disadvantaging firms selling gasoline domestically 
made from imported oil.  The cost advantage imported oil had 
held was now reversed. 
Phase II of the price controls lasted from November 
1971 until January 1973, and limited wholesale price increases 
to no more than 3% annually.374  Multiproduct firms, including 
refineries, were given some flexibility through “Term Limit 
Pricing” (TLP) agreements, which allowed them to meet the 
Phase II rules by keeping the average of prices across products 
  
 368 BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 268. 
 369 LANE, supra note 299, at xviii (attempts to control inflation preceded the 
Arab oil embargo and included price controls on oil and oil products). 
 370 VIETOR, supra note 98, at 120 (Nixon “acceded to market pressures by 
gradually liberalizing its controls until 1973, by which time they were irrelevant 
anyway.”); BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 208 (noting that inflation had become a 
concern in the mid-1960s). 
 371 1 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 466. 
 372 BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 210.  See 1 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 
467-68 (describing Phase I). 
 373 LANE, supra note 299, at 8.  In particular, imported crude-oil price 
increases could not be passed on to consumers of gasoline because cost increases in 
imports could be passed through only if the imported product was kept in its initial 
form and inventoried and accounted for separately from any domestic materials.  Id.  
Since the foreign crude oil was refined (a change in form) and impossible to keep 
segregated from domestic source oil in most refineries (the inventory and accounting 
rules), the cost increases in foreign oil could not be passed on to consumers.  Id.; see 
also BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 213. 
 374 LANE, supra note 299, at 9; see also BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 215 
(describing Phase II); 1 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 469-71 (same). 
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within the guidelines rather than each individual price.375  
Unfortunately for refiners, the TLP agreements could not 
include gasoline, home heating oil, and residual oil, so refiners 
wishing to recoup the increased costs of imported oil had to do 
so through price increases for their other refined products.376  
For example, diesel fuel, although chemically equivalent to 
home heating oil, was allowed in TLP agreements, resulting in 
plentiful diesel supplies and shortages of home heating oil.377  
The Nixon administration refused to allow gasoline and home 
heating oil price increases out of fear of a political backlash.378  
The TLP rules further distorted relative prices, discouraging 
gasoline production.  Thus, even before the Arab oil embargo in 
1973, price controls were having a major impact on gasoline 
markets by keeping prices artificially low and discouraging 
gasoline production.  Moreover, the differences in price for 
crude from different sources created political pressure for a 
government program to allocate access to cheap crude.379  
“Conditions had been created [by Nixon programs] wherein 
there was no market incentive to raise domestic production, no 
incentive to reduce consumption, and no incentive to increase 
imports.”380  Shortages began to appear in late 1972 and early 
1973.381  Although this led Nixon to suspend the quota program 
in April 1973,382 the formal elimination of quotas had little 
effect because events and the Nixon administration’s approach 
“had rendered the quota program ineffective before it was 
replaced”383 and the elimination of quotas did not connect the 
distortions introduced by the price controls. 
  
 375 LANE, supra note 299, at 9. 
 376 BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 215; LANE, supra note 299, at 11. 
 377 BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 216.  See 1 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 
469 (describing TLP provisions). 
 378 LANE, supra note 299, at 11-12.  Oil companies that sought price increases 
were “almost invariably . . . turned down and encouraged to take [their] price increase 
among [products governed by TLP agreements].  Several oil companies were told that a 
price increase for a ‘visible’ product would require public hearings and lead to 
protracted delays.”  Id. at 11 (quoting W.A. Johnson, The Impact of Price Controls on 
the Oil Industry, How to Worsen an Energy Crisis, in ENERGY: THE POLICY ISSUES 99 
(G. Eppen ed., 1975)). 
 379 BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 223 (“The government was moving 
toward a system a mandatory allocations of petroleum products even before the oil 
embargo.”). 
 380 Id. at 218. 
 381 1 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 668. 
 382 BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 218. 
 383 Id. at 219. 
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When war broke out between Israel and her Arab 
neighbors in October 1973, approximately 17% of U.S. oil 
supplies derived from Arab sources.384  The Organization of 
Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) halted exports 
to the United States and several other countries in retaliation 
for their support of Israel, causing severe supply disruptions.385  
Although a bill creating an import allocation system was 
already moving toward passage in Congress before the 
embargo,386 the supply disruptions caused by the embargo “gave 
impetus to the movement for an allocation system and added a 
new rationale for such a system: the distribution of crude oil 
and refined products during a period of supply disruption.”387 
Responding to the pressures for a new allocation 
program, Congress adopted the Emergency Petroleum 
Allocation Act (EPAA) in 1973388 and the initial set of rules 
implementing it went into effect in January 1974.389  “The 
legislation was originally drafted to deal with the problems 
smaller refiners, independent marketers and others had been 
experiencing in obtaining supplies prior to the embargo 
[and] . . . many of its provisions still reflected its more limited 
initial purpose.”390  It was available, however, and so Congress 
quickly adopted this square peg to fill the round hole that 
world events presented.  Nixon seized on allocation as a 
  
 384 RICHARD B. MANCKE, PERFORMANCE OF THE FEDERAL ENERGY OFFICE 1 
(1975) [hereinafter MANCKE, PERFORMANCE].  The embargo “reduced Arab oil supplies 
from 20.8 million barrels per day in October to 15.8 million barrels per day by 
December.”  LANE, supra note 299, at 30.  Additional production from other countries 
eased the shortage in the early months of 1974.  Id. at 31. 
 385 MANCKE, PERFORMANCE, supra note 384, at 1.  The embargo consisted of 
rolling production restraints that cut supply more each month and a total ban on 
export of oil to the United States, the Netherlands, Portugal, South Africa, and 
Rhodesia.  YERGIN, supra note 27, at 613.  Actual reductions in supply were smaller 
than they would have been without substitution of non-Arab supplies to the nations cut 
off.  There were 20.8 million barrels per day sold in early October.  Id. at 614.  At the 
lowest point during the embargo, non-OAPEC sales were 15.8 million barrels per day, 
for a gross loss of 5 million barrels per day.  Id.  But because other producers increased 
production, the net loss was only 4.4 million barrels per day, or about 9% of total world 
production in the “free world” before the embargo.  Id.  The impact was worse than this 
suggests, however, because demand was growing at 7.5% per year.  Moreover, during 
the cutbacks, information on substitution was not yet completely available and so the 
loss seemed larger.  Id.  The embargo was almost a complete surprise to U.S. 
policymakers, who, as a result, were unprepared for it.  Id. at 608-09. 
 386 1 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 487.  
 387 LANE, supra note 299, at xix; 1 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 487 (embargo 
“hastened” allocation controls). 
 388 Pub. L. No. 93-159 (Nov. 27, 1973). 
 389 39 Fed. Reg. 1924 (Jan. 15, 1974). 
 390 LANE, supra note 299, at 38-39. 
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response to the politics of the situation, perhaps in part to 
undercut his potential Democratic rival in the 1972 
presidential elections, Washington Senator Henry Jackson, 
who had promoted allocation during 1973.391 
To coordinate the response to the embargo, the 
government established the Federal Energy Office (FEO), 
which after a “glamorous, hyperactive six-month existence” 
became the Federal Energy Administration (FEA).392  “[T]he 
newly created Federal Energy Office began introducing an 
almost unimaginably complicated and wide-ranging set of 
regulations for allocating both crude oil and refined products.  
All assessments of the period agree that, viewed in toto, these 
allocation regulations aggravated consumer suffering 
stemming from the embargo.”393  Unfortunately, the FEO/FEA 
actions generally distorted the markets for oil products even 
more, rather than mitigating the problems.  For example, the 
FEO pressured refiners to produce more home heating oil at 
the expense of gasoline production because it feared a shortage 
of the former.394  But the FEO had overestimated demand for 
heating oil395 and underestimated demand for gasoline and so 
its pressure exacerbated gasoline shortages and produced a 
surplus of heating oil (supplies of heating oil in February 1973 
were 38% higher than they had been in February 1972).396   
The FEO adopted an allocation system for crude, which 
was “meant to distribute supplies evenly around the country.”397  
Instead, “it assured, perversely, that gasoline could not be 
shifted from an area already well-supplied to one where it was 
needed.”398  Federal allocations of gasoline to regions were not 
matched to demand because they were based on regional usage 
from before the shortages and did not take into account 
changes in regional population and driving patterns due to 
higher prices and jawboning efforts by the government.  
  
 391 1 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 671-73. 
 392 MANCKE, PERFORMANCE, supra note 384, at 2. 
 393 Richard B. Mancke, The American Response: “On The Job Training”?, in 
OIL DIPLOMACY: THE ATLANTIC NATIONS IN THE OIL CRISIS OF 1978-79, at 27, 33 (1980) 
[hereinafter Mancke, American Response]. 
 394 LANE, supra note 299, at 43; MANCKE, PERFORMANCE, supra note 384, at 8. 
 395 LANE, supra note 299, at 46 (noting that price increases in heating oil, 
however, reduced demand more than regulators anticipated and the result was a glut 
of heating oil and a shortage of gasoline). 
 396 MANCKE, PERFORMANCE, supra note 384, at 9. 
 397 YERGIN, supra note 27, at 617. 
 398 Id.; see also MANCKE, PERFORMANCE, supra note 384, at 11. 
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Erroneous allocations ranged from 63% of projected needs in 
New Hampshire and Virginia to 122% in Wyoming.399  In short, 
the federal response to the embargo eliminated the market’s 
ability to adjust, substituting an administrative allocation 
system that worsened the crude supply disruptions.  
Nevertheless, the federal government failed to learn 
from the embargo experience that markets were a superior 
means of adjusting to supply shocks.  Instead, each new 
problem provoked additional, quixotic regulations designed to 
“fix” the problems caused by the prior set.  As a result of the 
difficult political dynamic that produced them,400 the quotas 
and controls introduced in response to the Arab oil embargo 
grew ever more complicated.401  
  
 399 LANE, supra note 299, at 48-49; MANCKE, PERFORMANCE, supra note 384, 
at 11. 
 400 Yergin gives a clear explanation of the problem, which is worth quoting at 
some length: 
The massive reallocation posed a very considerable logistical problem.  Even 
under calm and relatively predictable circumstances, managing an integrated 
oil system was a highly complex matter.  Supplies of varying qualities from 
various sources had to be linked into the transportation system and then 
moved to refineries that had been designed to handle those specific oils.  Free 
will was not an option when it came to assigning crude oils.  The “wrong” 
crudes could do considerable damage to the innards of a refinery, as well as 
reducing efficiency and profitability.  And once the crude supplies were run 
through the refinery and turned into a number of products, they then had to 
be moved into a distribution system and linked with a “market demand” that 
wanted that particular balance of products—this amount of gasoline, that 
amount of jet fuel and heating oil. 
And to make matters even more difficult, the companies still had to figure out 
what their oil supplies actually cost, so that they did not sell at a loss or 
invite attack for excessive profit margins.  The costs for oil royalties, extent of 
government participation, buyback prices, volumes—all these were changing 
week by week, and were further complicated by leapfrogs and retroactive 
increases by the various exporting governments.  “It was impossible to know 
whether a calculation made on the basis of all the known facts on one day 
would not be overturned by a rewriting of those facts a month later,” said an 
executive from Shell. 
YERGIN, supra note 27, at 622.  In addition to the confusion created by the ever-shifting 
regulations on energy pricing and imports, the Nixon White House repeatedly 
reorganized its energy policy team during 1972-1973.  KATZ, supra note 271, at 17-19 
(describing various reorganizations and terming them “in chaos” by May 1973).  The 
piecemeal approach to energy issues in general meant that energy matters were 
scattered among sixty government agencies, “each operating with little or no 
communication with the others.”  Id. at 31.  Congressional efforts to produce a unified 
national policy failed to produce legislation. One analyst concluded that Congress “was 
whipsawed by regional concerns, conflicting special interests, and contradictory advice 
from various experts.”  Id. at 34. 
 401 See U.S. FED. ENERGY ADMIN., A COMPLIANCE GUIDE FOR DOMESTIC 
CRUDE OIL PRICING FOR PRODUCERS AND FIRST PURCHASERS (1977) [hereinafter FEA, 
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Phase III of the Nixon price controls began in January 
1973 and allowed companies to self-administer price controls.402  
However, after gasoline prices rose 7.4% by March (increases 
that were within the Phase III guidelines), greater controls 
were re-imposed on oil products.403 
Price controls also increased the demands for a non-
market allocation system.  For example, after April 1973, 
Phase III of the price controls included “Special Rule No. 1”404 
that barred the twenty-three largest oil companies from raising 
prices above their January 11, 1973 level.405  Among other 
things, Special Rule No. 1 created a disincentive for the large 
companies under it to import crude oil.406  This, in turn, 
disadvantaged the smaller, inland refiners who had grown 
dependent on trading import permits under MOIP for access to 
the oil fields controlled by the major oil companies closer to 
their refineries.407  They were “forced into direct competition 
with the majors for domestic sources of crude.”408  Some of these 
inland refiners then “joined the rising chorus of those 
demanding a government allocation system.”409   
Even the bureaucracy became overwhelmed by the 
complexity of the price controls, and Phase III failed to tame 
inflation adequately.410  Phase III was followed by “Phase III½,” 
a sixty-day price freeze intended “to provide an opportunity for 
Federal price regulators to rethink and redesign the Phase III 
price controls” that lasted from June 12, 1973 to September 7, 
1973.411  The freeze meant that oil companies were charging 
  
COMPLIANCE GUIDE], for an excellent introduction to the complexity of petroleum-
pricing rules. 
 402 BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 217; see also 1 BRADLEY, supra note 74, 
at 471-74 (describing Phase III). 
 403 BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 217. 
 404 38 Fed. Reg. 6283-84 (Mar. 8, 1973). 
 405 LANE, supra note 299, at 14-15; see also 1 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 472-
74 (describing Special Rule No. 1). 
 406 LANE, supra note 299, at 14-16 (giving full account of Special Rule No. 1’s 
impact).  In short, since Special Rule No. 1 did not apply to smaller firms, which were 
“for all intents and purposes, free of controls” because the Phase III rules were not 
adequately enforced, these firms were able to buy at controlled prices and sell at 
uncontrolled prices.  Id. at 15.  Because smaller firms were able to sell product at 
whatever price the market would bear, they could outbid large firms for supplies.  
 407 Id. at 17; BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 219. 
 408 BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 219. 
 409 LANE, supra note 299, at 17. 
 410 BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 220. 
 411 LANE, supra note 299, at 18; see also 1 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 474 
(describing Phase III½).  
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different customers different prices for the same goods.  
“Inequities and inefficiencies were created, harming some 
sectors and helping others, but confusing all.”412  It also meant 
that imported oil costs could not be passed on to consumers.413  
In September 1973, dissatisfaction with the Phase III½ freeze 
drew 1,000 heating oil distributors and 2,000 gasoline dealers 
to Washington for protest demonstrations.414 
Phase IV followed, introducing a regulatory distinction 
between new and existing sources of domestic crude and 
allowing higher prices for the former in an effort to boost 
supply.415  By the spring of 1974, multiple groups clamored for 
federal allocation of oil and refined product supplies: 
“independent refiners wanted access to domestic crude; 
nonbranded independent gasoline marketers wanted allocation 
of gasoline; New England fuel oil marketers and consumers 
sought an allocation program for heating oil; and farmers 
wanted a propane allocation program.”416  While the oil price 
controls were supposed to end in 1974 along with the other 
“temporary” price controls, the Arab oil embargo’s price 
pressure led to an extension into the Mandatory Petroleum 
Price Regulations which continued the “temporary” controls 
after the end of price controls generally.417   
With the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA) of 
1975,418 Congress revised the EPAA scheme in an incoherent 
  
The freeze increased demands for an allocation program. As the freeze period 
came to an end, gasoline dealers recognized that they would soon be able to 
sell the gasoline in their tanks at substantially higher prices. Many simply 
shut their stations or severely restricted sales. Gas station closings and the 
resulting shortages at the end of October seemed to underline the need for a 
system of mandatory allocation for petroleum products. 
LANE, supra note 299, at 33-34. 
 412 BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 221. 
 413 Id. at 220. 
 414 Id. at 223. 
 415 Id. at 221; see also 1 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 474-78 (describing Phase 
IV). 
 416 LANE, supra note 299, at 25; VIETOR, supra note 98, at 248 (Independent 
Refiners Association of America and its customers, forty-seven associations of 70,000 
gas station operators, all favored extension of controls in the 1970s.). 
 417 LANE, supra note 299, at 19; VIETOR, supra note 98, at 238 (“The price 
freeze eventually gave way to a series of price controls that finally expired in 1974—
except for the oil industry.”); see also Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, 
Pub. L. No. 93-159, 87 Stat. 627 (1973). 
 418 Energy Policy and Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 94-163, 89 Stat. 871 
(1975).  EPCA was set to expire on October 1, 1981, ending all oil price controls at that 
time, U.S. CONG. BUDGET OFF., THE DECONTROL OF DOMESTIC OIL PRICES: AN 
OVERVIEW 5 (1979) [hereinafter CBO, OVERVIEW], because the Ford administration 
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omnibus energy bill that “included provisions both to reduce 
and to raise the price of oil.”419  EPCA essentially incorporated 
the Phase IV program, including classifications for pricing 
purposes,420 which were intended to prevent “windfall” profits to 
domestic oil producers.421  But EPCA modified the Phase IV 
two-tier system, turning it into a three-tier system: old oil 
(from domestic wells that began producing before 1973); new oil 
(from wells that began producing during or after 1973); and 
uncontrolled oil (oil from the Alaskan North Slope, the Naval 
Petroleum Reserve, and “stripper”422 oil).423  Old oil’s price was 
set relatively low; new oil’s price was higher; and uncontrolled 
oil sold at the market price.424  Not surprisingly, the profits 
available from reclassifying oil into the market-price categories 
from the controlled price categories produced a number of 
  
traded an immediate price rollback on crude oil prices for authority to end the program 
after forty months and to end the controls on refined products sooner if Congress did 
not object and for larger price increases during the forty months.  KATZ, supra note 
271, at 58-59 (describing compromise); LANE, supra note 299, at 54; see also LANE, 
supra note 299, at 105-06 (explaining compromise). 
 419 KATZ, supra note 271, at 57. 
 420 LANE, supra note 299, at 104; see also 1 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 494-97 
(describing law’s implementation); BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 228 (“principle 
feature” of EPCA in December of 1975 “was the retention of at least standby price and 
allocation controls on the industry for five years and the broadening of the crude oil 
controls to include new oil, released oil, and stripper-well oil”).  “Lower tier” (or “old”) 
oil was the amount of oil produced from a property during the corresponding month of 
1972.  LANE, supra note 299, at 104.  It could be sold at “the highest posted price for 
that grade of crude at that property on May 15, 1973, plus $1.35,” giving a range from 
$3.50 to $7.00 per barrel.  Id. at 104-05.  “Upper tier” oil was “new, released and 
stripper—all produced domestically—plus imported crude.” Id. at 105.  “New” oil was 
the excess over the 1972 base production level or oil from a new property.  Id.  Released 
oil was the result of an incentive that allowed a barrel of old oil to become new for each 
barrel of new oil produced from a property.  Id.  Stripper crude came from wells 
producing ten barrels or less per day.  Id.  Upper-tier crude could be sold at market 
price.  Id. 
 421 LANE, supra note 299, at 113. 
 422 “Stripper” oil came from wells producing ten or fewer barrels per day of 
petroleum and petroleum condensates, including natural gas liquids, during the 
preceding calendar year.  SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMM. 
ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COM., U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 96TH CONG., 
THE CASE OF THE BILLION DOLLAR STRIPPER: THE EVASION OF PRICE CONTROLS ON 
DOMESTIC CRUDE OIL BY RESELLERS 2 (1980) [hereinafter BILLION DOLLAR STRIPPER]. 
 423 CBO, OVERVIEW, supra note 418, at 5-6.  The various definitions had many 
subtleties and complexities, described in some detail in id. at 5-8.  See also MANCKE, 
PERFORMANCE, supra note 384, at 18 (concise, clear explanation of pricing structure); 
FEA, COMPLIANCE GUIDE, supra note 401, at 7-34 (describing how to classify oil). 
 424 For example, in 1979 the old, new, and uncontrolled prices were $5.86, 
$13.06, and $18.50 per barrel, respectively.  CBO, OVERVIEW, supra note 418, at 6-7.  
The first two prices are wellhead prices; the latter is at the refinery gate and so 
includes transportation costs. 
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successful schemes to do so.425  In addition, the price 
differentials created an incentive to maximize production of 
upper-tier oil from a reservoir rather than to maximize total 
production.426  Refiners’ cost structure depended on the mix of 
crude types that they refined.  High-cost crude dependent 
refiners were able to pass along their costs only if the market 
allowed, while lower-cost refiners could sell all they produced.427  
Accordingly, capacity utilization rates among refiners varied 
widely.428  Analysts concluded that EPCA created problems 
“infinitely worse” than the quota system it replaced.429 
EPCA also “implemented far-reaching controls affecting 
energy supply and consumption patterns which reinforced and 
prolonged the distortions of the system.”430  The program proved 
so complex to administer that there were hundreds of formal 
amendments and “interpretative modifications” made to the 
regulations between 1974 and 1978.  “[N]early all of these 
changes were in response to pleas for relief from particular 
industry groups, or political pressures from the Congress.”431  
  
 425 BILLION DOLLAR STRIPPER, supra note 422, at 2 (noting that when the 
price of stripper oil grew rapidly in January 1979, “a significant and growing 
discrepancy began to appear in data reported to the DOE.  Refinery receipts of stripper 
oil, which had closely tracked production for several years, suddenly began to exceed 
production.  On a sustained basis this is, of course, a physical impossibility.”)  One 
method of doing so was to resell the oil through a number of entities, obscuring its 
origins.  Id. at 5.  Eventually, enforcement actions were brought against a number of 
firms for millions of dollars of false certifications.  See Cost to Consumers, supra note 
26, at 42-43. 
 426 LANE, supra note 299, at 111 (“In some instances, techniques to maximize 
production from a unitized reservoir might be foregone in favor of techniques that 
maximized production which could be sold at upper-tier crude prices.”). 
 427 BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 222-23. 
 428 Id. at 225. 
 429 VIETOR, supra note 98, at 252. 
 430 KATZ, supra note 271, at 31.  The extent to which the pricing system 
required far-reaching controls can be seen from considering just one set of 
consequences.  Refiners differed in the proportion of old and less-controlled crude they 
processed.  To prevent those processing a higher proportion of old and cheaper crude 
from earning higher profits,  
the FEO had to enforce differential ceilings on the prices refiners could 
charge for their products. The method was to allow each refiner a specified 
markup over its full unit production costs. Even within well-defined 
geographical markets, the price controls on old crude led to intercompany 
differences of as much as 12¢ per gallon in retail gasoline prices. 
MANCKE, PERFORMANCE, supra note 384, at 19.  Once the embargo-related shortages 
passed, to prevent those with lower costs from underselling their competitors, the 
government required these refineries to sell some of their cheaper oil to their 
competitors at controlled prices.  Id. at 20. 
 431 LANE, supra note 299, at 57.  See also DOE’s Enforcement of Alleged 
Pricing Violations by the Nation’s Major Oil Companies: Hearing Before a Subcomm. of 
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These frequent changes produced considerable uncertainty 
about the rules.   
By late 1975 it was still no exaggeration to state that in large 
segments of the industry there was uncertainty as to actual current 
costs and legal prices, about possible retrospective gains or liabilities 
when regulations were sorted out and finally applied, and about 
whether or not operations were or were not in compliance with 
regulations as they eventually would be interpreted.432 
The allocation program attempted to equalize the cost of 
crude and equalize oil supplies so that all refineries operated at 
the same percentage of their operating capacity.433  Refineries 
with supplies over the national average were required to sell, 
at their weighted average cost, the excess to those with 
supplies under the national average.434  This created a number 
of perverse incentives.  For example, any refiner who found 
additional supplies on the world market at prices above its 
average cost would be forced to sell the extra oil to its 
competitors at a discount.435  (This “extra” oil’s marginal cost 
would have to have been above the average cost of the rest of 
  
the Comm. on Government Operations, 97th Cong. 4 (1981) (“The regulations 
implementing [the petroleum price and allocation] controls were quite complex, 
addressing as they did a very complex industry.  The sheer magnitude of this industry 
is such that even a seemingly trivial type of violation of these complex regulations can 
result in apparent violations in the hundreds of millions of dollars.” (statement of 
James B. Edwards, Sec’y, Dep’t of Energy)); YERGIN, supra note 27, at 660 (describing 
complexity and cost of regulations in 1970s). 
 432 BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 229.  This was a problem throughout 
the program.  Transfer pricing rules led to risk for oil importers, for if they bought at 
high spot-market prices, they risked prosecution for violating rules if they could have 
bought comparable oil under contract at lower prices, and so “many oil companies 
continued to refrain from participating in the spot market.”  Mancke, American 
Response, supra note 393, at 34. 
 433 BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 226. 
 434 LANE, supra note 299, at 40; VIETOR, supra note 98, at 246; see also 
MANCKE, PERFORMANCE, supra note 384, at 15-16 (providing a clear, concise discussion 
of the inter-refinery allocation problem).  A particularly vivid example is the case of 
Sohio, operating in Ohio.  Sohio had a huge price advantage over its competitors from 
its Alaskan crude supplies (which received preferential treatment under DOE 
regulations).  Forced by DOE regulations to pass this price advantage on to its 
customers, Sohio undersold its competition and increased its market share in Ohio.  
The independents sought a regulatory correction with an ad hoc lobby group, the “Ohio 
Independents for Survival.”  Their lobbying precipitated a general rules change that 
favored the independents.  LANE, supra note 299, at 171-72.  Other lobbying groups 
also formed to attempt to secure changes in DOE rules to their advantage.  Id.  These 
efforts “diverted substantial amounts of managerial and entrepreneurial time and 
attention away from marketplace problems and toward political problems . . . [and] 
created constituencies for the continued existence of particular aspects of the controls, 
and in many cases for the controls themselves.”  Id. at 172. 
 435 LANE, supra note 299, at 41. 
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the refinery’s oil because the average cost included the price-
controlled domestic oil.)  Price ceilings set under EPCA proved 
difficult to calculate precisely, given their relationship to the 
market price for foreign crude and its market share in the 
United States, necessitating multiple adjustments.436  The net 
effect penalized refiners who had taken steps to resolve the 
shortages for the benefit of those that had done nothing.437  In 
economic terms, the 1970s allocation program was a step 
backward from MOIP, which had at least allowed the price of 
quotas to be set in the marketplace, whereas the FEA set the 
prices under the new program.438 
The regulations also created incentives to operate 
inefficient refineries simply to get the entitlements to crude oil 
that owning a refinery produced: “the result was the bringing 
out of mothballs any piece of ‘refining junk’ that could be 
found—leading to the return of hopelessly inefficient ‘tea 
kettle’ refineries of the kind that had not been seen since the 
flood of oil in the East Texas field in the early 1930s.”439  
Further modification of the program gave the small refiners 
additional entitlements based on a sliding scale in an attempt 
to reduce the cost advantage the larger, more efficient refiners 
had.440  As a result, smaller, less efficient refiners profited at 
the expense of larger, more efficient refiners, and additional 
new, inefficient firms entered the refinery industry.441   
The price control regulations did not allow passthroughs 
of capital costs even to the same extent that they allowed 
passthroughs of higher crude-acquisition costs, discouraging 
refiners from investing in the technology needed to process 
  
 436 Id. at 107. 
 437 Id. at 41. 
 438 BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 227. 
 439 YERGIN, supra note 27, at 660; see also FTC, GASOLINE PRICE CHANGES, 
supra note 9, at 51 (During the 1970s, “government controls on crude oil prices and 
allocation favored small refineries, which provided incentives for companies to open 
and operate small, inefficient refineries, including many that produced little or no 
gasoline.”). 
 440 LANE, supra note 299, at 134.  Under the “sliding scale,” refiners got 11.1% 
of the first 10,000 barrels per day of capacity and then smaller percentages of capacity 
above that.  For example, if a refinery had capacity above 300,000 barrels per day, it 
received only 3.7% of the capacity above that amount.  VIETOR, supra note 98, at 125.  
Over time, the sliding scale became even steeper, rising to 22% for the first 10,000 
barrels per day by the end of the program.  Id. at 126. 
 441 Between 1974 and 1980, sixty-five of the sixty-seven new refineries built 
had a total capacity below 45,000 barrels per day and sixty of these had a total capacity 
below 30,000 barrels per day.  LANE, supra note 299, at 134-35. 
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high-sulfur crudes.442  Moreover, smaller refineries were less 
likely to have the ability to process high-sulfur fuel or to 
maximize production of lead-free gasoline.  This reinforced the 
negative impact of the quota system and discouraged 
investment in processing high-sulfur crude.443  “Accordingly, 
most new refinery capacity brought on stream after the 
adoption of the small refiner subsidies was in the form of small 
refineries designed to operate on low-sulfur crude oil and to 
produce a relatively undesirable slate of products.”444  These 
refiners earned their owners economic rents from the 
allotments, but contributed little to broadening and deepening 
the gasoline market.  To some extent, such refiners actually 
hindered the development of the market, for their existence 
denied the more efficient producers crude they could have used 
to expand into new regional markets and subsidized the 
creation of protected pockets within the national market.  
Because the new refinery could receive its own 
allocation of the cheaper oil, building a new refinery became 
preferable to expanding an existing one.445  The gains were 
substantial.  Economic analysts calculated that the annual 
value of the cheaper oil allocations reached $17 billion in 
  
 442 BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 295; LANE, supra note 299, at 138.  In 
Senate testimony, a DOE official elaborated on how regulations had discouraged 
investment in refining: 
First, the most serious aspect of the problem is that seven years of price 
controls and general regulatory uncertainty have inhibited investment in the 
refinery expansions and improvements needed to make unleaded gasoline, or 
to make gasoline-range material out of heavy and high sulfur domestic crude 
oils. . . . Second, price controls have discouraged refinery improvements that 
increase efficiency, since they require that the full amount of such cost 
savings be passed on in the form of lower product prices.  Third, the 
regulations do not reflect the fact that during the period of controls cost 
increases relative to the production of gasoline have been much greater than 
for other products. . . . Finally, the regulations take a snapshot of each 
refiner’s prices as of May 15, 1973, and allow it to add certain costs to that 
price, no matter how that company’s relative pricing or competitive 
circumstances have changed in the meantime. 
Id. at 139-40 (quoting John F. O’Leary, Deputy Sec’y, Dep’t of Energy, Statement 
Before the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources (Dec. 11, 1978)). 
 443 BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 295. 
 444 LANE, supra note 299, at 135-36. 
 445 PETERSON & MAHNOVSKI, supra note 76, at 36 (“Despite falling demand, 
between 1975 and 1981 the construction of small, simple refineries was further 
stimulated by federal crude oil supply controls, which gave unusual supply advantages 
to small refineries.”). 
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1979.446  As economists Kenneth Arrow and Joseph Kalt dryly 
noted in a 1979 analysis, 
The prospect of a transfer of $17 billion per year induces political 
competition for its acquisition among producers, refiners, and 
consumers.  The entitlements program is an outcome of this process 
of competition and is the mechanism by which eventual ownership of 
the windfall gains that arise under crude oil price controls is 
resolved.447 
Predictably, “the Federal Register became more 
important than the geologist’s report.”448  It also meant that 
there were now vested interests in controls where there had 
not been before, and so weakened opposition to the EPAA 
within the oil industry.449 
Once crude shortages no longer existed, the allocation 
program was used to address the disparities in access to crude.  
When crude was limited, “disparities in crude costs . . . had not 
been a problem because supplies had been tight and product 
could be sold at whatever price a firm could charge under the 
regulations.” Once supplies were more abundant, however, 
“those with higher than average crude costs feared that they 
would be forced out of the marketplace.”450  The “entitlements” 
program granted refiners “the right to refine one barrel of price 
controlled crude oil during a given month,” allocated in such a 
way as to give each refinery a proportionate share of the price-
controlled gasoline but with a bias toward small refiners, who 
received more entitlements than their proportionate share 
would justify.451  This provided a tremendous cost advantage for 
small refiners, as much as ten cents per gallon of gasoline.452   
The Arab oil embargo spurred a 65% rise in real 
gasoline prices from 1972 to 1976 (21% when adjusted for the 
general rate of inflation).453  These prices pulled non-Arab oil 
  
 446 KENNETH J. ARROW & JOSEPH P. KALT, PETROLEUM PRICE REGULATION: 
SHOULD WE DECONTROL? 11 (1979). 
 447 Id.; see also LANE, supra note 299, at 28 (“It was government forces in 
effect during the previous two years that had not permitted market forces to operate in 
the petroleum industry.  Thus, the allocation program was a direct consequence of the 
price control program.”). 
 448 VIETOR, supra note 98, at 238. 
 449 BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 227. 
 450 LANE, supra note 299, at 128. 
 451 Id. at 129-31.  The allocation formulas were complex and are described in 
detail in id. at 128-30. 
 452 Id. at 133. 
 453 BERNARD A. GELB, THE CONF. BOARD, INFO. BULL. NO. 38, U.S. ENERGY 
PRICE AND CONSUMPTION CHANGES IN THE MID-1970’S, at 4 (1978). 
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and refined products into the United States from outside 
sources.454  Price controls on domestically produced crude oil—
designed to prevent “windfall profits” to oil producers—instead 
resulted in windfalls for refiners because the demand for the 
cheaper, domestic oil greatly exceeded the price-controlled 
price.  For example, refiners could include the price of gasoline 
they purchased for resale in the calculations of their average 
price, which determined the price at which they could sell all 
their gasoline.  Thus, refiners selling gasoline at a controlled 
price below the market price had an incentive to purchase 
gasoline at any price, including prices above market price, to 
bring their average up to the market price.455  In general, the 
regulations lowered the price of crude to domestic refiners, 
increasing their market share at the expense of foreign 
refiners, but also increasing the average operating costs of 
domestic refiners.456  They boosted the market share of 
nonbranded gasoline from 10.4% in 1973 to 18.4% in 1979.457 
When President Carter took office, his administration’s 
initial policy goal was aimed at finding a way to decontrol 
domestic oil prices “so that consumers could react to correct 
price signals.”458  However, Carter’s attempts to reform energy 
policy quickly mired in special interest politics.459   
The Carter administration attempted “‘voluntary’ wage 
and price guidelines, . . . backed by moral suasion, publicity, 
and the denial of Federal contracts to firms that violated them.  
At least initially, this was taken to include denial of the right 
to bid on Federal oil leases,”460 which induced compliance by the 
major oil companies.  These “voluntary” guidelines were in 
effect between October 1978 and December 1980.461  Like the 
mandatory regulations, these guidelines proved “quite complex 
  
 454 MANCKE, PERFORMANCE, supra note 384, at 7. 
 455 LANE, supra note 299, at 143. 
 456 Id. at 147. 
 457 Id. at 158. 
 458 YERGIN, supra note 27, at 663.  See also 1 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 503-
10 (describing Carter’s “phased decontrol” strategy). 
 459 YERGIN, supra note 27, at 663 (When the Carter administration tried to 
reform energy policy, it got “a firsthand education in how special interests operate in 
the American system, including liberals, conservatives, oil producers, consumer groups, 
automobile companies, pro- and anti-nuclear activists, coal producers, utility 
companies and environmentalists—all with conflicting agendas.”). 
 460 LANE, supra note 299, at 57. 
 461 FRANK CAMM, CHARLES E. PHELPS & P.J.E. STAN, RESOURCE ALLOCATION 
UNDER THE COWPS PRICE GUIDELINE: THE CASE OF FIXED PROPORTIONS, at v (1981). 
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in practice.”462  There is at least some evidence that these 
controls caused refinery-level shortages.463  Because price 
controls did not account for the interrelationships of products 
produced by refineries, they caused shortages in non-controlled 
products.464 
The Carter administration was also hampered by the 
Iranian hostage crisis, which doubled spot-market prices by 
February 1979.465  The loss of lighter Iranian crudes forced 
refineries to use heavier crudes, reducing gasoline yields.466  
The allocation program had “fallen into disuse” because a 
market surplus had rendered it moot, but these new shortages 
brought it back into play.  By 1979, small refiners were again 
making extensive use of the program.467   
  
 462 Id. at 3. 
 463 Id. at viii (“Some casual empirical evidence supports the belief that the 
COWPS controls were in fact the determinate cause of refinery-level shortages in 1978-
1980.”). 
 464 Id. at vi.  The economic analysis is relatively complex, and described in 
detail in the above cited report.  Briefly, the analysis can be summarized as follows: 
If and only if the productive technology of the firm embodies certain types of 
fixed proportions (as appears to be the case for refiners), then complying with 
[Council on Wage and Price Stability (COWPS)] guidelines can lead to a 
shortage of refined product from any given refiner.  If the COWPS constraint 
becomes so binding that the profit-maximizing refiner cannot charge market-
clearing prices for its products at any level of output, then it will select the 
output that leads to the highest COWPS-allowed profits and will charge less 
than market prices.  This, of necessity, leads to rationing of the product by 
the refiner among its customers and is a prima facie condition of shortage.  
Importantly, this theory shows how rationing of products can occur for 
products that were totally uncontrolled by the DOE, such as diesel fuel, 
heating oil, jet fuel, and other products. And indeed, there was nonprice 
rationing for each of these products by some refiners during the shortages, 
rationing that cannot logically be attributed to the DOE price controls on 
refiners. 
Id.; see also id. at 42 (noting shortages in jet fuel that occurred during a labor strike at 
a major airline and while the DC-10 fleet was grounded by the FAA, “a time when 
aggregate demand for fuel was unusually low”). 
 465 YERGIN, supra note 27, at 688.  Oil was cut off for sixty-nine days starting 
at Christmas 1979; it returned at a permanently lower production rate.  Paul Kemezis, 
The Permanent Crisis: Changes in the World Oil System, in OIL DIPLOMACY: THE 
ATLANTIC NATIONS IN THE OIL CRISIS OF 1978-79, at 3, 4 (1980).  Iran, at the time of the 
crisis, was the source of approximately 15% of internationally traded oil.  Mancke, 
American Response, supra note 393, at 29.  Iran was also the source of 9% of U.S. oil 
imports and 3% of U.S. consumption before revolution.  Id. at 31; see also YERGIN, 
supra note 27, at 702 (When Carter ordered a freeze on Iranian assets and ban on 
Iranian oil imports in the wake of the seizure of the hostages in the American embassy 
and Iran retaliated with a ban on exports to the United States, it disrupted supply 
channels and forced reallocation of oil.). 
 466 YERGIN, supra note 27, at 692. 
 467 LANE, supra note 299, at 69. 
2007] WHY GASOLINE COSTS SO MUCH 1017 
 
When President Ronald Reagan decontrolled oil prices 
in January 1981,468 the rationale for operating small, inefficient 
refineries dissipated and the number of refineries declined 
quickly and dramatically.469  The Reagan administration, 
unlike other post-World War II administrations, did not 
intervene to protect small refiners.470  Although the number of 
refineries fell from 324 in 1981 to 202 in 1991, the average 
capacity rose substantially from 65,300 barrels per day in 1983 
to 80,900 barrels per day in 1993 and 112,500 barrels per day 
in 2003.471   
With deregulation, the oil industry went through “a 
wholesale corporate reorganization from which no major 
company was immune.”472  Twenty-three small refiners shut 
down in 1981 alone.473  Add to this falling real prices and the 
rise of institutional investors interested in rapid returns, and 
the oil companies were forced to become leaner and more 
profitable quickly, sparking inter-company battles and a wave 
of consolidations.474  The shift from a regulatory program that 
encouraged the proliferation of refineries focused on domestic 
crude sources and kept small, less efficient refineries open, to a 
market-place that punished inefficiency led many refineries to 
close in the 1980s. 
5. Impacts on the Market for Gasoline 
The post-World War II economic regulation of the oil 
industry flowed from the belief that such a vital commodity 
required government involvement.  From there, “the drift of 
policy was inexorable . . . because at each step the decision was 
marginal—only a little more control was involved—and the 
benefits from the entire enterprise appeared substantial.”475  
But the regulatory scheme in place from the Korean War 
  
 468 Exec. Order No. 12,287, 46 Fed. Reg. 9909 (Jan. 30, 1981). 
 469 FTC, GASOLINE PRICE CHANGES, supra note 9, at 51 (“After the 
government controls were eliminated in 1981, a large number of small, inefficient 
refiners exited over the course of a number of years.”). 
 470 KATZ, supra note 271, at 159 (“Citing free market arguments, 
administration spokesmen stated after deregulation that no special treatment for the 
refining industry was needed and that if the industry shrank as it adapted to 
decontrol, the government should not meddle.”). 
 471 FTC, GASOLINE PRICE CHANGES, supra note 9, at 51-52. 
 472 YERGIN, supra note 27, at 726. 
 473 2 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 1237. 
 474 YERGIN, supra note 27, at 726-28. 
 475 BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 15. 
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through 1981 failed to achieve its goals.  Instead, it took crude 
away from efficient refiners and allowed “refiners 
manufacturing lower proportions of the products in short 
supply to use higher than normal proportions of the available 
crude,” shifted crude from the coasts, “where supplies were 
short, . . . [to] the midwest, where supplies were [already] 
plentiful,” and established “the precedent of bailing out refiners 
that had come to depend on the spot market for a large 
proportion of their crude supplies, reducing whatever incentive 
they might otherwise have had to stockpile oil for such 
contingencies in the future.”476  Moreover, the regulatory 
system repeated its mistakes from one crisis to the next.477 
At virtually all times, but particularly during the 1960s 
and 1970s, economic regulations induced significant distortions 
in the market for gasoline.  The decline of the U.S. refining 
industry’s world share is closely tied to American energy 
policies, policies which included such disincentives for efficient 
investment as the 1970s price controls’ requirement that larger 
domestic refineries sell imported oil to competitors at below 
cost.  Combined with other nations’ interest in developing their 
own refining industries, economic regulation contributed to 
American refiners’ inability to meet the growing demand for 
gasoline, both in the United States and the world.   
Although these regulatory efforts ultimately had no 
more chance of success than King Canute’s legendary command 
to the sea had of stopping the tides, they had two long-term 
impacts for our purposes.  First, gasoline imports, as opposed to 
crude oil imports, became more important in the American 
gasoline market.478  Before World War II, most crude oil refined 
and consumed in the United States was produced 
  
 476 LANE, supra note 299, at 89; see also KATZ, supra note 271, at 150 
(“[S]pecial programs passed by Congress to protect independent refiners required 
domestic producers to subsidize the refiners’ importation of foreign crude.”). 
 477 LANE, supra note 299, at 100-01 (“The most striking conclusion to emerge 
from this analysis is the fact that most of the ‘mistakes’ made by the government in 
handling the Arab embargo were repeated during the Iranian disruption six years 
later. This result cannot be attributed merely to the change of administrations or the 
turnover of administrative personnel. The same ‘mistakes’ were made because the 
same groups were affected by the regulations and responded politically in the same 
ways.”). 
 478 Gasoline imports became important in the 1970s.  NPC, FACTORS 
AFFECTING, supra note 61, at 4.  Imports grew from “a net negative in the early 1950s 
to a peak of about 7% of domestic demand in the late 1980s” and have since fluctuated 
between 2% and 6%.  NPC, ADEQUACY, supra note 59, at 21-22. 
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domestically.479  Indeed, throughout World War II, the United 
States had the vast majority of advanced refineries, with 
“[a]pproximately 60 percent of the total world crude-distillation 
and 65 percent of thermal cracking capacity” at the end of the 
war.480   
Second, the pervasive economic regulation had a more 
subtle, but in our judgment, more debilitating effect.  By 
making the pages of the Federal Register and United States 
Code more important to the oil industry than developing new 
technologies for recovering and refining petroleum, regulations 
convinced oil men, politicians, and bureaucrats that “kings” 
could command the tides of the oil business.  Regulators never 
recognized that the burdens of their regulatory structures were 
bearable only because the industry was simultaneously 
expanding production outside the United States, developing 
new technologies to improve refinery productivity, and growing 
crude supplies so rapidly that the real price of crude continued 
to fall.  The parasitic regulatory burden thus went largely 
unnoticed as it merely siphoned off portions of the gains from 
technical and economic improvements.481  The widespread use 
of “regulatory trading,” in which oil was traded to allow its 
reclassification and resale at a higher price (at least quasi-
legitimately), during periods of allocation controls is indicative 
of the destruction allocation programs caused.482 
Whether these regulations served the real economic 
interests of their supporters at the expense of the general 
welfare483 or, more benignly, whether they reflected a 
  
 479 USDOC, WAR AND POSTWAR, supra note 39, at 2 (“At the present time the 
country’s more than 450 refineries are supplied with crude oil by almost 425 thousand 
domestic producing wells and a relatively small volume of crude oil from foreign 
sources.” (citation omitted)). 
 480 Id. at 6.  The next largest shares were in the Netherlands, West Indies, 
and the Soviet Union, “each having approximately 10 to 15 percent as much crude-
distillation capacity as the United States.”  Id. 
 481 The same is true of some current environmental regulations of fuel 
composition.  See, e.g, NPC, ADEQUACY, supra note 59, at 37-38 (“The fact that product 
prices actually declined in spite of increased [regulatory] costs suggests that the direct 
cost increase was more than offset by other efficiency gains within the industry. 
Without increased environmental costs, prices would be lower.”).  Imports have been 
growing “significantly” in recent years, primarily from Europe.  NPC, OBSERVATIONS, 
supra note 13, at I-2.  Although imports are small overall, they account for 25% of 
gasoline supplies in PADD I.  Id. at I-9. 
 482 1 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 681-82, 685-710 (describing history of 
regulatory trading in detail). 
 483 YERGIN, supra note 27, at 660 (noting that the direct costs alone of the 
federal energy regulatory system “measured simply in terms of expenditures by 
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combination of incompetence and ignorance among policy 
makers, we cannot say.  The key point is that energy policy in 
this period involved major interventions running counter to the 
long-term market trends in gasoline, propping up inefficient, 
smaller refineries, and diluting the competitive pressures for 
securing supplies and technological innovation.  Despite the 
massive scale of these interventions, they reversed the long-
term trends only briefly, during the immediate aftermath of 
the Arab oil embargo in the mid-1970s.  Their distortions so 
pervaded the refining industry, however, that the industry in 
1981 bore little resemblance to what it would have been in 
their absence.  Most importantly, these distortions’ cumulative 
impact restricted the growth of a national market in gasoline 
by protecting isolated markets from competition, punishing 
firms that engaged in market-expanding behavior such as 
securing cheap, foreign crude supplies, and deterring 
investment in U.S. refineries. 
By 1980, oil and refined gasoline were internationally 
traded commodities, abundantly and cheaply available from 
primarily non-U.S. sources.  The failure to adapt to that fact 
itself distorted the U.S. refining industry.  The legacy of oil 
regulation was a narrower, shallower national gasoline market 
than would have evolved in the absence of forty years of import 
and price controls.  Refineries were smaller, less 
technologically sophisticated, and more concentrated on the 
Gulf Coast than they would have been in the absence of 
regulation.484  The gravity of these distortions was not fully felt 
in the 1980s, however, because economic conditions kept 
gasoline demand below 1978 levels well into that decade.485  
Indeed, the problem’s impact is still mitigated today by the 
East Coast importing gasoline from Europe, a solution possible 
only because Europe relies heavily on diesel passenger 
vehicles, which produces a gasoline surplus.486  If the diesel 
  
government agencies and by industry on regulatory matters—added up to several 
billion dollars in the mid-1970s”). 
 484 2 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 1163, 1226-28. 
 485 FTC, GASOLINE PRICE CHANGES, supra note 9, at 19 (“U.S. gasoline 
consumption fell significantly between 1978 and 1982, and remained lower during the 
1980s than it had been in 1978, despite lower crude oil and gasoline prices during the 
late 1980s.  Those reduced prices resulted in part from substantially reduced U.S. 
gasoline consumption and decreased worldwide petroleum consumption due to 
increased price sensitivity and an economic recession.”). 
 486 NPC, OBSERVATIONS, supra note 13, at I-9 to -11. 
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market grows in the United States, as some forecast it will,487 
supplies of diesel are not likely to be available from European 
refineries. 
These regulatory factors, in turn, exacerbated the 
burden of the environmental regulations that followed.  
Competition in the gasoline market pushed refiners to adopt 
increasingly sophisticated and expensive techniques to convert 
larger percentages of crude oil feedstocks into the most 
valuable end products (transportation fuels like gasoline)488 and 
to control the consistency of the products they produced.  With 
diverse inputs and a wide range of possible refinery outputs, 
refineries became increasingly sophisticated and costly to 
build.  The increased capital costs created a trend toward 
larger refineries.  
Even before the EPA directly regulated gasoline 
composition, pre-existing regulatory and market forces had 
virtually ensured that all but the most carefully designed 
environmental regulation would fragment the market.  
American refining capacity was insufficient to meet the U.S. 
demand for gasoline, requiring substantial imports of gasoline 
and leaving little excess capacity within the United States.  
Furthermore, the potential for expanding existing refineries 
was constrained by cost and the need for locations near oil 
pipelines and ports.  Although these same forces had produced 
a national market for commodified gasoline, that market 
remained vulnerable in ways that policy makers appear to 
have ignored. 
B. Environmental Regulations and Gasoline Markets 
1. Fuel Formulation 
Although the federal government has long had authority 
to regulate various aspects of motor fuels,489 and it has 
  
 487 See John Peter, Plotting Diesel’s Stake in North America, DIESEL FORECAST 
(2005) (“The Big 3 domestic manufacturers are already well established in Europe’s 
diesel market where nearly 50 percent of all light-duty vehicles are diesel powered.  
And they would like nothing more than to add light-duty diesels to their respective 
powertrain portfolios in North America.”). 
 488 GARY & HANDWERK, supra note 61, at 1 (The highest-value products from 
refining crude oil today are transportation fuels (gasoline, jet fuel, diesel) and light 
heating oils and the primary goal is to convert “as much of the barrel of crude oil into 
transportation fuels as is economically practicable.”). 
 489 See Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485, 504 (1967) 
(giving Department of Health, Education and Welfare the authority to regulate fuels 
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exercised that authority by requiring registration of fuels and 
additives,490 state and federal regulators imposed only one 
important fuel formulation requirement before the late 1980s: 
requiring the removal of lead additives.  Beginning in the late 
1980s, however, the EPA and state and local governments 
began to intervene more, increasing their efforts after the 
passage of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 (1990 
CAAA).491  These fuel requirements added a set of constraints to 
refinery operation and transportation of fuels.492  This section 
analyzes the major fuel formulation requirements. 
As noted earlier, lead had been added to gasoline to 
boost octane since the 1920s.493  Price controls on tetraethyl 
lead produced shortages in 1946, which in turn spurred a 
federal octane ceiling to reduce demand.  When price controls 
were abolished in late 1946, the shortage ended.  Lead 
shortages reappeared in the early 1950s when Korean War-era 
price controls were imposed.  The federal government 
considered a plan, supported by small refiners, to regulate 
octane levels to reduce demand.  The plan was abandoned, 
however, because the need for different octane levels in 
different regions due to climatic conditions made it too 
complex.  Instead, the government rationed tetraethyl lead 
until 1952.494 
Beginning in the 1950s, technological improvements 
gradually reduced the amount of lead added to gasoline, 
  
and fuel additives); Clean Air Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676, 1694 
(1970) (allowing fuel additive testing) and id. at 1698-1700 (allowing regulation of 
additives that could impair emissions-control equipment). 
 490 Reitze, supra note 152, at 486-87, 491-97. 
 491 FTC, GASOLINE PRICE CHANGES, supra note 9, at 69 (“As a result of the 
proliferation of unique fuel requirements, differing fuel specifications apply in different 
parts of the country at various times of the year.”).  The EPA uses the term “boutique 
fuels” in a very limited way, including only “clean fuel program[s] designed and 
enforced under state authority to reduce motor vehicle emissions and improve air 
quality; and [a]pproved by the [EPA] under the authority of Section 211(c)(4)(c) of CAA 
Amendments of 1990; and, [i]ncluded in an EPA-approved state [clean air] 
Implementation Plan (SIP).”  U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, TASK FORCE ON BOUTIQUE 
FUELS, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 5 (2006) [hereinafter EPA, TASK FORCE].  This 
excludes a wide range of state mandates for “bio-fuels,” among other things, and so 
understates the extent of fuel formulation regulation.  
 492 Jones, supra note 116, at xxi (noting importance of issue of “providing 
products to the high specification now required by our customers, by the public and 
pressure groups and by regulators (both domestic and, increasingly, supra-national)”).  
Research into ways to provide products that meet required specifications “at an 
acceptable cost” has been important in recent years.  Id. at xxii. 
 493 See supra notes 149-52. 
 494 This paragraph is based on 2 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 1150-56. 
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primarily through improved catalyst use.495  When Congress set 
automotive emissions standards with the Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1970, it “assumed that the automobile 
manufacturing industry would meet those standards by 
installing catalytic converters in the exhaust stream.”496  Lead 
would have harmed the catalysts in these converters, and so 
the 1970 Amendments authorized the EPA to order gasoline 
refiners to alter gasoline formulations to protect the catalytic 
converters.497  The EPA acted almost immediately to begin the 
process of removing lead from gasoline.498 
In 1972, in addition to protecting catalytic converters, 
the EPA also initiated rulemaking based on lead’s health 
effects.499  Not surprisingly, small refiners were again the 
beneficiaries of special treatment, winning an exemption from 
the rule until January 1, 1977 “in recognition of [their] special 
lead-time problems,”500 and then receiving an additional partial 
extension from Congress through October 1, 1982.501  As a 
  
 495 Bing Zhou, Ray Balee & Rebecca Groenendaal, Nanoparticle and 
Nanostructure Catalysts: Technologies and Markets, 2 NANOTECH. L. & BUS. 222, 223 
(2005). 
 496 Thomas O. McGarity, MTBE: A Precautionary Tale, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 281, 294 (2004) [hereinafter McGarity, MTBE]. 
 497 The authority was phrased broadly, however, allowing the EPA to control 
the use of additives on environmental grounds generally.  See 42 U.S.C. 7574(c)(1)(A) 
(2000).  
 498 In 1971, the newly formed EPA announced that it was considering 
restrictions on lead as an additive.  Regulation of Fuel Additives, 36 Fed. Reg. 1486 
(proposed Jan. 30, 1971).  In 1972, the agency proposed regulations, Fuels and Fuel 
Additives, 37 Fed. Reg. 11,786 (proposed June 14, 1972), and in 1973, the EPA 
exercised its Clean Air Act § 211(c)(1)(A) authority to require a series of lead additive 
reductions beginning January 1, 1975 to a final level of no more than 0.5 grams per 
gallon by January 1979.  Control of Lead Additives in Gasoline, 38 Fed. Reg. 33,734 
(1973).  Refiners challenged the EPA’s actions and lost, Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 501 F.2d 
722 (D.C. Cir. 1974), although the challenge resulted in a less-restrictive phaseout 
schedule.  2 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 1252-53.  This relaxation resulted from the 
delay in investment needed to convert refineries to unleaded production caused by the 
regulatory uncertainty resulting from the litigation.  In addition, unleaded production 
reduced the volume of gasoline produced from each barrel of crude, and the government 
feared shortages.  Id. at 1254-55; Mancke, American Response, supra note 393, at 34 
(“Higher operating costs, stemming from larger crude oil requirements and the 
multimillion-dollar capital investments needed to modify a large refinery to produce 
unleaded gasoline, entail that unleaded gasoline is substantially more expensive to 
manufacture than leaded gasoline.”). 
 499 Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives, 37 Fed. Reg. 3882 (Feb. 23, 1972).  
The final rule was issued in January 1973.  38 Fed. Reg. 1254 (Jan. 10, 1973).  
Although the lead additive makers challenged the EPA’s actions, the en banc D.C. 
Circuit upheld the rule.  Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc). 
 500 38 Fed. Reg. 33,734, 33,740 (1973). 
 501 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 223, 91 Stat. 685, 
764 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7545(g) (2005)). 
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result, between 1979 and 1982, there appeared “a small 
subindustry of ‘blenders,’” firms created “to take advantage of 
the small refiner exemptions,” which “would purchase 
inexpensive, low-octane gas from foreign markets and blend in 
just enough high-octane leaded gas to stay within the small-
refiner exemption.”502 
Removing lead produced “a desperate search for ways to 
maintain the octane level of [refiners’] gasoline pool.”503  The 
prevailing solution was to “crank up the severity of the cat 
reformer, making higher octane reformate,” but this reduced 
the volume of gasoline produced and pushed refiners to look for 
lead substitutes that would boost octane.504  Some refiners 
resorted to an alternative additive to boost octane, 
methylcyclopentadienyl manganese tricarbonyl (MMT), 
previously approved by the EPA.505  However, under the 1977 
Clean Air Act Amendments, “which may well have been 
enacted with MMT in mind,” refiners were not allowed to 
market gasolines for catalytic converter-equipped vehicles that 
were not substantially similar to the gasolines used to certify 
the vehicle, hampering MMT use.506  In late 1978, the EPA 
restricted refiners’ use of MMT507 but a few months later, it 
approved the use of methyl tertiary-butyl ether (MTBE) as an 
octane-boosting additive, a decision with important 
consequences, discussed below.508 
The interaction of the environmental regulation with 
the 1970s economic regulations also caused problems for 
refiners.  Pricing rules did not allow refiners to fully pass 
through to consumers the additional costs of producing 
unleaded gasoline, and so “[b]ecause th[e] premium was less 
than the added costs associated with producing unleaded 
gasoline, most oil companies chose to go slow in expanding 
  
 502 Thomas O. McGarity, Radical Technology-Forcing in Environmental 
Regulation, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 943, 950 (1994) [hereinafter McGarity, Radical 
Technology-Forcing]. 
 503 LEFFLER, supra note 40, at 141. 
 504 Id. 
 505 McGarity, MTBE, supra note 496, at 296; see also Reitze, supra note 152, 
at 506-07. 
 506 McGarity, MTBE, supra note 496, at 296. 
 507 Id.  The agency is currently reviewing the safety of MMT.  See U.S. Envtl. 
Prot. Agency, Comments on the Gasoline Additive MMT (methylcyclopentadienyl 
manganese tricarbonyl), http://www.epa.gov/otaq/regs/fuels/additive/mmt_cmts.htm 
(last visited Apr. 12, 2007). 
 508 McGarity, MTBE, supra note 496, at 297. 
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their unleaded gasoline capacity.”509  As a result, there were 
periodic shortages of unleaded gasoline in the 1970s,510 
prompting the EPA to slow down the lead phaseout.511 
The lead ban revealed the fragility of refining 
infrastructure.  Regulations raising costs combined with price 
controls to reduce the economic returns to refining, lowering 
the incentive to invest in capacity.  In virtually every instance, 
small refiners lobbied for and received special treatment (for a 
time), further harming the development of an efficient refining 
sector.  As had happened with earlier regulatory constraints, a 
combination of external events and policy responses mitigated 
the problem.  Lower-than-expected demand and delays in the 
lead phaseout both ameliorated the capacity crunch,512 and the 
EPA used an innovative quasi-market mechanism to reduce 
the compliance costs of the lead phaseout, allowing refineries to 
trade lead credits,513 and so bought off the small refiners. 
A second formulation requirement began in the late 
1980s.  Through 1987, regulators had not seen volatility in 
gasoline as an air quality problem.  But when the summer of 
1988 delivered “some of the worst ozone excursions on record,” 
research fingered high-volatility gasoline as a contributing 
culprit.514  States began the trend toward fuel controls to 
address the ozone issue.515  Before the 1990 Amendments, 
California refiners led a push toward “cleaner” fuels out of 
concern that the state would mandate a mixture of 85% 
methanol and 15% gasoline,516 and ultimately introduced a wide 
range of fuels built around the addition of MTBE.517 
In 1989, following state actions, the EPA set upper RVP 
limits for summer gasoline nationwide,518 and then 
  
 509 Mancke, American Response, supra note 393, at 35. 
 510 Id. 
 511 McGarity, Radical Technology-Forcing, supra note 502, at 949. 
 512 U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL REPORT TO 
CONGRESS, VOLUME THREE: PROJECTIONS 57, DOE/EIA-0173 (1979). 
 513 2 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 1258-59 (describes trading). 
 514 NAS, OZONE-FORMING POTENTIAL, supra note 142, at 108.  One problem 
was that the EPA allowed vehicles to be certified with lower volatility gasoline than 
was used in practice, leading to higher emissions than anticipated.  See Reitze, supra 
note 152, at 515-16. 
 515 Reitze, supra note 152, at 516 (describing efforts of Northeast States for 
Coordinated Air Use Management, an eight-state coalition, and a subgroup of the 
coalition to impose volatility requirements in 1989). 
 516 McGarity, MTBE, supra note 496, at 305-06. 
 517 Id. 
 518 NAS, OZONE-FORMING POTENTIAL, supra note 142, at 109. 
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“substantially expanded” its involvement after the passage of 
the 1990 Amendments, which mandated the federal 
reformulated gasoline (RFG) program.519  Unfortunately, in 
1990, gasoline formulation was known to affect “performance 
criteria, notably volatility, octane quality, good startability, and 
driveability, but little was known about the effects of fuel 
composition on vehicle emissions.”520  
As “a relatively minor and late-arriving aspect of a 
multi-year effort to amend” the Clean Air Act that reached 
fruition in 1990,521 Congress also required adding oxygenates to 
gasoline in order to reduce emissions in carbon monoxide 
nonattainment areas.522  The requirement, apparently resulting 
from a coalition of farm-state senators, was passed without 
consideration of the environmental impacts of any of the 
additives, including MTBE.523   
As the new bill was being debated on the floor of the Senate, 
Senators Tom Harkin (D-Iowa), Tom Daschle (D-S.D.) and Bob Dole 
(R-Kan.) introduced an amendment under which refiners would have 
to reduce the ozone forming potential of the gasoline sold in the nine 
most seriously polluted ozone nonattainment areas by 15% while 
adhering to a 2.7% oxygen requirement and keeping aromatics below 
25%.524  
This measure, seemingly designed to boost demand for ethanol, 
raised the level of government involvement in fuel design to new 
heights.  The later discovery of MTBE’s serious environmental 
problems led Congress to substitute ethanol as the oxygenate of 
choice.525 
The 1990 Amendments allowed the EPA to impose a 
baseline set of requirements for gasoline, including mandating 
reformulated gasoline in nine geographical areas to help meet 
federal standards for ground level ozone.526  The first set of RFG 
requirements was applied in 1995, with a second, tighter phase 
following in 2000.  The EPA initially required the RFG 
  
 519 Id. 
 520 PEARSON, supra note 132, at 83. 
 521 McGarity, MTBE, supra note 496, at 306. 
 522 42 U.S.C. §§ 7512(a)-(b), 7545(m) (2000).  
 523 McGarity, MTBE, supra note 496, at 309; see also Reitze, supra note 152, 
at 526-28 (describing interest group maneuvering over oxygenates). 
 524 McGarity, MTBE, supra note 496, at 309. 
 525 Reitze, supra note 152, at 528 (noting that rulemaking ultimately had “a 
tilt away from a fuel neutral approach to one that carved a place for ethanol”). 
 526 The 1990 amendments specified a wide range of characteristics of “base” 
gasoline.  42 U.S.C. § 7581(4) (2000). 
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formulations in nine metropolitan areas, although others were 
added later.527  States were allowed to add more areas to the 
RFG program, although the EPA could delay “opt-ins” if RFG 
supplies were insufficient.528  In 1992 and again in 1996, 
California promulgated its own regulations, which were even 
more stringent than the EPA’s requirements.529   
The initial specification for RFG gasoline required an 
oxygen content of at least 2% by weight, a benzene content of 
no more than 1% by volume, no lead or manganese, a year-
round average NOX emission level of a 1990 summer baseline 
gasoline, and reduced toxic air pollutant and volatile organic 
compound emissions.530  The federal RFG program set different 
targets for northern and southern states, reflecting “the 
historical industrial practice where southern gasoline had 
lower RVP than northern gasoline to compensate for higher 
ambient temperatures.”531  Thus, the federal RFG requirements 
produced three fuels: a “northern” RFG; a “southern” RFG; and 
uncontrolled gasoline used outside the areas where states or 
the EPA mandated one of the RFG gasolines. 
These regulatory requirements produced several 
changes in gasoline refining.  The 1989 standard was primarily 
met by reducing the butane content of gasoline, which required 
compensating for the resulting loss of octane by increasing 
catalytic cracking and alkylation of gasoline.532  The 1992 RVP 
standards were met by increasing downstream processing of 
gasoline and blending lower RVP components with higher 
octane.533  Both of these steps required “large capital 
investments.”534 
Even implementing a comparatively simple regulatory 
program like this required some sophisticated regulations.  For 
  
 527 42 U.S.C. § 7545. The initial nine were Baltimore, Chicago, Hartford, 
Houston, Los Angeles, Milwaukee, New York City (including suburbs in other states), 
Philadelphia, and San Diego.  Reitze, Fuels, supra note 152, at 524 n.307. 
 528 42 U.S.C. § 7545(k)(6)(A)-(B). 
 529 See California Air Resources Board, The California Reformulated Gasoline 
Regulations, available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/fuels/gasoline/gasoline.htm#Programs 
(last visited Apr. 12, 2007) (summarizing state program). 
 530 See Reitze, supra note 152, at 532-36 (describing initial regulations). 
 531 NAS, OZONE-FORMING POTENTIAL, supra note 142, at 116-17. 
 532 EPA, PROFILE, supra note 68, at 91.  Because n-butane also raises the 
average octane, however, a substitute was needed to maintain the blend’s octane level.  
Needless to say, refineries also found themselves with seasonal surpluses of n-butane.  
GARY & HANDWERK, supra note 61, at 8-9. 
 533 EPA, PROFILE, supra note 68, at 91. 
 534 Id. 
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example, one concern was that the blendstocks removed from 
the RFG fuels would be used in gasolines for non-RFG areas, 
increasing the volatility of gasolines there and causing new 
problems.  As a result, the EPA adopted “antidumping” rules to 
prevent the gasoline components not used in RFG from being 
blended into gasolines outside the RFG mandated areas.535  
These rules used baselines individualized for each refiner.536  
Moreover, the 1990 CAAA oxygenate requirements 
necessitated waivers in part because of limited time to build 
the “new oxygenate production, storage, and transportation 
facilities,” as well as the constraints on the ability to buy 
oxygenates for storage.537 
A second set of constraints on refiners came from the 
EPA’s order under the 1990 Amendments to dramatically 
reduce the sulfur content in transportation fuels, including 
gasoline.538  These restrictions reduced the permissible sulfur 
content in highway diesel.539  Combined with the shift in crude 
supplies to heavier sour (e.g., higher in sulfur) crudes, this 
required refiners producing fuel for the U.S. market to make 
substantial capital investments.540 
Beginning in 1998, the EPA imposed additional 
requirements on fuels.  In that year, the EPA began requiring 
refiners to use a more complex model of fuels’ emissions 
properties known, appropriately, as the “Complex Model.”541  
Furthermore, after 1990, the EPA regulated deposit control 
additives in fuel.  “The details of the regulations and 
procedures did not emerge for several years, and led to an 
interim stage of certification of four types of detergent additive: 
polyalkylamines, polyetheramines, polyalkylsuccinimides and 
polyalkylaminophenols.”542  The key is that as the regulations 
  
 535 NPC, 1990S, supra note 63, at 13 (“It is illegal to dump undesirable 
gasoline components from RFG into conventional gasoline for other areas of the 
country.  Starting January 1, 1995, refiners, blenders, and importers will be required 
to comply with regulations that will prohibit any increase in VOC, NOx, CO, or TAP 
emissions over 1990 levels in gasoline sold outside the RFG program cities.”); see also 
Reitze, supra note 152, at 536-37. 
 536 Reitze, supra note 152, at 536; 40 C.F.R. § 80.91 (2006).   
 537 NPC, 1990S, supra note 63, at 6. 
 538 Calvert, Heywood, Sawyer & Seinfeld, supra note 133, at 42 (Reducing 
sulfur content both lowers sulfur-oxide emissions and makes catalytic reduction of 
HCs, CO, and NOx more efficient.). 
 539 Reitze, supra note 152, at 507-12.  40 C.F.R. § 80.195 contains the gasoline 
sulfur requirements. 
 540 See supra note 172. 
 541 Blackmore, supra note 92, at 248 (describing model). 
 542 Id. 
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became more complex, the EPA’s involvement in fuel design 
steadily increased.  Moreover, boutique fuel requirements are 
not simply a matter of the government specifying a particular 
set of gasoline characteristics.  The technique used to add one 
required ingredient may affect the completed fuel’s 
characteristics in other dimensions.543 
In the oxygenate regulations, the EPA initially allowed 
the use of both ethanol and MTBE.  After refiners had invested 
considerable capital in MTBE facilities, however, the 
chemical’s negative environmental impacts became widely 
recognized and its use was phased out.544  This left refiners with 
both significant stranded investments in MTBE545 facilities and 
shortages of ethanol.546   
The formulation restrictions did not stop with those 
imposed by the EPA.  State and local governments also 
imposed restrictions on gasolines sold in their jurisdictions 
through various State Implementation Plans (SIPs).547  
Although there is no comprehensive list of formulations 
mandated by all levels of government, there appear to be at 
least seventeen different formulations—a major increase from 
  
 543 For example, the EPA was concerned with 
potential abuse of the process of adding oxygenate to gasoline downstream of 
a refinery.  This practice, called “splash blending,” involves mechanical 
mixing of finished gasoline or gasoline blending stock having front-end 
volatility set at a typical warm-season value (RVP of 7 to 8 psi) with a liquid 
oxygenate (such as ethanol).  Splash blending, unlike refinery-performed 
match blending that renormalizes product output to the required properties 
of an RFG, can change the proportional constituents of a gasoline by diluting 
(replacing) their mass and volumetric share in each gallon.  It also has the 
potential to increase the quantity of the total fuel that evaporates from 
vehicles if the fuel’s resulting RVP is significantly higher.  EPA sought to 
obviate this possibility by requiring the type of oxygenate that can be added 
be stipulated at the refinery and thus maintain RVP integrity. 
NAS, OZONE-FORMING POTENTIAL, supra note 142, at 126-27.  The problem was 
ultimately solved by the EPA’s “in situ” sample audits, which led most refiners to blend 
at the refinery.  Id. at 127. 
 544 But see McGarity, MTBE, supra note 496 (arguing that refiners bear a 
portion of the responsibility for stranded investment because of lack of investigation 
into environmental impact). 
 545 See STILLWATER ASSOC., INC., MTBE PHASE OUT IN CALIFORNIA 57 (2002), 
available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/reports/2002-03-14_600-02-008CR.pdf (discussing 
problem of phaseout and recognizing stranded investment issue). 
 546 James R. Healey, Ethanol Shortage Could Up Gas Prices, USA TODAY, 
Mar. 30, 2006, available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/energy/2006-03-
30-ethanol-gas-prices_x.htm?csp=1. 
 547 See EPA, Reformulated Gasoline Frequent Questions, http://www.epa.gov/ 
oms/rfg/faq.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2007) (discussing SIP revisions for state-
mandated gasoline formulations). 
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the single standard (the lead standard) in place in the mid-
1980s.548  In addition, some state and local governments have 
imposed “biofuel” requirements.549   
These requirements have three primary effects on 
gasoline markets.  First, the fuel requirements may isolate 
particular geographic markets from the overall gasoline 
market, making it harder to bring new supplies to a region or 
uneconomical to shift supplies out of a region.550  Second, as 
noted earlier, additional capital investment may be needed to 
produce the boutique fuels.  This limits the number of current 
plants able to produce a particular fuel, which creates both an 
incentive to exit the market and a barrier to enter the market.  
Econometric investigations into these requirements, comparing 
prices and price volatility between matched pairs of boutique 
and non-boutique cities, found that not only is there evidence 
that boutique fuel requirements raise the cost of gasoline, but 
that the price impact varies with the geographic isolation and 
degree of competition in the relevant market.551  Third, these 
requirements alter the path of technological change, diverting 
investment away from improving production processes to meet 
regulatory requirements.552 
Additional strong evidence indicates that the boutique 
fuel requirements, occurring together with limited refinery 
capacity and pipeline connections to other regions, affect prices.  
  
 548 MAJORITY STAFF OF THE PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, GAS 
PRICES: HOW ARE THEY REALLY SET? 94 (2002), available at http://www.senate.gov/ 
~gov_affairs/042902gasreport.htm.  
 549 See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 486J-10 (2005) (requiring 10% ethanol content 
for all unleaded gasoline sold after April 2, 2006). 
 550 For example, if a boutique fuel is more costly to create than conventional 
gasoline, refiners may be unwilling to divert supplies of it to meet a shortage in an area 
that does not require the boutique fuel. There is evidence that boutique fuels are more 
costly to produce than standard gasolines.  See Jennifer Brown, Justine Hastings, Erin 
T. Mansur & Sofia B. Villas-Boas, Reformulating Competition? Gasoline Content 
Regulation and Wholesale Gasoline Prices 4-5 (Dep’t of Agric. & Res. Econ., U. Cal. 
Berkeley, Working Paper, No. 1010, 2007), available at http://repositories.cdlib.org/ 
are_ucb/1010. 
 551 Id. at 4-5.  A forthcoming EPA analysis reportedly finds that boutique 
requirements are not a factor in increasing gasoline prices, claiming that the refining 
and distribution network is “able to provide adequate quantities of boutique fuels, as 
long as there are no disruptions in the supply chain.”  H. Josef Hebert, EPA: Special 
Fuel Not to Blame for Costs, ABC NEWS, June 22, 2006, available at 
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory?id=2108257 (quoting the EPA report).  We 
have not yet seen the EPA report, but the quote suggests the agency focused on the 
wrong question.  It is precisely when there are disruptions in the supply chain that a 
broad, deep market makes a difference. 
 552 One summary of industry trends concluded that air pollution “has driven 
the direction of our technological development.”  Jones, supra note 116, at xxiii.  
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After examining regional prices, the FTC found that differences 
in price variability across regions began appearing in 1992 and 
have increased since 1995.553  The agency concluded that “[t]he 
timing of price changes . . . suggests that they may bear some 
relationship to the introduction of Phases I (1992) and II (1996) 
of the stringent and specialized CARB [California Air 
Resources Board] requirements for gasoline sold in 
California.”554  While the FTC study found evidence of a 
boutique fuel price effect in California, it did not find such 
evidence in the Gulf Coast, where the agency concluded that 
the larger amount of refinery capacity and greater 
interconnection of that region with other areas reduced the 
impact of disruptions at any particular facility.555  The FTC 
found similar results in the East Coast, Rocky Mountain, and 
midwestern states.556 
The increasing difference between U.S. market and non-
U.S. market gasolines represents another effect of boutique 
fuel requirements.557  Low sulfur requirements for both gasoline 
and diesel in the United States limit the types of oil that many 
refineries can process to make products for the U.S. market.558  
This limits the possibility of importing gasoline from some 
foreign refineries, reducing those refineries’ ability to supply 
gasoline when there are spot shortages.559 
As discussed earlier, running a modern refinery is 
essentially an issue of complex optimization in which refiners 
must solve the problem of creating the highest-value mix of end 
products by managing the streams of intermediate products 
  
 553 FTC, GASOLINE PRICE CHANGES, supra note 9, at 88-89. 
 554 Id. at 90. 
 555 Id. at 94. 
 556 Id. 
 557 NPC, ADEQUACY, supra note 59, at 37 (“European conventional gasoline 
does not meet U.S. specifications for either conventional or reformulated gasoline.  
Adjusting European gasoline to U.S. quality would require some upgrading with an 
associated cost increase.”). 
 558 Mortished, supra note 63 (“Few refineries are able to convert more of the 
heavy sulphurous ‘sour’ crudes into petrol and most of those are in the United States.”).  
Although Canadian and European sulfur requirements are moving in similar 
directions, making gasoline from those sources potentially available for the U.S. 
market, Caribbean and South American refiners are less likely to be able to meet the 
U.S. sulfur requirements without large capital investments.  NPC, ADEQUACY, supra 
note 59, at 41. 
 559 BEHRENS & GLOVER, supra note 10, at 3 (“Foreign refiners typically 
manufacture products designed to sell in the international market, not the special 
product ‘boutique fuels’ demanded by a significant share of the U.S. market.”). 
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manufactured at different stages.560  The boutique fuel 
requirements thus increase the number of constraints in the 
optimization problem.  If the constraints are binding (and they 
are meaningless if they are not), then the constraints have 
costs.561 
The market-fragmenting nature of the various boutique 
fuel requirements is easy to grasp: by making gasoline sold in 
Phoenix different from gasoline sold in Tucson, boutique fuel 
requirements prevent owners of Phoenix-formulated gasoline 
from selling their gasoline in Tucson and vice versa, limiting 
the depth of the markets.  Indeed, boutique fuel requirements 
are government-mandated versions of what sellers of branded 
gasoline spend considerable resources unsuccessfully 
attempting to persuade gasoline consumers to believe: that a 
gallon of one gasoline differs significantly from a gallon of 
another gasoline.562  What is less obvious is the impact of the 
broader fuel formulation requirements.  The ultra-low sulfur 
and other wider restrictions all reduced refinery capacity by 
helping push marginal refiners out of the marketplace and 
raising the barriers to entry by increasing the capital 
requirements for entry.563 
There are two main consequences of fragmenting the 
gasoline market.  First, markets function best when they are 
deep rather than shallow.564  That is, when a market has many 
participants and the materials traded in the market are 
relatively standardized, there are many potential providers of 
the goods to each potential buyer.  Antitrust law recognizes the 
  
 560 See A. Ogden-Swift, Control and Optimization, in 2 MODERN PETROLEUM 
TECHNOLOGY, supra note 37, at 181, 181 (“Refinery planning and scheduling, 
optimization, process control and monitoring are essential to achieving [maximum 
profits].  Typically savings from improvements in these areas exceed $20 million per 
year for a world-scale refinery by choosing the best feedstocks, the best way to operate 
the refinery, effective control at the best point, and efficient detection and management 
of abnormalities.”). 
 561 See Jones, supra note 116, at xxi (“The development of products that meet 
the required quality standards has not generally been unduly difficult; where problems 
have arisen they have frequently arisen from the need to ‘trade off’ one characteristic 
against another.”). 
 562 This seemed to have worked well early on: a 1947 government study noted 
a “strong consumer tendency to deal regularly at particular stations where the desired 
brand is sold” and that “the general preference of consumers [is] for branded gasoline.”  
USDOC, WAR AND POSTWAR, supra note 39, at 28. 
 563 NPC, ADEQUACY, supra note 59, at 99. 
 564 Some analyses have found this to be key in gasoline markets.  See, e.g., 
Marshall C. Howard, Interfirm Relations in Oil Products Markets, 20 J. MKTG. 356, 361 
(1956) (“The greatest source of interfirm friction and competition is price policy of both 
suppliers and their market outlets when product is in ample supply.”). 
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inherent advantages of markets with many buyers and sellers.  
This basic premise undergirds virtually all economic 
discussions of the efficiency of competitive markets.  The 
classic example of deep market efficiency is the market for 
widely traded public company stocks (e.g., Microsoft) or 
commodities like gold, silver, and pork bellies.  Attempts to 
exercise market power in such deep markets fail because 
opponents can easily profit by applying price pressure against 
the would-be monopolist.565  Extending a market makes it 
deeper by bringing in additional participants.  There is 
evidence of such an impact in the case of boutique fuel 
regulations.  A study from the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) concluded that  
[f]or the boutique fuels—which are sold only in certain cities in the 
East Coast and Gulf Coast regions, or in California—increased 
market concentration led to higher wholesale prices than for 
conventional gasoline.  This difference likely stems from the limited 
availability of the boutique fuels, which can only be produced by a 
few refiners.566 
Second, boutique fuel requirements defeat the market 
forces promoting standardization in gasoline.  Standardization 
is an important means of deepening a market.  Standardizing a 
good allows buyers to make low-cost comparisons between 
goods offered by different sellers, facilitating price competition.  
In gasoline markets, for example, government regulations 
require that fuel sellers post octane numbers for fuel and the 
method used to calculate the octane number567 in order to 
facilitate consumer comparison of different sellers’ products.568  
The EPA has (commendably) taken a number of steps to reduce 
the impact of boutique fuel requirements, but these merely 
mitigate the extent of the problem caused by multiplying fuel 
formulation requirements,569 they do not address the 
  
 565 See EDWARD CHANCELLOR, DEVIL TAKE THE HINDMOST, A HISTORY OF 
FINANCIAL SPECULATION 252 (1999) (discussing Hunt brothers’ attempt to corner the 
silver market). 
 566 GAO, MERGERS, supra note 69, at 79. 
 567 Octane numbers can be determined by various methods.  See GARY & 
HANDWERK, supra note 61, at 15. 
 568 See Posting of Minimum Octane Numbers on Gasoline Dispensing Pumps, 
36 Fed. Reg. 23,871 (Dec. 16, 1971) (FTC rule requiring posting). 
 569 See EPA, TASK FORCE, supra note 491, at 11-12 (listing efforts to mitigate 
problems). Congress has also expanded the EPA’s authority to grant waivers when 
necessary to reduce disruptions.  See Energy Policy Act of 2005 § 1541 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 7545).  While waivers are useful in an emergency, they do not address the 
underlying structural problems and do not relieve price impacts from non-emergencies. 
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underlying issue.  Most importantly, the EPA’s mitigation 
efforts actually undercut the regulatory certainty necessary to 
induce investment in expanding refinery capacity significantly 
because they signal that investors cannot rely on a stable 
regulatory environment. 
Firms that are able to convince consumers that their 
products differ significantly from competitors’ products are able 
to charge a price premium because consumers’ differentiation 
between the products reduces competition.  For example, Coca-
Cola is able to sell its soda for a higher price than store brands 
because consumers distinguish Coke from store-brand colas.  
To protect this product differentiation, Coca-Cola spends a 
considerable amount on advertising aimed at maintaining a 
brand image.570  Similarly, “green” energy providers are able to 
charge above market rates for energy produced by 
“sustainable” methods to consumers who prefer to consume 
power that is not produced with non-renewable energy, even 
though the electricity itself is indistinguishable from power 
produced by plants using non-renewable energy.571   
Boutique fuels are a special case of interference with 
standards.  Consumers are not allowed to choose the fuel they 
will use, except in border regions between areas with different 
fuel requirements.  These fuels prevent arbitrage across 
geographic markets, preventing market forces from reducing 
price differentials.572  Arbitrage produces price convergence 
with startling effectiveness.573   
When an imbalance between supply and demand across 
different geographic markets causes price differentials, for 
example, opportunities for arbitrage exist and attract the 
  
 570 See Coca-Cola Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 70 (2005), available at 
http://www2.coca-cola.com/investors/pdfs/form_10K_2005.pdf (reporting advertising 
expenditures of $2.5 billion for 2005). 
 571 Michael Evan Stern & Margaret M. Mlynczak Stern, A Critical Overview of 
the Economic and Environmental Consequences of the Deregulation of the U.S. Electric 
Power Industry, 4 ENVTL. LAW. 79, 148 (1997) (noting that green and “dirty” energy 
cannot be distinguished). 
 572 Arbitrage is an attempt to profit by exploiting price differences in different 
markets. 
 573 Indeed, one rationale for the adoption of the euro was that it would 
facilitate price comparisons and produce arbitrage opportunities across the countries 
adopting it.  The Euro Will Be One of the Worlds Most Stable Currencies: José Maria 
Gil-Robles, President of the European Parliament Answers Questions, CONTEXT 
EUROPEAN EDUC. MAG., Mar. 2, 1997, available at http://www.context-europe.org/ 
ca181.html (“[F]or the first time, it will be possible to easily compare the prices of goods 
and services in different countries. The Euro will therefore stimulate competition, 
which will be beneficial for both consumers and enterprises.”). 
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attention of entrepreneurs.  If a good costs more in Phoenix 
than in Tucson, entrepreneurs will buy the good in Tucson and 
bring it to Phoenix.  This will increase demand in Tucson, 
creating market pressure for higher prices there.  It will 
increase supply in Phoenix, creating market pressures for 
lower prices there.  Ordinarily, the price between Tucson and 
Phoenix will converge.  In general, price differentials will likely 
persist only where transactions costs limit opportunities for 
arbitrage.574  Even where such transactions costs exist, 
however, there are market pressures to reduce the cost of 
delivering gasoline from Tucson to Phoenix and allow the 
Tucson gasoline source to undercut the Phoenix price.575  Where 
boutique fuel requirements fragment markets sufficiently to 
cause price differentials, such individual efforts at arbitrage 
are also likely to occur—and this reduces the effectiveness of 
the boutique fuel requirement. 
2. Obstacles to Refinery Capacity Growth 
In the 1950s, “entry into gasoline retailing [was] 
‘relatively easy.’”576  As we have seen, there have been periods 
of rapid (sometimes too rapid, from the industry’s point of view) 
expansion of refinery numbers and capacity in response to 
demand and regulatory stimuli.  The post-war refinery crunch 
quickly yielded to considerable expansion in the 1950s and the 
perverse incentives of the 1970s brought numerous plants 
online (including some of dubious efficiency) with little lead 
time.  But remarkably, no new refinery has been built in the 
United States since 1976.577  Rather than build new refineries, 
  
 574 A gasoline price differential between Phoenix and Tucson will not be 
competed away by Tucson gasoline owners trucking their gasoline to Phoenix unless 
the price in Phoenix is more than the cost of transporting the gasoline from Tucson to 
Phoenix, plus the cost of gasoline in Tucson. Because an arbitrageur seeking to exploit 
the price differential will have to bring the gasoline to Phoenix to sell, transportation 
costs will matter. 
 575 Indeed, we observe individuals engaged in arbitrage on small scales where 
there are artificial barriers to price competition.  Thus, for example, on the Arizona-
California border, Arizona gas stations advertise the lower price of gasoline in Arizona 
because Arizona has a lower gasoline tax than California, so individuals fill up their 
tanks in Arizona to avoid paying the higher tax in California (this information comes 
from the personal observation of one of the authors).  Tax boundaries create such 
behavior in many instances.  
 576 Dirlam & Kahn, supra note 33, at 838. 
 577 Jad Mouawad, No New Refineries in 29 Years, But Project Tries to Find a 
Way, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2005, at A1, available at http://www.corpwatch.org/ 
article.php?id=12227; FTC, GASOLINE PRICE CHANGES, supra note 9, at 50 (“Since 
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refiners have expanded existing facilities, meeting the increase 
in U.S. demand for transportation fuels without domestic 
greenfield projects.578 
What accounts for the difference between “easy” entry 
in the 1970s and a completely stalled new construction 
program since 1976?  For starters, the refining business has 
not drawn investment because its economics are unattractive.  
For example, after the oil price shocks in 1973 and 1979, 
demand for refined petroleum products fell and “[r]efinery 
expansion plans were consequently curtailed and plans for 
‘green field’ refineries abandoned, particularly in Europe and 
North America.”579  Similarly, in the 1990s, “some firms 
divested refineries because of high operating costs and low 
returns.  For companies acquiring these refineries, it was more 
cost effective to acquire an existing refinery than to build one, 
especially given the high cost and stringent environmental 
requirements for refinery construction in the United States.”580  
Low interest from investors offers a partial explanation, but 
the industry’s massive investments in compliance with new 
environmental regulations and expansion of existing refineries 
demonstrate that considerable capital has flowed into the 
industry despite the unfavorable economics.  Thus, low investor 
interest cannot entirely explain the absence of new refineries.  
Put simply, firms had a choice between expanding existing 
facilities and building new ones and, since 1976, they have 
chosen the former. 
Refiners also contend that they have not been able to 
build new refineries because of the combination of high capital 
costs, regulatory costs, and low returns.581  Emissions controls 
  
1976, no new refinery has been built in the U.S. with the primary purpose of producing 
gasoline.”). 
 578 FTC, GASOLINE PRICE CHANGES, supra note 9, at 49 (“Between 1985 and 
2005, U.S. refineries increased their total capacity to refine crude oil into various 
refined petroleum products by 10.3 percent, moving from 15.7 million barrels per day 
in 1985 to 17.3 million barrels per day in 2005.  Most of this new capacity came into 
operation after 1998.  This increase—approximately one million barrels per day—is 
roughly equivalent to adding approximately 10 average-sized refineries to industry 
supply.” (citation omitted)). 
 579 Jones, supra note 116, at xviii. 
 580 GAO, MERGERS, supra note 69, at 42. 
 581 One reason is the protectionist impact of air pollution regulations that 
require new plants to secure off-setting emissions reductions, but grandfather existing 
facilities.  2 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 1266; GAO, MERGERS, supra note 69, at 66.  A 
1974 report by the National Petroleum Council reached similar conclusions.  It found, 
based on a survey of refiners, that refiners expected to spend on environmental 
regulatory compliance an amount ($3.3 billion in 1970 dollars) that could have paid for 
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on refineries have led to massive capital and operating cost 
expenditures.582  Of course, many of these same problems would 
also afflict expansions of existing facilities, but they do not 
seem to have stopped that process, and critics of the industry 
remain skeptical.583 
Land use restrictions provide a more likely explanation 
for the thirty-year lull in refinery construction.  Throughout 
the industry’s history, neighbors of potential refinery sites have 
objected to their construction.  For example, Standard Oil’s 
attempts to build a refinery in Chicago to process the sulfur-
laden Lima oil field’s production caused opposition from 
neighbors of the proposed plant “on account of the odor from 
Lima crude and the fire hazard.”  The refinery was ultimately 
built in Whiting, Indiana, “a desolate spot on the sand dunes 
along the southern shore of Lake Michigan.”584  Today, of 
course, “desolate spots” close to oil supplies are harder to find 
than they were in the early twentieth century and even the 
most desolate spot may have environmental restrictions that 
impede construction of a refinery.  An attempt to build a 
refinery in a relatively isolated rural area in Yuma County, 
Arizona, for instance, has drawn some local opposition.585 
  
1.3 to 2.2 MMB/CD refinery capacity.  NPC, FACTORS AFFECTING, supra note 61, at 35-
36. 
 582 2 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 1250-51. 
 583 Environmental pressure groups, for example, argue that refiners are 
deliberately restricting the expansion of capacity through mergers and closure of 
refineries.  See Public Citizen, Myths and Facts About Oil Refineries in the United 
States, http://www.citizen.org/cmep/energy_enviro_nuclear/electricity/Oil_and_Gas/ 
articles.cfm ?ID=11829 (last visited Apr. 12, 2007) (arguing that “[o]il companies have 
exploited their strong market position to intentionally restrict refining capacity by 
driving smaller, independent refiners out of business”).  After reviewing data on 
mergers, the GAO concluded that “anecdotal data” exists to support the idea that 
mergers “have had some impact on barriers to entry in the U.S. petroleum industry.”  
GAO, MERGERS, supra note 69, at 64.  There is little question that many refinery 
owners have reduced capacity by closing plants.  The dispute is over their motivation in 
doing so—refiners contend that the closed plants had been uneconomical to operate, in 
part because of the costs of capital requirements.  An alternative explanation for some 
of the closures is the impact of antitrust regulators’ insistence on divesture of 
particular refineries as a condition of approval of mergers.  For example, vertically 
integrated oil companies reduced refining capacity by closing or selling unprofitable 
refineries (sometimes as a result of FTC pressure in mergers), which reduces their 
capacity and reduces their ability to supply unbranded gasoline. 
 584 GIDDENS, supra note 37, at 10. 
 585 See, e.g., Jonathan Athens, Opposition to Refinery Grows, YUMA SUN, Nov. 
21, 2004, available at http://sun.yumasun.com/google/ysarchive10913.html.  But see 
Tammy Krikorian, Petitions in Wellton Back Refinery, YUMA SUN, Dec. 10, 2004, 
available at http://sun.yumasun.com/google/ysarchive111913.html (detailing support in 
neighboring community).  See also infra notes 593-99. 
1038 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:3 
 
The rise of land use regulation, other environmental 
restrictions, and popular resistance to the “local refinery” 
limited expanding capacity as early as the 1970s.586  For 
example, by 1974, state-level restrictions in California and 
Delaware posed significant barriers to refinery construction.587  
At the federal level, environmental legislation protecting 
coastal areas restricted the availability of considerable land 
with access to tankers for crude supply.588 
The FTC analysis of the industry concluded that “[i]n 
general, the FTC has not found entry to be likely in petroleum 
refining; the sheer complexity of entry (both inherent and due 
to environmental restrictions) is a significant barrier to timely 
entry.”589  Furthermore, the agency found that both high-sunk 
costs and environmental regulations present significant 
deterrents to entering the refining business.  “These entry-
deterring factors have become more formidable since the 1980s, 
as refineries have become more capital-intensive and 
environmental regulations have become more restrictive.”590  
Indeed, the 2005 FTC review of gasoline pricing concluded that 
“costly and extensive permitting and licensing requirements 
mandated by various federal, state, and local environmental 
and other laws, as well as community opposition” “likely” 
induced U.S. refiners to expand by increasing capacity at 
existing refineries rather than by constructing new ones.591  The 
GAO also recognized these barriers to entry.  It concluded that 
the refining sector “is characterized by pervasive barriers to 
entry, including large capital investment requirements at the 
refining level, and regulatory and permitting impediments at 
the refining and wholesale/retail levels.”592   
The ongoing effort to build a refinery near Yuma, 
Arizona illustrates the obstacles and difficulties facing refinery 
  
 586 NPC, FACTORS AFFECTING, supra note 61, at 5 (“Despite the rigorous 
standards for both water and air quality that refineries must meet now and in the 
future, resistance still exists in many areas of the country to constructing plants, even 
with appropriate environmental equipment.”). 
 587 Id. at 42. 
 588 See Breck C. Tostevin, Note, ‘Not On My Beach’: Local California 
Initiatives to Prevent Onshore Support Facilities for Offshore Oil Development, 38 
HASTINGS L.J. 957 (1987) (discussing obstacles to development of oil facilities in coastal 
areas). 
 589 FTC, MERGERS, supra note 5, at 33. 
 590 Id. at 197. 
 591 FTC, GASOLINE PRICE CHANGES, supra note 9, at 50. 
 592 GAO, MERGERS, supra note 69, at 66. 
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construction.  In 1999, Arizona Clean Fuels initially sought593 to 
build a $2-3 billion refinery594 in Maricopa County, but 
Maricopa’s emissions restrictions and ozone noncompliance led 
Arizona Clean Fuels to shift its focus to Yuma County.595  In 
addition to the company obtaining state and federal approval 
for its emissions permit, the refinery would need local zoning 
changes.  All of these requirements involved multiple public 
hearings and lengthy review by various bodies.596  Arizona 
Clean Fuels estimated that it needed “two dozen” permits to 
build and operate the refinery.597  Opponents also 
unsuccessfully sought a referendum on the zoning changes.598  
Arizona Clean Fuels’ efforts to secure the required permits 
persisted for six years, costing the company $30 million 
without producing a single physical act toward construction.599 
The capital investment needed to produce boutique fuels 
provides yet another entry barrier.  Meeting these new fuel 
  
 593 Oil Refinery Permit Takes Next Step for Approval, YUMA SUN, Feb. 5, 2005, 
available at http://sun.yumasun.com/google/ysarchive12080.html. 
 594 Initial estimates put the refinery cost at $2 billion.  See T.M. Schultz, 
Surprise! Refinery Eyeing Yuma County, YUMA SUN, Oct. 31, 2003, available at 
http://refinery.org/news/2003/news_10310305.htm.  By 2005, however, news stories 
estimated the cost at over $3 billion.  Jonathan Athens, Refinery Awaits Green Light 
from Mexico, YUMA SUN, Oct. 14, 2005, available at http://sun.yumasun.com/google/ 
ysarchive16704.html (noting estimate of $3.2 billion); Blake Schmidt, Refinery Price 
Tag at $3 Billion, YUMA SUN, Sept. 15, 2005, available at http://sun.yumasun.com/ 
google/ysarchive16151.html.  A new refinery on the Gulf Coast is also estimated to cost 
a similar amount.  See NPC, OBSERVATIONS, supra note 13, at I-20.  Purchases of 
refineries value them at approximately 25%-33% of new construction cost, according to 
an industry study.  Id. at I-21. 
 595 James Gilbert, Gas Plant Proposal Still Needs Refining, YUMA SUN, Jan. 
29, 2004, available at http://sun.yumasun.com/google/ysarchive13659.html; Schultz, 
supra note 594.  The refinery would get its crude from a pipeline from Mexico.  Id. 
 596 See, e.g., Jonathan Athens, Oil Refinery a Slippery Issue, YUMA SUN, Aug. 
20, 2004; Jonathan Athens, Refinery Permit Subject of Public Hearings, YUMA SUN, 
Nov. 8, 2004, available at http://sun.yumasun.com/google/ysarchive10707.html.  The 
proposed site included “cultural resource sites” of two Native American tribes, about 
which the refinery owner had held two years of meetings.  Jonathan Athens, Wellton 
District Closer to Land Transfer, YUMA SUN, Mar. 10, 2005, available at 
http://sun.yumasun.com/google/ysarchive12622.html. 
 597 Tammy Krikorian, EPA: No Objection to Refinery Permit, YUMA SUN, Mar. 
22, 2005, available at http://sun.yumasun.com/google/ysarchive12823.html. 
 598 Jonathan Athens, Refinery Foes Form Battle Plan, YUMA SUN, Dec. 3, 
2004, available at http://sun.yumasun.com/google/ysarchive11094.html; Jonathan 
Athens, Board of Supervisors Unanimously Approves Land Use Change for Proposed 
Oil Refinery in East Yuma County, YUMA SUN, Dec. 14, 2004, available at 
http://sun.yumasun.com/google/ysarchive11268.html (noting that, “[i]n a surprise 
move,” opponents abandoned their plan to seek a referendum). 
 599 David Sharp, Farm Leader: U.S. Needs More Refining Capacity, YUMA 
SUN, Sept. 11, 2005, available at http://sun.yumasun.com/google/ysarchive16041.html.  
This lengthy process is not unique in refinery permitting.  See 2 BRADLEY, supra note 
74, at 1263-64 (discussing delays for projects in the 1970s). 
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formula specifications “required substantial investments.”  
Environmental regulation-related investments in domestic 
refineries reached at least 25% of total refinery investment 
during the 1990s, with industry groups estimating it accounted 
for $102 billion in 2004 dollars, up to half of the oil industry’s 
total environmental expenditures.600  Many smaller refineries 
closed in the 1990s, in part because they lacked the capacity to 
meet the new fuel requirements and their owners declined 
investing in the upgrades needed to provide that capacity.601  
Significant investments were required in the 1990s, 
particularly to enable production of the 1992 RFG gasoline.602  
The FTC Mergers report noted that “[s]ome recent [refinery] 
closures have been related to the large investments required to 
meet new fuel specifications.”603  For example, in 2001, an 
Illinois refinery closed rather than make a $70 million 
investment to meet new product specifications.604  “Refinery 
environmental investments, which peaked near $3.3 billion in 
1992 ($3.9 billion in 2002 dollars) . . . accounted for about 25% 
of total domestic refinery capital investment during the 
1990s.”605  Environmental expenditures hit a new peak in the 
1990s, around the introduction of the 1992 gasoline 
formulation requirements.606   
Thus, it seems likely that the combination of refinery 
economics’ unattractiveness, capital-intensity, economies of 
scale, and fuel specification and locational regulatory 
requirements provides significant barriers to entry for the 
refining industry.  Together, these factors may well form a 
greater barrier to entry than the sum of their parts.  For 
example, the relatively low refinery profitability not only deters 
investment in this capital-intensive business, but magnifies the 
hurdle posed by the required regulatory investments.  
Moreover, some of these barriers apply to expanding refineries 
into new boutique fuel product lines.  Although the FTC noted 
  
 600 FTC, GASOLINE PRICE CHANGES, supra note 9, at 57. 
 601 Id. at 52; see also FTC, MERGERS, supra note 5, at 184 (stating that “the 
large capital investments required under recent environmental regulations may 
disadvantage small refineries, which lack economies of scale relative to larger ones”). 
 602 FTC, MERGERS, supra note 5, at 69 (“Total environmental capital 
investments peaked at $4.8 billion in current dollars ($5.7 billion in 2002 dollars) in 
1993 with the implementation of new product standards for gasoline, improvements to 
retail station tankage, and other pollution control measures.”). 
 603 Id. at 186. 
 604 Id. 
 605 Id. at 69. 
 606 Id. at 82 fig.3-9. 
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that even if entry into refining by building entirely new 
refineries is not likely, entry by existing refiners into new 
product lines remains possible.607  Such entry can often require 
significant capital investment even at an existing refinery, 
however.  Unfortunately, the low margins are insufficient to 
justify the investment necessary to overcome these hurdles.608 
The undeniable reality remains that the number of 
domestic refineries has steadily fallen, even as capacity has 
grown, leaving relatively little slack in the system if a refinery 
shuts down for unplanned maintenance or to weather a 
hurricane.609  Planned maintenance can also be a problem, since 
major maintenance is typically planned up to a year in 
advance610 and so may coincide with unplanned events 
(weather, etc.) that cause supply disruptions.  Even the 
impressive capacity growth of the past thirty years, partially 
caused by the rise in utilization rates, has reduced system 
flexibility by leaving little unused capacity available to make 
up for unplanned closures.611 
3. Crowding Out Investment 
Refineries pollute the air, emitting a variety of 
impurities through their operations, including “fugitive 
emissions of the volatile constituents in crude oil and its 
fractions, emissions from the burning of fuels in process 
heaters, and emissions from the various refinery processes 
themselves.”612  “Evaporative losses from refinery tankage also 
represent a significant proportion of the total loss,” particularly 
  
 607 Id. at 197. 
 608 FTC, GASOLINE PRICE CHANGES, supra note 9, at 50. 
 609 This is what happened with the Katrina-related reduction in capacity in 
the Gulf Coast region refineries. 
 610 NPC, OBSERVATIONS, supra note 13, at II-4. 
 611 FTC, GASOLINE PRICE CHANGES, supra note 9, at 76 (“High utilization 
rates also can contribute to price volatility and periodic supply problems. When 
unexpected gasoline supply disruptions occur or gasoline demand increases 
unexpectedly, then high refining utilization rates can mean that no or little extra 
refining capacity is available to remedy a supply shortage or satisfy an increase in 
demand.”). 
 612 EPA, PROFILE, supra note 68, at 39 (“Fugitive emissions occur throughout 
refineries and arise from the thousands of potential fugitive emission sources such as 
valves, pumps, tanks, pressure relief valves, flanges, etc.  While individual leaks are 
typically small, the sum of all fugitive leaks at a refinery can be one of its largest 
emission sources.  Fugitive emissions can be reduced through a number of techniques, 
including improved leak resistant equipment, reducing the number of tanks and other 
potential sources, and, perhaps the most effective method, an ongoing Leak Detection 
and Repair (LDAR) program.”).  
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from floating roof storage tanks.613  As one would expect, 
refineries are heavily regulated under the Clean Air Act. 
Controlling some of these emissions is relatively 
straightforward, yet sometimes costly.  Simply replacing 
floating roof tanks with less leaky alternative storage 
containers and fixing leaky pipes and valves reduces pollution 
and can improve a refinery’s bottom line.  “Studies have shown 
that 70% of all emissions from a process unit originated from 
about 1% of the leaks’ sources.”614  Although “[s]imply 
tightening of valve seals can often eliminate leakage once 
detected” and only a few valves are the source of most leaks,615 
identifying which of the thousands of valves in a refinery are 
the 1% causing the problem is time-consuming and costly. 
In addition to investments in pollution control, 
refineries face market and regulatory pressures to invest in 
expanding capacity, adding the capability of processing cheaper 
heavy-sour crudes,616 and upgrading equipment to meet the 
new fuel specifications.617  In particular, meeting fuel standards 
requires expensive investments in refining equipment 
upgrades,618 and refineries undoubtedly will continue to have to 
  
 613 Martin, supra note 37, at 201. 
 614 Id. 
 615 Id. 
 616 Stock analysts favor companies with the ability to refine cheaper heavy-
sour crudes.  See, e.g., Stock Report, ConocoPhillips, STANDARD & POOR’S (Apr. 8, 
2006), at 2 (citing “considerable ability to refine heavy-sour crude feedstocks” as a 
positive attribute); Stock Report, ConocoPhillips, MORNINGSTAR (Mar. 29, 2006), at 2 
(ConocoPhillips “is well positioned to benefit from a trend toward wider spreads 
between the cost of lighter, high-quality oil and heavier, low-quality feedstock.”).  
Compare Stock Report, Sunoco, MORNINGSTAR (Mar. 2, 2006), at 1 (noting Sunoco is 
relatively less attractive because it “is unable to add a significant amount of heavy sour 
crude conversion capacity like many of its peers”).  But see Stock Report, Valero 
Energy, MORNINGSTAR (Mar. 15, 2006), at 1 (“We think Valero’s heavy sour crude 
refining capacity provides a nice short-term competitive advantage, but not a 
sustainable one.”). 
 617 Standard & Poor’s stock analyses of refining companies see increasing 
restrictions on fuel composition as improving returns in refining.  See, e.g., Stock 
Report, Frontier Oil, STANDARD & POOR’S (Apr. 8, 2006), at 3 (“[W]e expect increased 
fuel demand amid tightened sulfur regulations for gasoline and diesel fuel, the phase-
in of ethanol and the elimination of MTBE as a gasoline blending component to support 
above mid-cycle refining margins in 2006 and 2007.”).  But see Stock Report, Marathon 
Oil, MORNINGSTAR (Feb. 28, 2006), at 1 (noting refining and marketing “are brutally 
competitive areas where companies have to resort to being price-takers”). 
 618 FTC, MERGERS, supra note 5, at 182 (“Downstream processing units also 
have been important in allowing refineries to meet new environmental regulations for 
fuel products.”).  In one case, the FTC even found that synergies from a merger “were 
likely to contribute significantly to the continued viability of the acquired refinery in 
light of the upcoming investments needed to satisfy regulatory requirements for 
cleaner-burning fuels.”  Id. at 35; see also id. at 184-85 (describing synergies). 
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make those investments to meet the new fuel specifications and 
reduce pollution from operations.619  Moreover, there are 
important scale economies to operating groups of refineries as a 
unit,620 creating an incentive to combine refineries through 
acquisitions, and Wall Street, if not the FTC, views regional 
capacity concentration positively. 
There are thus pressures on refiners to invest 
significant capital in multiple areas: mergers and acquisitions, 
reducing refinery emissions, new processing equipment for 
heavy crudes, new processing equipment for the new fuel 
formulations, and expanding capacity.  These pressures mount 
in the context of a highly cyclical business,621 with low returns 
in some years, albeit at least partially offset by high returns in 
others.622  For example, returns were below zero in 1992 and 
near zero in 1995,623 but reached record levels in 2005.624  The 
cyclical nature of the business raises the cost of capital by 
making investors more reluctant to purchase equity.  For 
example, Morningstar’s spring 2006 reports on the major U.S. 
refiners argue that their stocks are heavily overpriced, a 
whopping 36% for Marathon Oil, the second largest 
independent refiner, and 69% for Valero Energy, the largest 
independent refiner.625 
  
 619 See, e.g., Stock Report, Valero Energy, MORNINGSTAR, supra note 616, at 1 
(“We expect capital spending to remain high over the next couple of years as the firm 
finishes making capital improvements to comply with the new Environmental 
Protection Agency clean-air regulations and adds capacity.”). 
 620 FTC, MERGERS, supra note 5, at 185 (“[I]t may be possible to increase the 
total amount of gasoline produced, or to produce it at lower cost, by blending higher 
octane, higher sulphur gasoline from one refinery with lower octane, lower sulphur 
gasoline from another refinery. The advantages of multi-refinery operation in allowing 
a firm to exchange intermediates probably have become more important since the mid-
1980s because of the larger number of environmental mandates for gasoline 
specifications.”). 
 621 See Stock Report, Sunoco, MORNINGSTAR, supra note 616, at 1 (refining is 
“an economically unattractive and cyclical industry”). 
 622 See, e.g., Stock Report, BP PLC ADR, MORNINGSTAR (Mar. 29, 2006), at 1 
(“Refining and marketing activities . . . have less attractive economics [than 
exploration].  The industry has historically been plagued by periods of excess capacity 
that lead to weak—or even negative—gross profits.”). 
 623 FTC, MERGERS, supra note 5, at 72. 
 624 See, e.g., Stock Report, Tesoro, MORNINGSTAR (Mar. 2, 2006), at 1 (noting 
“refiners have been riding a cyclical high and raking in the profits” and that Tesoro’s 
“gross refining margins increased more than 75% from 2003 to 2005”); Stock Report, 
ConocoPhillips, MORNINGSTAR, supra note 616, at 2 (“ConocoPhillips is reaping the 
benefits of refining margins that are well above historical averages.”). 
 625 This was calculated by comparing the “fair price” with the “current price” 
(price as of the report date).  
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Investing in emissions control and boutique fuel 
processing restricts refiners’ ability to invest in increasing 
capacity.  That is, the opportunity cost of the environmental 
spending likely reduces capacity expansion.  Investment in 
upgrading refineries to meet environmental requirements and 
add the capacity to produce boutique fuels, which the American 
Petroleum Institute (API) estimates at $47 billion in the last 
decade, may be crowding out investment in upgrading capacity.  
As API’s Edward Murphy noted, such investment “is going to 
cost you money and the only thing you will get is cleaner air 
and less emissions—which are good—but no new capacity.”626  
For the past thirty years, U.S. refining capacity has grown 
exclusively through increasing capacity in domestic refineries 
(rather than from new refineries), a trend likely to continue,627 
which suggests that the industry’s ability to keep pace with 
demand will be reduced by the capital needed to meet 
regulatory requirements.  Furthermore, these regulatory-
related investments impede the industry’s ability to make 
domestic refineries more flexible in their inputs, such as adding 
more heavy-crude processing capacity.  The ability and 
incentive to invest in innovation are also crowded out:  “Almost 
all that is changing today is driven by environmental 
regulation, causing refiners to tweak the existing processes.  
The technology introduced in the last 15 years has been 
centered on catalyst improvement, not new processes.”628   
If refineries in the United States cannot meet domestic 
demand, of course, the United States might be able to import 
gasoline from foreign refineries.629  European refineries often 
produce a surplus of gasoline, primarily because of Europe’s 
greater demand for diesel fuel for passenger vehicles and, to be 
sure, the United States has imported significant amounts of 
gasoline from Europe in the past decades.630  Some refineries 
outside the United States have significant cost advantages 
  
 626 Mouawad, supra note 577. 
 627 FTC, MERGERS, supra note 5, at 197 (“Future supply increments are 
expected to come from expansion of existing refineries and increased reliance on 
imported refined products rather than the opening of new refineries.”). 
 628 LEFFLER, supra note 40, at 5; Jones, supra note 116, at xxi (noting that 
regulatory product specifications are one of the factors which “has a significant 
influence on the prioritization of technological development within the industry”). 
 629 Gasoline imports rose during the 1990s, from 4.7% of supply in 1992 to 
9.7% in 2004. FTC, GASOLINE PRICE CHANGES, supra note 9, at 59.  The FTC expects 
imports to grow further in the future.  FTC, MERGERS, supra note 5, at 61. 
 630 See Alexei Barrionuevo, Europe Drives Up Gas Exports, Keeping U.S. 
Pump Prices Low, WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 2002, at A1. 
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because of lower labor and regulatory costs.  For example, in 
the early 1970s—before much of the Clean Air Act’s impact—
refineries in the Caribbean had a forty to sixty cent per barrel 
cost advantage over U.S. Gulf Coast refineries.631  In some 
cases, these cost advantages can make imports of gasoline 
competitive despite the increased transportation costs.  
Boutique fuel specifications, however, reduce the ability of 
foreign refineries to export gasoline or blendstocks to the U.S. 
market.  There is, thus, some question about whether imports 
of gasoline and blendstocks will be able to expand significantly 
if the growth of U.S. refinery capacity begins to lag behind the 
growth of demand.  
4. Cumulative Market Impacts 
These negative regulatory market externalities have 
weakened the gasoline market’s competitive forces.  
Consequently, the market is slower to adjust to supply 
disruptions, less likely to produce arbitrage opportunities, and 
more insulated from market pressures for innovation.  While 
the refining industry is competitive when market concentration 
is measured against a national market, with relatively low 
standard measures of concentration,632 the same is not true of 
specific markets.  For example, the California market, 
separated from the rest of the country by both geographic 
isolation and the CARB boutique fuel specifications, is quite 
concentrated.  Indeed, before the CARB specifications, the 
standard measure of market concentration (HHI)633 fell from 
1,434 in 1985 to 1,184 in 1990, but rose again to 1,475 in 2003 
after the CARB specifications were introduced.  It would have 
been significantly higher had the FTC not forced divestitures of 
several refineries during mergers in that period.634  For 
example, the FTC calculated that the Exxon/Mobil and 
Chevron/Texaco mergers would have produced an HHI of 2,377 
  
 631 NPC, FACTORS AFFECTING, supra note 61, at 6-7. 
 632 FTC, MERGERS, supra note 5, at 191. 
 633 Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is a “commonly accepted measure of market 
concentration. It is calculated by squaring the market share of each firm competing in 
a market, and then summing the resulting numbers. The HHI number can range from 
close to zero to 10,000.”  Investopedia.com, Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/h/hhi.asp (last visited Apr. 12, 2007).  
 634 FTC, MERGERS, supra note 5, at 196. 
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for the CARB market in the absence of the divestitures.635  
Moreover, the boutique fuel specifications limit competition 
from foreign refineries.636 
While there are reasons to be skeptical of the FTC’s 
analyses of market competitiveness, the point is not whether 
any particular energy company merger should proceed.  
Rather, the point is that more sophisticated analyses of the 
gasoline market, analyses which pay attention to fuel 
specifications and pipeline connections, suggest that the 
market is less competitive than the national statistics indicate.  
Because much of the data necessary to evaluate the 
competitiveness of submarkets is proprietary and unavailable 
to the public, we cannot directly test this hypothesis.  The 
available evidence, however, comports with our analysis. 
Why does this matter? The total impact of the various 
environmental regulations described above is more than the 
mere sum of its parts.  These combined trends, together with 
the other industry and general economic trends noted earlier, 
suggest that the United States depends on a smaller number of 
larger refineries clustered in fewer geographic locations and 
connected by fewer pipelines than it would without these 
policies.  Of course, environmental regulations are hardly the 
only cause of this situation.  Indeed, we contend that the 
current situation stems from bad policies and industry trends 
spanning the entire twentieth century.  However, on the 
margin, environmental regulations have exacerbated these 
other trends, leaving the United States dependent on a refinery 
infrastructure more vulnerable to natural disasters, terrorist 
attacks, and industrial accidents than it would be if different 
environmental policies had been pursued. 
C. Incentives for Fragmentation: Gasoline and the 
Structure of the Clean Air Act 
Two structural features of the Clean Air Act frame the 
context in which regulators design the programs they 
implement.  First, the Act establishes national ambient 
  
 635 Id. at 197; see also KEITH LEFFLER & BARRY PULLIAM, PRELIMINARY 
REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL REGARDING CALIFORNIA GASOLINE PRICES, at 
chart 7 (1999) (noting that the seven largest refiners of California gasoline had a total 
market share of 95% in the late 1990s). 
 636 See, e.g., Stock Report, Valero Energy, MORNINGSTAR, supra note 616, at 2 
(stating that “the limitation of refined product imports because of new EPA 
regulations” makes domestic refiners’ stocks more attractive). 
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standards.637  These standards are generally to be achieved 
through SIPs, largely drafted by state environmental 
agencies.638  The state agencies must demonstrate through 
EPA-approved emissions models that their SIPs’ combined 
restrictions will yield compliance with the national ambient 
standards and other requirements of the Clean Air Act.639  
Thus, states must achieve the relevant ambient standard by 
effectively allocating the emissions among the sources 
(including new sources) within the state’s jurisdiction.640  The 
ability to allocate additional emissions is valuable, because a 
state that cannot provide for emissions from new or expanding 
sources will be shut off from economic growth.641   
Second, the Clean Air Act treats mobile and stationary 
sources differently.642  Stationary sources are subjected to 
national technological requirements as well as highly specific 
operating restrictions included in the SIPs.643  As significant 
stationary emissions sources, refineries are heavily regulated 
under the Clean Air Act and emissions controls erect more 
barriers to entry, blocking new refineries.644 
Until the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, mobile-
source pollution control primarily involved the EPA regulating 
tailpipe emissions when new cars left the factory.645  States 
enjoy very limited authority over vehicle emissions systems, 
primarily to prevent fragmentation of the automobile market.646  
  
 637 This paragraph draws on Andrew P. Morriss, Bruce Yandle & Andrew 
Dorchak, Regulation by Litigation: The EPA’s Regulating of Heavy-Duty Diesel 
Engines, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 403, 408-09 (2004) (describing basic framework of Clean 
Air Act regulation). 
 638 Andrew P. Morriss, The Politics of the Clean Air Act, in POLITICAL 
ENVIRONMENTALISM, GOING BEHIND THE GREEN CURTAIN 263 (Terry L. Anderson ed., 
2000) (overview of SIP process). 
 639 See Morriss, Yandle & Dorchak, supra note 637, at 415-21 (overview of 
EPA modeling). 
 640 States cannot allow deterioration of better-than-standard ambient 
conditions to the ambient standard and there are qualifications necessary with respect 
to toxics pollutants as well. These are beyond the scope of this article. 
 641 Morriss, Yandle & Dorchak, supra note 637, at 408-09. 
 642 Id. at 412-15. 
 643 Id. at 412. 
 644 See NPC, ADEQUACY, supra note 59, at 41 (“The ongoing requirement for 
environmental expenditures coupled with the need to make significant investments for 
product quality changes will result in capital expenditures by the industry approaching 
the maximum historical levels.”). 
 645 Calvert, Heywood, Sawyer & Seinfeld, supra note 133, at 37-42 (noting 
that most of the improvement in mobile source emissions from 1970 to 1990 came from 
measures in the design of engines and exhaust systems). 
 646 Morriss, Yandle & Dorchak, supra note 637, at 412-13. 
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Consequently, the improvements in mobile-source emissions 
were largely driven by EPA action, with California contributing 
through its unique authority to impose additional exhaust-
system controls.647   
Although states may also impose transportation 
controls, these are politically unpopular and rarely used.648  
Instead, states more commonly adopt inspection and 
maintenance (I&M) programs, which are also unpopular and 
rarely effective.649  As a result, a state’s primary politically 
feasible means of reducing mobile-source emissions today is 
regulation of gasoline blends sold within the state.650   
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the EPA faced an 
increasingly serious regulatory problem with respect to ozone.  
“Of the 29 urban areas required by the Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1990 to submit State Implementation Plans, 27 
were unable to submit plans that showed attainment by the 
mandated date of 1998.”651  This sparked interest in new 
methods of regulation, including a focus on fuel composition.652  
The ozone problem proved technologically difficult to solve, 
because ozone production by its precursors depends on a 
variety of conditions.653  Moreover, the scant knowledge about 
actual fleet emissions “leads to substantial uncertainties in the 
calculations of emissions.”654  Nevertheless, the 1990 
  
 647 See Morriss, supra note 638. 
 648 Morriss, Yandle & Dorchak, supra note 637, at 412-13. 
 649 See Todd A. Stewart, E-Check: A Dirty Word in Ohio’s Clean Air Debate—
Ohio’s Battle over Automobile Emissions Testing, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 265, 285-96 (2001) 
(describing battles over I&M program in Ohio).  Nonetheless, even ineffective I&M 
programs generate credits in the EPA’s mobile source models.  On the ineffectiveness of 
I&M programs, see NAS, OZONE-FORMING POTENTIAL, supra note 142, at 96 (“I&M 
can, in principle, detect a malfunctioning control system.  In practice, however, the test 
has been too simplified in most locations to detect more than a few possible 
malfunctions.”). 
 650 Little attention was paid to this until the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments 
authorized fuel regulation. 
 651 NAS, OZONE-FORMING POTENTIAL, supra note 142, at 17. 
 652 Id. at 18 (“With the persistence of the ozone-pollution problem comes the 
need to develop new and innovative approaches to lowering ozone-precursor emissions.  
The federal RFG program is but one example of a new approach that is being 
promulgated to address this need.”). 
 653 See id. at 23 (“[T]he rate of ozone formation is a complex and variable 
function of the concentrations of VOC and NOX as well as meteorological conditions.  As 
a result, establishing the relative benefits of VOC and NOX emission controls can be a 
difficult and challenging task.”); id. at 23-29 (explanation of NOX/VOC interaction); id. 
at 69 (“[N]ot only does ozone formation respond differently to different VOC species, 
but it will often respond differently to the same compound in different locations or 
during different episodes at the same location.”).  
 654 Id. at 66.  
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Amendments required states to revise their SIPs to bring ozone 
nonattainment areas into attainment by statutory deadlines 
and set interim targets.655  In addition, states could “opt in” to 
the mandatory RFG program as one means of reducing ozone 
precursor emissions.656  The EPA could still require delays in 
such opt-ins, however, if delays would help maintain sufficient 
supplies of RFG gasoline for the mandatory markets.657  
Because of the political unpalatability of serious I&M programs 
and driving restrictions, states had few options beyond 
boutique fuel requirements. 
Regrettably, some of these mandates were imposed 
without supporting data.  For example, “[w]hen the 1990 Clean 
Air Act Amendments were passed, there was little quantitative 
information on the relation between fuel composition and 
emissions, especially regarding oxygenates, on which to base 
prescriptions for changes in fuel properties that would reduce 
the ozone-forming potential of emissions.”658  But once these 
programs are entrenched, they are difficult to dislodge,659 even 
when environmental benefits prove elusive.660  For example, the 
requirement that ethanol be blended into gasoline nets no 
  
 655 NPC, 1990S, supra note 63, at 9 (“States are to use the existing State 
Implementation Plan (SIP) process to impose the necessary measures to bring their 
nonattainment areas into compliance by [the 1990 Act deadlines].  States with 
moderate, serious, severe, and extreme ozone nonattainment areas must achieve 
interim reductions in VOC emissions of 15 percent by 1996 and 3 percent per year 
thereafter until attainment is reached.”).  
 656 Id. at 12 (Los Angeles, San Diego, Houston, Chicago, Milwaukee, 
Baltimore, Philadelphia, New York, and Hartford). 
 657 Id. (On application of a governor, another area can opt in to the RFG 
program effective January 1, 1995, but the EPA can delay it for up to three years if 
there is insufficient domestic capacity for RFG production.).  Refiners were concerned 
about opt-ins, telling the NPC’s consultant that there was “a need for cautious 
management of opt-ins” and that they saw “the potential for uncontrolled actions by 
state and local governments seriously crippling the industry’s ability to meet 
compliance requirements.”  Id. at 7. 
 658 Calvert, Heywood, Sawyer & Seinfeld, supra note 133, at 43. “[I]n 
retrospect we see that oxygenates represent a reasonable approach to limit CO 
emissions and maintain octane ratings in the face of other composition changes but 
appear to offer negligible benefits in terms of decreasing atmospheric ozone formation.”  
Id. 
 659 See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 649 (discussing difficulties in ending an I&M 
program in Ohio once established). 
 660 PEARSON, supra note 132, at 88-89 (“Adding oxygenates to gasoline reduced 
hydrocarbons and carbon monoxide in both current and older vehicles, but had no 
significant effect in more modern vehicles.  One reason could be that modern vehicles 
have much lower hydrocarbon and carbon monoxide emissions because of their efficient 
exhaust catalyst systems.  There was no significant effect of adding oxygenates on 
emissions of nitrogen oxides except for low-aromatic fuels, where the addition of MTBE 
increased NOX.”). 
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environmental benefits,661 but provides important economic 
benefits for politically powerful interests.662  Moreover, 
mandating specific fuel ingredients has stunted technological 
development.  Ethanol and MTBE, for example, both boost 
octane and compete with refining processes like catalytic 
cracking that can raise octane more economically.663  In 
addition, gasoline characteristics may increase pollution in one 
vehicle while reducing it in another.664 
Moreover, both federal and state environmental 
regulators must balance allocating emissions among stationary 
and mobile sources.  Permission to emit is valuable, and 
emissions allocated to one source are unavailable for use by 
another.  A state seeking new industry must allocate the new 
polluters sufficient permits to emit.  But if the state’s emissions 
are fully allocated, it must reduce existing emissions in order to 
permit a new source.  In the absence of markets, this can occur 
in only two ways: (1) the state must reduce an existing 
stationary source’s emissions, taking a valuable right away 
from an existing source, or (2) the state must acquire emissions 
credits by altering the EPA’s calculation of mobile-source 
emissions by adopting more stringent emissions controls, 
imposing gasoline formulation requirements, transportation 
controls, or an I&M program.  Transportation controls and 
I&M programs impose direct, politically unpopular costs on 
automobile owners.  Emissions controls, on the other hand, 
raise the cost of new cars in a way that is hidden from car 
buyers, and formulation requirements raise the price of 
gasoline (as we discuss below), while hiding the cost of this 
measure from consumers.  Predictably, regulators find the 
  
 661 Calvert, Heywood, Sawyer & Seinfeld, supra note 133, at 43 (“The addition 
of ethanol to gasoline is generally counterproductive with respect to ozone formation.”); 
David Pimental & Tad W. Patzek, Ethanol Production Using Corn, Switchgrass, and 
Wood; Biodiesel Production Using Soybeans and Sunflower, 14 NAT. RESOURCES RES. 
65 (2005) (calculating ethanol’s net energy benefits as negative).  The theory behind the 
oxygenate requirement was that introducing oxygen into the fuel would ensure more 
complete burning of the hydrocarbons, leading to less CO and more CO2 and H2O, while 
reducing HC emissions.  LEFFLER, supra note 40, at 145. 
 662 See Adler, supra note 158. 
 663 NAS, OZONE-FORMING POTENTIAL, supra note 142, at 105-06 (“In general, 
those processes [e.g., cracking] can be more economical than those that produce 
oxygenates; and thus, oxygenates were not initially the additive of choice for enhancing 
the octane number in fuels . . . .”). 
 664 TAMINIAU, supra note 38, at 218 (“[C]hanges in a given property may lower 
the emissions of one pollutant but may increase those of another . . . [and in] some 
cases, results also depended on vehicle category,” with changes in fuel improving 
emissions from some types of vehicles but not from others.). 
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latter two methods more politically acceptable than the former 
two. 
The structure of the Clean Air Act’s regulatory 
apparatus made gasoline regulation almost politically 
irresistible by 1990.  Prior regulatory efforts had focused 
elsewhere, making additional regulation of tailpipe emissions, 
for example, even more costly as regulations moved up the 
marginal cost curve.  The need to allow for new emissions from 
stationary sources created pressure to gain emissions 
reductions from mobile sources, and fuel regulation was the 
most politically attractive of the available options.  Fuel 
regulation avoided imposing costs on the auto manufacturers, 
imposed primarily hidden costs on consumers, and offered 
refiners the prospect of a level playing field surrounded by a 
regulatory fence that could deter would-be competitors through 
higher capital costs. 
The fuel requirements also give regulators something to 
“sell” in the political marketplace.  As the fuel mandates 
become increasingly complex, and are largely buried in the 
details of poorly indexed and massive SIPs,665 it seems likely 
that they will evolve toward specifications designed to take 
account of the capacities of incumbent refineries in particular 
markets purely through technical dialogues between regulators 
and refineries.  Political pressures can accelerate this trend; 
recall how quickly the energy regulations on price mutated in 
the 1970s.666  As gasoline formulation requirements proliferate 
and become more complex, they can hardly avoid the political 
imperatives to evolve in a similar way. 
Refiners and automobile manufacturers share some, but 
not all, interests.  Both have an enormous investment in the 
future of internal combustion engine-powered automobiles.  
Auto makers and gasoline refiners have long recognized this 
interdependency and have, on a number of occasions, 
  
 665 See Morriss, supra note 638 (discussing SIP’s massive size and complexity). 
 666 LANE, supra note 299, at 55-56 (“The FEA and DOE amended the 
regulations through formal rulemaking over 200 times in the seven years following 
their formal promulgation in January 1974, and many of these changes were complex, 
multi-part amendments. . . . In addition to the regulations themselves, the various 
administrators of the regulations issued dozens of formal rulings on such complex 
matters as the definition of ‘property’ and the ‘refiner price formula.’  Furthermore, the 
Office of General Counsel provided over 2,800 formal interpretations of the rules to 
various individual firms.  Finally, some 1,600 final decisions regarding exceptions, 
appeals, and other petitions for special relief or redress were issued by DOE’s Office of 
Hearings and Appeals (OHA) and its predecessor offices.”). 
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attempted cooperative efforts to address emissions.667  Yet each 
prefers that the other incur the costs of environmental 
regulations on auto emissions.668  For example, an analysis of a 
joint oil/auto company emissions control project in Europe 
noted disagreements over the proper allocation of pollution 
control responsibilities, with the oil industry arguing “that if 
they have to make the precise fuels the car industry wants the 
fuel will be so expensive that ‘you will have to buy it in little 
bottles in the pharmacy.’”669  
Of course, government policies have rarely been 
explicitly aimed at causing market fragmentation.  Yet the 
market appears fragmented, with the federal government 
rejecting the conclusion that gasoline markets are national, 
and the FTC looking at transportation costs and refinery 
  
 667 Ford and Mobil formed the Inter-Industry Emission Control Program 
(IIEC) in 1967 in response to pressures to improve air quality.  “The objective of the 
IIEC was to develop a powerplant and emission-control system that not only lowered 
emissions, but also improved fuel economy, vehicle driveability, and vehicle durability.”  
J. ROBERT MONDT, CLEANER CARS: THE HISTORY AND TECHNOLOGY OF EMISSION 
CONTROL SINCE THE 1960S, at 5 (2000).  The project had an initial budget of $7 million 
and a three-year plan.  By 1971, it included thirteen companies, including six oil 
companies and seven car companies (only Ford of the Big Three).  Id. at 45.  A second 
stage began in 1974 and was completed in 1977, spending a total of $32 million during 
the two stages.  Id. at 46. 
[GM] elected not to be a partner in IIEC, preferring to develop emission 
control technologies using its own internal resources, including personnel and 
facilities.  Chrysler also did not join the IIEC program, electing to rely on 
internal resources and considerable support from its supplier base. Concerns 
relating to antitrust laws perhaps were an additional factor in these 
decisions. 
Id. at 47. 
  In 1989, “the auto and oil industries initiated the Auto/Oil Air Quality 
Improvement Research Program (AQIRP) . . . The purpose of AQIRP was to develop 
data on potential improvements in vehicular emissions and air quality that could be 
realized through the use of RFG, various alternative fuels, and the development of 
automotive technology.”  NAS, OZONE-FORMING POTENTIAL, supra note 142, at 110.  
AQIRP involved 3,000+ emissions tests, twenty-six reformulated fuels, two reference 
gasolines, twenty 1989 cars and light-duty trucks, and fourteen older vehicles from 
1983-1985.  Id. at 133. 
 668 A report on negotiations over the final report of the joint oil-auto program 
to develop technological data to inform regulators in the EU illustrates the tradeoffs 
between emissions controls based on fuel changes and those based on engine changes: 
[T]ensions arose between the two industries who were fighting hard to get 
the most results favorable for their industry. It often was a win-lose situation 
where improvements for the auto industry meant a loss for the oil industry 
and vice-versa. . . . [The discussions] was also described as “physically, 
mentally and morally very hard” and the competition between the two 
industries was compared to European warfare. 
TAMINIAU, supra note 38, at 217. 
 669 Id. at 202 (footnotes omitted). 
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capacity for specific blends as factors in defining regional 
markets.670  A partial explanation may lie in the opportunity for 
a “bootleggers and Baptists” coalition inherent in the 
environmental regulatory scheme.  As economist Bruce Yandle 
explained in formulating the theory, a “bootleggers and 
Baptists” coalition is analogous to the combination of interests 
supporting laws barring alcohol sales on Sunday.671  
Bootleggers support such laws because they restrict 
competition from legal sellers of alcohol.  Baptists support the 
laws because of their general opposition to alcohol sales.  While 
the bootleggers and Baptists disagree over the appropriate 
policy concerning many aspects of alcohol—Baptists would be 
more likely to support harsh penalties for bootlegging, for 
example, while bootleggers would not—their interests overlap 
with respect to Sunday liquor laws.  Not only is their coalition 
larger than either group individually, but the Baptists provide 
a crucial legitimate rationale for the laws benefiting the 
bootleggers.  
In the case of gasoline markets, the “bootleggers” are 
the stationary sources and automobile manufacturers, while 
the “Baptists” are the environmentalists, whose faith672 
includes a creed that largely rejects the power of market 
incentives to improve environmental quality without detailed 
government regulations.  Both auto makers and stationary 
sources have a strong interest in seeing air quality 
improvements “purchased” through regulations on someone 
else.673  Thus, shifting the cost of controlling emissions to 
drivers and refiners appeals to both groups.  Doing so directly, 
however, has the potential to provoke a political response, 
while regulating fuel content in a manner that conceals the 
cost to the public through “clean fuel” mandates is less likely to 
draw opposition.674  Although refiners currently bear the brunt 
  
 670 FTC, MERGERS, supra note 5, at 23-24. 
 671 See Bruce Yandle, Bootleggers and Baptists: The Education of a Regulatory 
Economist, REGULATION, May/June 1983, at 12, 13.  
 672 See Robert Nelson, Environmental Religion: A Theological Critique, 55 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 51 (2004) (describing environmentalism’s similarities to more 
traditional religions). 
 673 One example is the automobile industry’s effort to reduce fuel volatility.  
See NPC, ADEQUACY, supra note 59, at 93 (“There is disagreement between the 
automobile and oil companies about the vehicle performance benefits of lower DI 
gasoline.”). 
 674 See, e.g., id. at 37 (“[S]ome costs [of fuel regulations] may not be apparent 
to consumers.  Examples include the fuel economy loss from oxygenate addition to 
gasoline and the shareholder value lost from low capital returns to the industry.”). 
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of the costs imposed through fuel regulations, their reward is a 
regulatory “fence” around the industry that prevents new 
entry, allowing them to pass along the costs of the massive 
investments necessary to meet the new fuel specifications.675   
III. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
While the specifics of the fragmented gasoline markets 
described above rest on a regulatory history unique to the 
United States, other countries are following the U.S. lead in 
modifying fuel composition for environmental reasons.676  And 
to be sure, most industrialized nations have had distorted 
energy markets since World War II, with each choosing to warp 
its markets in its own fashion, making the problem of negative 
regulatory externalities a general one.  Indeed, the tempest 
currently brewing in gasoline markets threatens to worsen as 
five related regulatory and market conditions loom along the 
horizon: 
(1) Refineries are becoming more complex and costly as refining 
technology evolves to meet the combined demands of regulators and 
modern engines. 
(2) The number of refineries is declining, even as their individual 
capacity increases, due, in part, to the increasing complexity and 
cost of refining technology.  As a result, gasoline supplies are 
vulnerable to unplanned outages at refineries. 
(3) The pipeline interconnections between refineries and markets are 
insufficient to support a national market. 
(4) Boutique fuel requirements prevent gasoline blended for one 
location from being sold in other locations. 
(5) Reduced inventories leave little slack in the system for 
unplanned refining shutdowns. 
The confluence of these conditions leaves the gasoline market 
vulnerable to hurricanes, accidents, crude supply interruptions, 
terrorists, and dictators.677  These vulnerabilities, in turn, 
jeopardize market stability, threatening consumers with price 
  
 675 This seems particularly likely in light of the EPA’s unsuccessful attempt to 
build a fence around the U.S. market through its foreign refiners’ rule. 
 676 A. Cluer, Gasoline Processes, in 2 MODERN PETROLEUM TECHNOLOGY, 
supra note 37, at 83, 85. 
 677 Andy Webb-Vidal, US Is ‘Not Ready’ for Chávez Oil Ban Threat, FIN. TIMES 
(London), June 14, 2006 (reporting unreleased Government Accountability Office 
report highlighting U.S. vulnerability to oil pressure from Venezuela). 
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hikes and fuel shortages.  Lest we overstate our case, this is 
not a doomsday scenario, but merely recognition of the 
compounded problems confronting the nation’s gasoline 
markets.   
As we have discussed, these problems have long, 
complicated histories.  Recall that much of America’s energy 
policy flows from its own blend of political, industrial, and 
regulatory interests.  The Arab oil embargo in the early 1970s 
combined with the advance of environmentalism and helped 
undermine industry efforts to develop new technologies or 
build new refineries.  As regulators convinced the industry and 
environmental advocates that market barriers best served the 
country’s economic and ecological interests, the economic 
regulatory schemes became politically entrenched, despite their 
subsequent failure.  These then exacerbated the burden of 
increasingly stringent environmental regulations adopted 
through the 1980s and 1990s.   
Gasoline formula regulation is, we have argued, an 
artifact of both the structure of the Clean Air Act and the long 
history of gasoline regulation.  The regulations fragmented the 
market and effectively de-commodified gasoline.  Fuel 
composition regulations can also reduce gasoline supply by 
making it uneconomical to convert portions of a barrel of crude 
into gasoline.678  Mandating fuel blends ignores the fact that 
most mobile-source emissions come from a fraction of the total 
vehicle pool.679  But altering fuels affects all vehicles, and it 
remains an open question whether doing so is a cost-effective 
way to address a problem primarily caused by a small minority 
of vehicles.  Consider as well that customizing petroleum 
blends is also a way for refiners to distinguish their products.  
Some refiners are already trying to distinguish their gasolines 
on the basis of environmental quality.680  To the extent that 
  
 678 See NPC, ADEQUACY, supra note 59, at 99 (“For a 50ºF DI reduction, 10 to 
15% of the heavier gasoline molecules must be removed and either cracked to lighter 
molecules or replaced. . . . [T]he NPC believes that, in general, refiners would tend to 
remove the heavy molecules from the gasoline pool and seek other outlets for these 
molecules, such as to distillate or export . . . [and cause] a gasoline volume loss of as 
much as 10-15%.”). 
 679 Calvert, Heywood, Sawyer & Seinfeld, supra note 133, at 40. 
 680 Jones, supra note 116, at xxi (“Where companies have sought to 
distinguish the quality of their fuels in recent years it has . . . [been] more usually on 
the basis of environmental quality.”). 
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market fragmentation restricts such competition, it potentially 
forestalls market forces that promote environmental quality.681 
Having acknowledged such problems and traced their 
heritage, policy makers should begin to consider ways to 
mitigate future disruption and damage.  One lesson from the 
tortured history of gasoline regulation is that sending 
regulators home might be the simplest way to avoid further 
problems.  But there are lessons as well for those unwilling to 
rely on markets alone.  In the most general terms, of course, 
the gasoline market must slowly be defragmented as 
consumers, producers, and policy makers treat gasoline as a 
true commodity in need of a deep and broad market.  To 
accomplish this, we do not advocate installing another layer of 
top-down federal agency micromanagement.  Although we 
recognize the entrenched political interests involved, the 
problem need not have only a governmental solution; the 
government’s abysmal record in anticipating fuel trends 
counsels against relying on central planning solutions.682  
Furthermore, the dangers of federally mandated technical 
specifications are apparent from the record.  By creating 
incentives to shift pollution reductions to fuel specifications at 
the time when the refining industry became most susceptible to 
market fragmentation, Congress and the EPA have vastly 
complicated the gasoline market.  If Congress had instead 
focused on creating incentives for emissions reductions, rather 
than specifying technologies, gasoline refiners and auto 
manufacturers would have been drawn to work together to 
develop methods of capturing those incentives.  
Rather than focus on new federal solutions, the gasoline 
market’s regulatory schemes should be streamlined to 
minimize their arcane complexity, and harmonized with 
consistent, long-term policy agendas to limit regulators and 
market forces working at cross-purposes.  In light of the five 
regulatory and market conditions listed above, we recommend 
removing barriers to expanding and diversifying refinery 
capacity and making clean fuels more desirable to producers 
  
 681 See 2 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 1264-68 (discussing anti-environmental 
impacts of environmental regulation).  
 682 Petroleum demand forecasting in particular is remarkably imperfect.  Both 
OPEC and the International Energy Agency failed to foresee the rate at which world 
demand for oil grew in 2004, for example, estimating a 1.5% increase in demand when 
actual demand grew by 3.3%, more than twice forecasts.  FTC, GASOLINE PRICE 
CHANGES, supra note 9, at 26. 
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and consumers alike.683  For example, there are moves to 
standardize elements of refinery design by reducing costs 
through the use of off-the-shelf components rather than custom 
ones.684  Fragmenting the market for gasoline reduces the 
opportunities for such standardization.  Regulators could “fast 
track” approval of designs based on such components, 
encouraging the trend.685   
Encouraging investment that deepens the market can 
also help.  Valero, a major U.S. refiner, made significant 
investments in the ability to process lower-quality “sour” 
crudes in recent years, investments that paid off by allowing 
Valero to buy cheaper crude.686  More refiners might be 
following Valero’s path but for the expense of regulatory 
compliance.  Unfortunately, fuel regulation and political 
interests have diverted investment away from technology that 
could improve environmental quality and funneled it into 
technology like ethanol and MTBE, whose environmental 
virtues are dubious at best.687  Not only is such investment a 
waste, but continuing such regulatory diversions threatens the 
overall market.  An important step would be to eliminate the 
ethanol mandate and replace it with a performance standard.  
Similarly, adopting a strategy similar to that used in the lead 
phaseout for sulfur reductions, rather than imposing a uniform 
sulfur standard in a short period as the EPA has done, could 
spur both technological developments to reduce sulfur and 
increase refining capacity by allowing refineries to adapt more 
economically to the requirements.688 
  
 683 The best incentive is to remove the disincentives and to allow market 
processes to work.  Politically, of course, a laissez faire approach to energy issues seems 
unlikely.  The most we can realistically hope for is a set of policies that do relatively 
little harm. 
 684 Jones, supra note 116, at xx. 
 685 The permitting process takes significant time.  See, e.g., NPC, ADEQUACY, 
supra note 59, at 134 (noting six to eighteen months necessary for permit applications 
and state agency review); id. at 136-40 (describing overall process times). 
 686 Valero Energy Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 6-15 (Mar. 14, 2005), 
available at http://eol.edgar-online.com/edgar_conv_html/2005/03/14/0000950134-05-
004779.html. 
 687 Agencies tend not to recognize the opportunity cost of compliance.  For 
example, one FTC report concluded that the additional costs of producing boutique 
fuels “made the countervailing cost savings that refineries found through technological 
and other advances even more important in keeping the price of gasoline relatively low 
during the 1990s.”  FTC, GASOLINE PRICE CHANGES, supra note 9, at 58.  This ignores 
the fact that these savings are not the result of the regulation and thus would have 
been implemented regardless of the increased costs. Such savings thus are not 
“countervailing,” but merely fortuitous. 
 688 See NPC, ADEQUACY, supra note 59, at 27. 
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Finally, deregulatory and market-based steps should be 
taken to allow investors to build and expand refineries and 
pipelines.  Recent damage from Gulf Coast hurricanes should 
prompt the industry and regulators to consider the strengths 
and weaknesses of the fuel-transportation infrastructure, with 
an emphasis on new and secure methods of transport designed 
to withstand multiple emergency refinery closings.  The EPA’s 
shift away from allowing refineries to trade off pollution 
increases from expansions against offsetting reductions from 
the same plant and the New Source Review litigation689 against 
refiners slow increases in capacity through expansion of 
existing refineries’ capacity.690  Refiners have identified interest 
groups’ court challenges to permits as a significant barrier to 
expansion of refinery capacity691 and such challenges could 
certainly be resolved more quickly.  Likewise, more attention 
needs to be paid to the rigidity of boutique fuel requirements 
that prevent blends in one city from being moved to another 
during a crisis.  Doubt remains as to whether all of the touted 
gains from boutique fuels are even realized.  Removing 
pollutants like lead and sulfur from the fuel supply provides 
net environmental benefits, assuming the octane enhancers 
that replaced lead are not later found to cause even worse 
problems.  But with respect to the volatility and other more 
recent specifications met by altering the blendstocks used to 
formulate particular gasoline blends, the gains are offset by 
emissions from the substitute uses of the displaced 
blendstocks.  Although the EPA attempted to prevent 
“dumping” of high-volatility blendstocks and refiners can alter 
the mix of hydrocarbons produced in refineries to some degree, 
there remains an empirical question about whether these 
changes improved environmental quality.   
Empirical questions can often be answered, if anyone 
cares to spend the time and money on research to do so.  There 
have been some efforts at such research.  Concerns over 
regulation prompted many firms in the auto and refining 
industries to join together to examine the technical details of 
the fuel-engine interaction and its impact on emissions.  
Fourteen oil companies, together with the “Big Three” U.S. 
auto makers, formed the Auto/Oil Air Quality Improvement 
  
 689 See, e.g., id. at 140-41 (discussing NSR issues). 
 690 Id. at 27. 
 691 Id. at 118 (discussing impact of environmental justice litigation). 
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Research Program (AQIRP) in 1989 “to develop data on 
fuel/vehicle systems” to study emissions, with modeling focused 
on ozone and economic analysis of alternatives.692  The 
participants ultimately spent $40 million on the program.693  
The AQIRP research produced data suggesting that the impact 
of gasolines’ composition varied considerably across vehicle 
types and ages.694  It also showed that at least some changes 
traded decreases in one pollutant for increases in another,695 
while others had unambiguously positive impacts on 
emissions.696  Encouraging such research through clear 
restrictions on antitrust actions could vastly expand our 
knowledge of how fuel composition affects the environment.  
More speculatively, one wonders what might happen if 
U.S. gasoline markets were not fragmented.  There are clear 
relationships between fuel properties and engine emissions (as 
well as between fuel properties and other aspects of engine 
performance).  In the absence of gasoline composition 
regulation, how might these be addressed?  A hint of this 
alternative future lies in the ASTM fuel specification (D4814) 
created in 1988 and modified in 1994 by the private standards 
organization.  This specification includes multiple classes of 
fuels.697  The trend in the United States is away from using it 
  
 692 MONDT, supra note 667, at 199; Blackmore, supra note 92, at 247 (“The 
project aimed to develop data to help regulators meet the US goals for cleaner air, and 
was the largest and most comprehensive of the type ever undertaken. . . . [T]he 
project . . . embraced not only vehicle fuel-emission measurements but also air-quality 
modeling and economic analysis.”).  The program involved Chrysler, Ford, and GM plus 
Amoco, Arco, Ashland, BP, Chevron, Conoco, Exxon, Marathon, Mobil, Phillips, Shell, 
Sun, Texaco, and Unocal.  PEARSON, supra note 132, at 83.  This cooperation was 
motivated in part by fear that alternative fuels (e.g., methanol) would be mandated 
based on their perception as “clean” fuels.  “Automobile and oil companies, traditionally 
uncomfortable partners, joined forces in order to quantify the possible improvements in 
emissions due to changes in conventional fuel composition.”  Id. at 82. 
 693 PEARSON, supra note 132, at 85. 
 694 Id. at 87 (“Reduction of gasoline aromatics content from 45% to 20% 
produced the interesting result of hydrocarbon emissions being reduced by some 6% for 
current vehicles and increased by 14% for older vehicles. . . . Nitrogen oxides were 
reduced by 11% in older vehicles, yet there was no significant effect in current 
vehicles.”). 
 695 Id. at 88 (“Reducing gasoline olefin content from 20% to 6% increased 
hydrocarbons by 6% and decreased nitrogen oxides by 6% for both current and older 
fleets.”). 
 696 Id. (“Reducing sulfur . . . from 450 ppm to 50 ppm reduced all pollutants in 
current fleets substantially by improving the efficiency of the catalytic converters.  
Hydrocarbon emissions were reduced by 18%, carbon monoxide by 19%, and nitrogen 
oxides by 8%.  Air toxics were reduced by 10%.”). 
 697 Blackmore, supra note 92, at 246 (six vapor-pressure classes and five 
vapor-lock classes). 
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due to Clean Air Act fuel requirements, but the reliance on a 
private standards organization is an alternative path for 
resolving the conflict between the gasoline refiners and auto 
manufacturers over responsibility for emissions reductions.698  
Market-based measures also have the potential to produce 
innovative contractual measures that improve air quality.  
Creative contracting is important, both for consumers of fuels 
such as trucking companies and airlines, and for refiners 
seeking stable, long-term supplies of crude.699  Thus, given the 
dangers of a highly fragmented boutique gasoline market with 
depleted refinery capacity and low inventories, market-driven 
incentives should be developed to ameliorate future risks and 
economic disasters.  In the meantime, burdensome economic 
and environmental regulatory entanglements should be 
loosened to spark innovation.  To borrow a line from country 
singer Terri Clark, “Let ’em go ’cause I don’t need no strings; 
just give me a road and a little gasoline.”700 
  
 698 See Morriss & Dudley, supra note 314, at 355-56 (discussing potential roles 
of private standards-setting organizations). 
 699 See, e.g., FTC, GASOLINE PRICE CHANGES, supra note 9, at 30 (describing 
importance of futures contracts as hedges against price increases and for refiners’ 
planning). 
 700 TERRI CLARK, A Little Gasoline, on FEARLESS (Mercury Nashville 2000). 
